Aadhaar’s Creeping Mandate: Are Government Services Defying Supreme Court’s Puttaswamy Ruling?

New Delhi – Six years after the Supreme Court of India delivered its landmark verdict in Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (“Puttaswamy II”), decisively settling the limits of the Aadhaar project, a wave of new governmental applications is reigniting a critical legal debate. An extensive review of recently approved use-cases reveals a sprawling expansion of Aadhaar authentication across dozens of central and state government services, raising profound questions about whether administrative convenience is quietly eroding a constitutionally protected right to privacy.

The 2018 judgment, while upholding the Aadhaar Act’s constitutionality, drew a clear line in the sand: Aadhaar could only be mandated for accessing benefits paid from the Consolidated Fund of India and for the filing of income tax returns. For all other purposes, its use was to be voluntary. Yet, as legal expert Shashi Shekhar Misra notes, Aadhaar’s position has "remained turbulent - mostly by practice and sometimes by law." This turbulence is now manifesting as a systemic integration of Aadhaar into the very fabric of citizen-state interaction, from securing railway recruitment to verifying fishermens' identities at sea, often blurring the line between voluntary and coercive.

The Proliferation of 'Good Governance' Use-Cases

An analysis of government-approved use-cases, valid until 2025, showcases the sheer scale of this integration under the banner of "good governance." Central ministries and state governments from West Bengal to Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan are rolling out Aadhaar-based authentication for a startlingly diverse array of functions:

• Workforce Management: The West Bengal government is implementing an "Aadhaar Based Attendance System (ABAS)" to "eliminate Proxy Attendance" among its workforce, citing the need for transparency and accountability.
• Recruitment and Examinations: The Ministry of Railways proposes using Aadhaar authentication on a "voluntary basis" to prevent impersonation in its recruitment cycle. Similarly, the Department of Higher Education aims to use it in computer-based tests to "debar proxy candidates."
• Service Delivery: Andhra Pradesh will use Aadhaar authentication for issuing certificates, licenses, and permits. Tamil Nadu is integrating it into its single sign-on platform for accessing government applications, and Rajasthan requires it for environmental clearance applications.
• Beneficiary Identification: The Department of Sports will use Aadhaar to verify athletes for disbursing scholarships under schemes like Khelo India, while the Department of Fisheries will use it to generate digital ID cards for marine fishers.

These initiatives are often justified using the language of efficiency and integrity. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, for instance, seeks to replace "laborious, time-consuming, and prone to errors" manual verification of contract workers with Aadhaar OTP authentication. This narrative of seamless, transparent, and fraud-free governance is powered by the Aadhaar Authentication for Good Governance (Social Welfare, Innovation, Knowledge) Rules, 2020, which enables government entities to request Aadhaar authentication for specified purposes in the interest of "good governance."

The Puttaswamy II Precedent: A Fading Landmark?

The central legal conflict arises from the apparent divergence between this administrative push and the principles laid down in Puttaswamy II . The Supreme Court meticulously applied the proportionality test to balance the state’s objectives against the individual's right to privacy. It concluded that mandatory Aadhaar linkage for services like bank accounts, mobile phones, and school admissions was unconstitutional and disproportionate. The Court’s core reasoning was that a person could not be denied a service or a right for refusing to part with their biometric identity, unless the state’s interest was backed by law and met the stringent test of necessity and proportionality.

The current expansion challenges this delicate balance. While many of the new use-cases are officially termed "voluntary," legal analysts and privacy advocates argue that this distinction is often illusory. When Aadhaar becomes the default, most efficient, or sometimes the only practical method to access a service, its use becomes de facto mandatory. This creates a system of exclusion where citizens who are unable or unwilling to use Aadhaar—due to privacy concerns, lack of a registered mobile number for OTPs, or biometric authentication failures—are significantly disadvantaged.

The risk, as articulated by Misra, lies in making "a hotbed of personal data (such as photograph, biometrics, name, address, date of birth) – a mandatory KYC document for any identification purpose that is not backed by Puttaswamy II." Each new linkage amplifies the potential for surveillance and data breaches. Creating centralized databases of migrant workers (Bihar), students (Tamil Nadu), or farmers (Assam) linked to a single, unique identifier risks creating a panopticon that the Supreme Court explicitly sought to prevent.

From Identity Verification to Data Ecosystem

A closer examination of the approved use-cases reveals a functional creep beyond simple identity verification. Many applications leverage Aadhaar not just to confirm who a person is, but to build comprehensive digital ecosystems.

For example, Tamil Nadu’s proposal for its higher education department states that "Aadhaar seeding and biometric validation will verify the identities of students, parents, faculty, and staff, enabling secure admissions, attendance tracking, examination processing, and affiliation workflows." Another Tamil Nadu initiative, the "SFDB Platform," allows citizens to log in via Aadhaar OTP to view their demographic data alongside availed government schemes and "probable Eligible schemes." This moves Aadhaar from being a proof of identity to a foundational layer for a cradle-to-grave data infrastructure, tracking an individual's engagement with the state across multiple domains.

This trend is legally significant because it transforms Aadhaar into an indispensable key to economic and social participation, a scenario the Supreme Court cautioned against. By making it the primary tool for everything from a student's examination process to a street vendor's license renewal in Chandigarh, the state risks creating a society where the inability to authenticate via Aadhaar results in civil death.

The Legal Road Ahead

The ongoing expansion of Aadhaar necessitates urgent judicial and legislative scrutiny. The key legal questions that emerge are:

1. The Test of Voluntariness: Is the "voluntary" basis cited in many applications genuinely optional, or does it impose an unreasonable burden on those who opt out? Courts may need to define clearer parameters for what constitutes truly voluntary consent in the context of essential services.
2. Proportionality of New Mandates: Do these new use-cases, even if backed by the Good Governance Rules, satisfy the proportionality test established in Puttaswamy ? Is mandating Aadhaar for attendance or recruitment a necessary and least intrusive measure to achieve the stated administrative goals?
3. The Scope of the Good Governance Rules: Can delegated legislation like the 2020 Rules authorize an expansion of Aadhaar that bypasses the constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court? This raises fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the sanctity of judicial precedent.

As government bodies continue to find new and innovative uses for Aadhaar, the legal community must remain vigilant. The promise of "good governance" cannot become a pretext for constructing a surveillance architecture that infringes upon the fundamental right to privacy. The principles of Puttaswamy were not meant to be a historical footnote but a guiding framework for balancing state interests with individual liberty in the digital age. The current trajectory suggests this balance is at risk of being irrevocably tilted.