Advocate General's Refusal to Grant Consent for Criminal Contempt Proceedings Under S.15(1)(b) is Not Justiciable: Kerala High Court - 2025-08-14

AG's Refusal to Sanction Contempt Proceedings Not Reviewable by Court: Kerala HC

Ernakulam: The Kerala High Court, in a significant ruling, has held that an order by the Advocate General refusing to grant consent for initiating criminal contempt proceedings under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is not justiciable. Justice C.S. Dias, while dismissing a writ petition, clarified that while the court cannot review the AG's decision, its power to take up contempt matters suo motu remains unfettered.

Background of the Case

The case originated from a family dispute. The petitioner, N. Prakash, had filed an earlier writ petition (W.P.(C) No.19869 of 2024) against his sister-in-law, R. Ashakumari, alleging she had fraudulently obtained a ration card. In that proceeding, he claimed Ms. Ashakumari submitted a counter-affidavit containing false statements to mislead the court.

Believing this act constituted criminal contempt, Mr. Prakash sought the Advocate General's consent to initiate proceedings against her, as mandated by Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act. However, the Advocate General rejected his application. Mr. Prakash then filed the present writ petition (W.P.(C) No.2407 of 2025), challenging the legality of the Advocate General's refusal.

Arguments Presented

• Petitioner's Contention: Appearing as a party-in-person, Mr. Prakash argued that the Advocate General's order was passed without proper application of mind and that such an administrative decision was subject to judicial review, citing precedents from the Karnataka High Court.

• State's Contention: The Special Government Pleader, representing the Advocate General's office, countered that the writ petition was not maintainable. He argued that the AG's role in granting or refusing consent is administrative and serves as a filter to prevent frivolous litigation. The refusal, he submitted, is not justiciable and does not prevent the High Court from taking suo motu cognizance of contempt. The State relied on Supreme Court judgments, including P.N. Duda v. P.Shiv Shanker .

Court's Analysis and Reliance on Precedent

Justice C.S. Dias undertook a detailed examination of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which outlines the procedure for taking cognizance of criminal contempt. The court noted the divergent views of the Supreme Court in the P.N. Duda case regarding the justiciability of the Attorney General's consent.

However, the High Court found its answer in a binding Division Bench judgment of its own in Joseph Kuzhijalil v. Joseph Pulikunnel (1999) . The court quoted a key passage from this precedent:

“The refusal of consent by the Advocate General cannot be said to be justiciable... when an Advocate General refuses sanction for moving the Court under S. 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, no right of a party could be said to have been impaired.”

The court further highlighted that the purpose of requiring the AG's consent is to "safeguard the valuable time of the High Court and the Supreme Court being wasted by frivolous complaints."

The Final Verdict

Based on the emphatic declaration of law in the Joseph Kuzhijalil case, the High Court concluded that the writ petition challenging the Advocate General's refusal was bound to fail.

Dismissing the petition, Justice Dias observed:

“In the light of the emphatic proclamation of the law in Joseph Kuzhijalil’s case, an order declining sanction by the learned Advocate General under Section 15 (1) (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is not justiciable. Therefore, the writ petition has to necessarily fail.”

The court, however, clarified that its decision does not prevent the petitioner from pursuing other remedies, such as his application to initiate proceedings for perjury under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. More importantly, the judgment reiterated that the High Court’s inherent power to initiate criminal contempt proceedings on its own motion remains unaffected by the Advocate General’s decision.