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Bars Article 226 Challenges to Criminal Court Orders, Echoing Supreme Court Directive
In a ruling that reinforces boundaries on High Court powers, the at its Lucknow Bench dismissed a writ petition seeking to quash orders from a criminal magistrate. Justice Subhash Vidyarthi held the petition under unmaintainable, directing the petitioner to invoke Article 227 instead. This decision, rooted in the Supreme Court's recent Neeta Singh v. State of U.P. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761), underscores that judicial orders—even from criminal courts—are off-limits for Article 226 review.
The case stems from Criminal Case No. 3894 of 1999 ( ), where the petitioner targeted orders dated , and , issued by the .
Roots in a Quarter-Century-Old Case
The saga began over two decades ago in a criminal matter involving Sahdev Singh and others. Fast-forward to late 2025: the magistrate passed an order on December 12, prompting the petitioner's bid to nullify it via writ. A follow-up order in February 2026 escalated the challenge. Filed under Article 226, the petition invoked the High Court's writ jurisdiction to issue against what the petitioner deemed jurisdictional overreach by the lower court.
This wasn't just procedural jockeying; it spotlighted a core constitutional tension: when can High Courts step in via extraordinary writs versus supervisory oversight?
Petitioner's Jurisdictional Gambit
, aided by
, argued fiercely for Article 226. They leaned on
Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath
((2015) 5 SCC 423), quoting a passage from the 1954 case
T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa
(AIR 1954 SC 440). The key excerpt:
"
may lie... when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction."
Tripathi contended the magistrate's orders lacked jurisdiction, making under Article 226 apt. The argument framed the dispute as a fundamental jurisdictional flaw, not mere error.
State's Preemptive Strike with Fresh Supreme Court Ink
Opposing counsel, , fired the first salvo with a preliminary objection. Citing Neeta Singh (supra), he asserted judicial orders from criminal courts—like civil ones—cannot be assailed under Article 226. Only appeals, revisions, or Article 227 petitions suffice. This aligned with news reports highlighting the ruling's sweep: High Courts are "disabled" from Article 226 scrutiny of such orders.
Decoding the Constitutional Divide
Justice Vidyarthi dissected the precedents meticulously. He clarified that Radhey Shyam referenced but did not approve the Basappa passage. Instead, it affirmed: judicial orders of civil courts evade Article 226 , with Article 227's standing apart.
Neeta Singh
extended this to criminal courts explicitly:
"If a judicial order passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226...
, a judicial order passed by a criminal court cannot also be challenged."
The logic? Judicial orders don't typically breach fundamental or statutory rights warranting
; statutory remedies exist.
This wasn't a merits dive—the petition fell at admission for want of jurisdiction.
Key Observations from the Bench
Justice Vidyarthi's order distilled the shift:
"The legal position has been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court... High Courts stand disabled from entertaining a writ petition seeking issuance ofand thereby examining the validity of a judicial order under Article 226."
On the remedy:
"The petitioner shall have liberty to file a fresh petition underof India."
These quotes, as echoed in legal media coverage, signal a post- Neeta Singh era of stricter writ discipline.
Door Closed, But Not Locked: Path Forward
The writ stands dismissed as not maintainable, with certified copies returned post-photocopy retention. Practically, this funnels challenges to Article 227's narrower supervisory lens—no re-litigating merits via writ.
For litigants eyeing criminal court orders, the message is clear: skip Article 226; head to revision, appeal, or Article 227. This could streamline dockets but curb perceived overreach, shaping High Court interventions in criminal justice.
