Allahabad High Court Bars Default Dismissal of Criminal Appeals

Introduction

In a pivotal decision underscoring the imperatives of procedural fairness in criminal jurisprudence, the Allahabad High Court has ruled that appellate courts cannot dismiss criminal appeals merely due to the non-appearance or default of the appellant's counsel. Instead, such courts are obligated under Section 425 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, to appoint an amicus curiae and proceed to adjudicate the matter on its substantive merits. This ruling came in Criminal Revision No. 8411 of 2025, decided on January 8, 2026, by a single bench comprising Justice Abdul Shahid.

The case at hand involved Sanjay Yadav, the revisionist, who had been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for a cheque bounce offense—a common commercial dispute in India involving dishonored payments. Yadav's timely appeal against the conviction was dismissed in default by the Sessions Court, Gorakhpur, prompting a chain of legal proceedings that ultimately reached the High Court. The opposite parties included the State of Uttar Pradesh and complainant Mithilesh Narayan Pandey. This judgment not only restores Yadav's appeal but also serves as a binding reminder to lower courts to prioritize justice over technical lapses, potentially impacting thousands of similar criminal appeals annually. By invoking Supreme Court precedents, the High Court emphasized that such dismissals are void ab initio, reinforcing the constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 21.

Case Background

The origins of this dispute trace back to a complaint filed in 2020 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by Mithilesh Narayan Pandey against Sanjay Yadav at Police Station Sahjanwa, District Gorakhpur. Section 138 addresses the criminal liability for dishonor of cheques, often arising in business transactions where payments fail due to insufficient funds or other reasons. On May 20, 2022, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ist, Gorakhpur, convicted Yadav and sentenced him, finding him guilty of issuing a cheque that bounced.

Aggrieved by this verdict, Yadav, who was in custody at the time, promptly filed a statutory criminal appeal—Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022—before the Sessions Court, Gorakhpur, well within the prescribed limitation period. This appeal, titled Sanjay Yadav versus Mithilesh Narayan Pandey , represented Yadav's substantive right to challenge the conviction on merits, a cornerstone of criminal procedure.

However, on October 26, 2023, the appeal was dismissed in default solely due to the absence of Yadav's counsel on that date. No steps were taken by the court to appoint alternative representation or proceed further. This dismissal triggered further complications. Nearly eight months later, on August 31, 2024, Yadav filed a second criminal appeal, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay and restoration of the original appeal. This application was heard by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Gorakhpur, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 587 of 2024.

On September 17, 2025, the Special Judge rejected the application, upholding the default dismissal and refusing condonation. Undeterred, Yadav approached the Allahabad High Court via the present criminal revision petition, arguing procedural irregularities and seeking to revive his original appeal. The timeline—from the 2020 complaint to the 2026 High Court decision—highlights the protracted nature of such disputes, particularly in cheque bounce cases, which constitute a significant portion of India's criminal docket, with over 20 lakh cases pending as per recent National Judicial Data Grid reports.

The parties' relationship was adversarial: Pandey, the complainant and presumed creditor, initiated proceedings after the cheque dishonor, while Yadav, the accused, denied liability or raised defenses typical in NI Act matters, such as the cheque's purpose or repayment claims. The core legal questions before the High Court were: Whether a criminal appeal can be summarily dismissed for counsel's default, the validity of requiring a second appeal post-default, and the obligations of appellate courts under the new BNSS regime.

Arguments Presented

The revision petition by Sanjay Yadav, represented by counsels Kunwar Abhishek Singh and Suresh Pratap Singh, centered on the illegality of the default dismissal. Yadav contended that his first appeal was filed within the limitation period while he was incarcerated, underscoring his inability to personally monitor proceedings. He argued that the Sessions Court's order of October 26, 2023, violated fundamental procedural norms, as no opportunity for hearing was provided, and the dismissal was based solely on his counsel's non-appearance—a circumstance beyond his control.

Further, Yadav's counsel emphasized that filing a second appeal was necessitated by the erroneous dismissal but was superfluous, as the original appeal remained valid and pending. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was presented as a precautionary measure to cure any perceived delay, with explanations attributing the eight-month gap to custodial constraints and lack of legal aid. They invoked the principle that criminal appeals embody a constitutional right to appeal convictions, which cannot be thwarted by technical defaults. No fresh evidence was introduced; the focus was on restoring the status quo ante.

On the opposite side, the State of Uttar Pradesh, represented by the learned Assistant Government Advocate (A.G.A.), was heard but did not mount a robust opposition in the records. As per the judgment, the State did not contest the core procedural lapse, and the proceedings were largely unopposed. The complainant, Mithilesh Narayan Pandey, did not actively participate in the revision, though his interests aligned with upholding the conviction. The Special Judge's rejection order had relied on the finality of the default dismissal and deemed the delay unexplained, arguing that fresh appeals must strictly adhere to limitation without leniency for procedural errors.

Key factual points raised by Yadav included his continuous custody post-conviction, which impeded communication with counsel, and the absence of any frivolous intent in the appeal. Legally, the revisionist highlighted the mismatch between the dismissal and statutory safeguards, urging the High Court to declare the order void and direct merits-based adjudication. This side-stepped merits of the underlying NI Act conviction, focusing instead on appellate process integrity.

Legal Analysis

The Allahabad High Court's reasoning was firmly rooted in statutory interpretation and binding precedents, emphasizing the transition from the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, to the BNSS, 2023, which modernizes but retains core protections for appellants. At the outset, Justice Abdul Shahid quoted Section 425 BNSS in extenso, noting its provisos that prohibit summary dismissal without a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Specifically, proviso (a) mandates hearing the appellant or their advocate before dismissal of appeals under Section 423 BNSS, while proviso (b) extends this to custody appeals under Section 424, barring frivolous cases or disproportionate inconveniences.

The court drew a clear distinction: Unlike civil appeals, where defaults may lead to ex parte decisions, criminal appeals demand heightened scrutiny due to liberty implications. The dismissal here was deemed "contrary to law," as the Sessions Court failed to explore alternatives like appointing an amicus curiae—a neutral assistant to aid the court when the accused lacks representation.

Heavy reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's judgment in K. Muruganandam & Ors. v. State Rep. by the Superintendent of Police (2021) 20 SCC 642. In that case, the apex court clarified that non-representation does not justify dismissal; instead, courts must appoint an amicus to ensure the appeal is heard on merits. This precedent, binding on all High Courts, was directly applied, with the bench quoting: "It is well settled that if the accused does not appear through counsel appointed by him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the case only after appointing an amicus curiae." The relevance is twofold: It addresses systemic issues like counsel absenteeism, common in overburdened lower courts, and upholds the accused's right to a substantive review, preventing convictions from attaining finality through procedural shortcuts.

The analysis extended to the second appeal's futility: Since the original was timely, no fresh filing or limitation condonation was needed. The High Court distinguished this from cases of abandoned appeals, holding that default orders are void ab initio, lacking legal effect from inception. In the context of NI Act proceedings, which often involve self-represented or under-resourced parties, this ruling clarifies that appellate lapses cannot compound trial errors. It aligns with broader principles under Article 21, ensuring life and liberty are not jeopardized by administrative oversights. The BNSS's emphasis on expeditious disposal further underscores the need for proactive judicial intervention, distinguishing valid non-prosecution from mere defaults.

Key Observations

The judgment is replete with incisive observations that encapsulate the court's stance on procedural justice. Key excerpts include:

• On the illegality of default dismissal: "The dismissal of Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022 in default on account of absence of learned counsel for the appellant is contrary to law and is not in consonance with Section 425 of the B.N.S.S. (corresponding to Section 384 Cr.P.C.)." This highlights the statutory bar against such actions.

• Referencing Supreme Court guidance: "It is well settled that if the accused does not appear through counsel appointed by him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the case only after appointing an amicus curiae, but cannot dismiss the appeal merely because of non-representation or default of the advocate for the accused (see Kabira vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Mohd. Sukur Ali vs. State of Assam )." (Quoted from K. Muruganandam , Para 7)

• Declaring the order invalid: "The order dated 26.10.2023 dismissing Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022 in default is absolutely void ab initio." (Para 8) This underscores the nullity of improper dismissals.

• On the validity of the original appeal: "There is no requirement or legal necessity for filing a second criminal appeal. The Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022, which was filed by the revisionist/accused within the prescribed period of limitation, is valid and in consonance with the provisions of law." (Para 9)

• Directing future action: "The learned appellate court is directed to decide the criminal appeal as expeditiously as possible." (Para 10) These observations, attributed to Justice Abdul Shahid, serve as guiding principles for appellate practice.

Court's Decision

The Allahabad High Court allowed the criminal revision petition, delivering a clear and operative final decision. It set aside the Sessions Court's default dismissal order dated October 26, 2023, in Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2022, declaring it void ab initio. Consequently, the Special Judge's rejection order of September 17, 2025, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 587 of 2024—dismissing the condonation application—was also quashed, rendering it legally insignificant.

The original appeal was restored to its file number, with explicit directions to the appellate court (Sessions Court, Gorakhpur) to adjudicate it on merits "as expeditiously as possible." No costs were imposed, and the revision stood disposed of accordingly.

The practical effects are manifold: For Sanjay Yadav, it revives his challenge to the 2022 conviction, potentially leading to acquittal or reduced sentence if merits favor him. Broader implications include a deterrent against hasty default dismissals, compelling courts to maintain amicus panels and schedules. This may alleviate the burden of repetitive filings under the Limitation Act, streamlining proceedings in resource-strapped jurisdictions like Uttar Pradesh.

For future cases, particularly under the NI Act's stringent timelines, this decision mandates robust procedural compliance, reducing the risk of appeals being lost to counsel errors. It could influence similar revisions across High Courts, promoting uniformity post-BNSS. Ultimately, it bolsters the justice system's credibility by ensuring that substantive rights eclipse procedural pitfalls, fostering greater access for indigent or incarcerated appellants.

Broader Implications for Criminal Justice

This ruling extends beyond the instant cheque bounce dispute, signaling a paradigm shift in how criminal appeals are handled under the BNSS framework. Cheque bounce cases, governed by Section 138 NI Act, form a bulwark against financial malpractices but are notorious for procedural complexities—delays in summons, evidence disputes, and appellate backlogs. By prohibiting default dismissals, the High Court addresses a lacuna that previously allowed convictions to solidify without scrutiny, disproportionately affecting defendants from marginalized backgrounds who may lack consistent legal support.

In practice, lawyers must now prioritize communication with clients in custody and prepare contingency plans for amicus involvement. Courts, especially Sessions and Magistrate levels, will need to institutionalize amicus appointments, possibly through rosters or legal aid committees, to avoid reversals like this. The decision aligns with the BNSS's reformative intent, introduced in 2023 to replace the colonial CrPC with citizen-centric provisions, including timelines for disposal (e.g., 60 days for certain appeals).

On a systemic level, it mitigates injustice in high-volume criminal dockets. With over 4 crore cases pending in Indian courts, procedural safeguards like this prevent the "inadvertent" erosion of appeal rights, echoing SC directives in cases like K. Muruganandam . For legal professionals, it underscores the duty to appear or seek adjournments, while empowering judges to act suo motu for fairness. In the long term, such precedents could reduce litigation multiplicity, enhance conviction scrutiny, and uphold Article 21's guarantee of reasoned decisions—vital in an era where digital payments amplify NI Act disputes. This judgment, though from a single bench, holds persuasive value, potentially inspiring guidelines or circulars from higher forums to standardize appellate etiquette.