"Amending the Constitution?": Supreme Court Grapples with Setting Timelines for Bill Assent

New Delhi – The Supreme Court of India finds itself at a constitutional crossroads, tasked with navigating the delicate balance between judicial oversight and executive discretion. A five-judge Constitution Bench is currently hearing a Presidential Reference on one of the most contentious issues in contemporary Indian federalism: whether the judiciary can impose fixed timelines on Governors and the President for assenting to Bills passed by state legislatures. The hearings have sparked a profound debate on the separation of powers, the interpretation of constitutional silences, and the potential for judicial intervention to become a de facto constitutional amendment.

The reference, initiated by President Droupadi Murmu under Article 143(1), was prompted by a two-judge bench ruling in the Tamil Nadu Governor's case, which had suggested a three-month deadline for the President to act on Bills reserved under Article 201. Now, a larger bench, comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha, and A.S. Chandurkar, is dissecting the fundamental question of whether such judicial prescriptions are constitutionally permissible.

The Core Conundrum: Judicial Mandate vs. Constitutional Text

The central tension of the case revolves around Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. These provisions outline the Governor's options when presented with a Bill—grant assent, withhold assent, return it for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President's consideration. The articles stipulate that these actions should be taken "as soon as possible," a phrase that has become the crux of the legal battle.

Representing opposition-ruled states like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, senior advocates Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Kapil Sibal argued that this phrase has proven insufficient. They contended that in the face of "contemporary realities," where Governors allegedly sit on Bills indefinitely, the "pious declaration" of "as soon as possible" has left state legislatures in a "completely remedyless situation."

Singhvi passionately argued that without judicial intervention to stipulate timelines, Governors could effectively exercise a "pocket veto," thereby becoming "an all-pervading super Constitutional authority" and subverting the will of the people. “Unless and until Your Lordships purposely interprets the Constitution in the present context of Article 200 by stipulating timelines, Your Lordship would really be reducing it to a mere formality in expectation of hope,” Singhvi submitted.

However, the Bench expressed significant reservations, repeatedly questioning if setting a "broad brushstroke of a general timeline" would amount to judicial overreach. Justice Vikram Nath articulated this concern most pointedly, stating, “one has to amend the Constitution basically to incorporate all these timelines into the provisions of Articles 200 and 201.” This observation frames the judiciary's dilemma: intervening to provide a remedy could be seen as usurping the legislative power to amend the Constitution.

The Challenge of Enforcement and the "Deemed Assent" Doctrine

The Bench probed the practical consequences of imposing a judicial timeline. "What happens if the timeline is not followed?" Justice Narasimha asked. The most critical question came from the Bench at large: “Can the court haul up the governor or President for contempt if the bills are not passed?”

This query exposed the inherent enforcement problem. The President and Governors enjoy constitutional immunity under Article 361, making contempt proceedings a constitutionally fraught proposition.

In response, Singhvi proposed the doctrine of "deemed assent"—if a Governor or the President fails to act within a court-mandated timeframe, the Bill should be automatically considered passed. He argued this was the "only workable safeguard" to avoid invoking contempt powers.

The Bench, however, met this suggestion with skepticism. Justice Nath warned that the proposal carried “dangerous implications.” He reasoned that Article 200 provides a Governor with four distinct options. If the court could enforce one outcome (assent) through a "deemed" provision, what would prevent it from stepping into the Governor's shoes to exercise the other options, such as returning the Bill or reserving it for the President? This, the court implied, would fundamentally disrupt the constitutional scheme.

A Case-by-Case Approach or a Universal Rule?

Chief Justice Gavai suggested an alternative path. Instead of a "straightjacket formula," he posited that courts could deal with delays on a case-by-case basis. Aggrieved parties could approach High Courts under Article 226 or the Supreme Court, which could then, considering the specific "exigencies and situations," direct a decision within a reasonable period, potentially using its plenary powers under Article 142 to do "complete justice."

“Though in the facts of the case, the court may have laid down a timeline under Article 142 to do complete justice. (But) can you lay down a straight jacket formula for the exercise of the powers by the Governor and the President while exercising 142?” the CJI asked.

The states’ counsel countered that a "Bill-by-Bill approach" would defeat the purpose. Singhvi argued that such a method would fail to address the systemic issue of gubernatorial inaction, forcing legislatures into a cycle of protracted litigation for every delayed Bill.

The Political Undercurrents

While the Bench insisted it would decide the reference purely on constitutional merits, the political context was palpable. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the Centre, cautioned against turning the hearing into a forum for political grievances, warning that if states cited specific examples of gubernatorial delays, he was prepared to file an affidavit detailing how the "Constitution was taken on a joy ride since Independence."

The case highlights the escalating friction between the Centre and opposition-ruled states, where Governors are often perceived as acting at the behest of the central government to stymie state legislation. The Supreme Court's final opinion will, therefore, not only be a landmark constitutional interpretation but will also profoundly impact the future of Indian federalism.

As the hearings continue, the legal community watches with bated breath. The Court's opinion will either reinforce the discretionary authority of the President and Governors, leaving the legislature to address the issue of delays, or it will carve out a new role for the judiciary in policing the procedural boundaries of the legislative process, a move that could redefine the delicate separation of powers that underpins India's constitutional democracy.