AP High Court Denies Anticipatory Bail to Ex-Minister & Others in Corruption Case, Directs Adherence to BNSS Arrest Procedures

Amaravati: The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in a significant common order delivered by Justice T Mallikarjuna Rao on April 25, 2025, declined to grant anticipatory bail to former Minister and MLA Smt. Vidadala Rajani (A1) and her Personal Assistant Sri Dodda Ramakrishna (A4) in a corruption and extortion case. However, the court issued crucial directions to the investigating agency to strictly follow the procedure laid down under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which is equivalent to Section 41A of the old Criminal Procedure Code, and the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar . The anticipatory bail petition of Sri Vidadala Venugopinath @ Gopi (A3) was dismissed as infructuous following his arrest.

The case stems from Cr.No.01/RCO-CIU-ACB/2025 registered by the Central Investigation Unit, ACB, Vijayawada, initially for offences under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (PC Act), and Sections 384 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Section 384 IPC was later altered to Section 386 IPC during the investigation.

Case Background:

The prosecution's case originates from a Vigilance & Enforcement (V&E) enquiry based on a representation alleging that A.1, along with Sri P. Joshua, IPS (A2, then RV&EO, Guntur), and others, demanded and accepted bribes from Sri Nallapaneni Chalapathi Rao , Managing Partner of Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers. The V&E report recommended an ACB investigation, disciplinary action against A2, and legal proceedings against others.

The core allegation is that A1, A3, A4, and A2 demanded and extorted ₹2 crores for A1 and ₹10 lakhs each for A2 and A3. This allegedly followed an unauthorized inspection of the stone crusher unit by A2 on September 10, 2020, purportedly initiated by A1 due to a political feud, solely to intimidate and extort money.

Arguments Presented:

Counsel for A1 argued that the case is a result of political vendetta by the new government, highlighting an unexplained four-year delay in lodging the FIR and alleging multiple false cases post-regime change. It was contended that A1, being an MLA, required prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act, which was not obtained, unlike for A2. Reliance was placed on Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia regarding anticipatory bail grounds and Arnesh Kumar regarding arrests for offences below 7 years.

Counsel for A3 argued that he is not a public servant and the complaint is politically motivated, factually incorrect, and malicious, citing delay and invocation of Section 120B IPC as signs of ulterior motives.

Counsel for A4 contended that allegations are vague, unsupported by evidence, and lacked specific details. He argued mere demand is insufficient under PC Act (citing Sk. Hussain ) and that A4 is entitled to bail under Section 35(3) BNSS as alleged offences carry less than 7 years.

The Advocate General, opposing the bail, argued that the investigation is ongoing and granting anticipatory bail could lead to tampering with evidence or interference with witnesses. He relied on Devinder Kumar Bansal , which emphasizes that anticipatory bail in serious corruption cases should only be granted in exceptional circumstances like false implication or political motivation, and that the presumption of innocence alone is not sufficient. He also cited Supreme Court observations from Dr Subrahmanian Swamy on the corrosive nature of corruption.

Court's Analysis and Findings:

The court examined several key contentions:

1. Applicability of Section 17A PC Act: The court held that Section 17A applies only when the alleged offence is "relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in the discharge of his official functions or duties." Citing the government's memo which clarified that extorting money from a businessman cannot be reasonably construed as an official duty of an MLA, and based on the V&E opinion that A2's inspection was done to serve A1's interest, the court found that the alleged act by A1 falls outside the purview of Section 17A. Prior approval was thus not a pre-requisite for investigating A1 for these specific allegations.

2. Preliminary Enquiry under Section 173(3) BNSS: The court noted that the case was registered based on the V&E enquiry report which established a prima facie case. Referring to Imran Pratapgadhi , the court stated that Section 173(3) BNSS allows proceeding with investigation directly when a prima facie case exists, thus dispensing with the mandatory preliminary enquiry in this context.

3. Delay in Lodging FIR: While acknowledging the delay, the court noted the State's explanation that the complainant was hesitant to come forward while A1 held public office. The court did not find the delay alone to be a sufficient ground for granting anticipatory bail, distinguishing it from a previous case involving a former Chief Minister.

4. Political Vendetta Allegations: The court declined to express an opinion on the political vendetta claims, stating that this ground alone cannot warrant anticipatory bail. Concerning the circulation of A2's statement by a ruling party MP, the court noted the sensitivity of disclosing investigation details but also observed that A2's statement itself did not directly implicate A1, questioning the notion that political mileage against A1 was necessarily achieved by circulating that specific statement.

5. Applicability of Section 386 IPC: This proved to be a crucial point. The court examined Section 386 (extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt) and Section 384 (punishment for extortion, generally fear of 'any injury'). It noted the prosecution's subsequent addition of Section 386. Comparing the alleged threats cited in the report (e.g., "Chitrahimsalu ku gurichestamu" - likely meaning harassment) with the statements recorded from the complainant and partners during the V&E enquiry, the court found that the V&E statements consistently referred to threats of legal action, business closure, and imposing penalties (like ₹50 crores), not threats instilling fear of death or grievous bodily harm. The court concluded that the essential ingredients of Section 386 IPC were prima facie not satisfied based on the V&E material, and Section 384 IPC, as originally invoked, appeared more appropriate.

6. Requirement for Arnesh Kumar / Section 35(3) BNSS Compliance: Given the court's prima facie finding that Section 386 IPC may not be applicable, the alleged offences would likely fall under the category punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years. In such cases, Section 35(3) BNSS (and Arnesh Kumar guidelines) mandate that a police officer shall not arrest a person without a prior notice to appear, unless specific reasons warranting arrest exist.

The court also noted concerns regarding the lack of verification of the source of the alleged ₹2 crore payment by the investigating officer, as well as the political differences between the parties. However, it found no reasonable apprehension that the petitioners, having permanent residences and societal roots (A1 being an ex-MLA/Minister, A4 a government employee), would influence witnesses or tamper with evidence.

Decision:

Based on the cumulative analysis, particularly the prima facie non-applicability of Section 386 IPC and the nature of the alleged threats, the High Court did not grant anticipatory bail to A1 and A4 but instead directed the investigating officer to strictly comply with the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines. A1 and A4 are required to cooperate with the investigation and adhere to conditions including furnishing address details and abstaining from public comments on the case.

The petition filed by A3 was dismissed as infructuous because he had been arrested after the hearing but before the order was pronounced.

The court clarified that its observations are preliminary and solely for the purpose of deciding the present petitions, not an indication of the case's merits. The investigating agency retains the freedom to investigate without being influenced by these observations.