Art. 14 Violation: Bombay HC Orders LIC to Consider Regularization for Long-Serving Staff Denied Benefit Granted to Similarly Situated Employees - 2025-04-30

Bombay High Court Directs LIC to Consider Regularization for Long-Serving Temporary Staff, Cites Discriminatory Treatment

NAGPUR: The Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justices Nitin W. Sambre and Vrushali V. Joshi, has directed the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) to consider the regularization claims of 56 temporary Class-IV employees, emphasizing that denying them consideration while granting it to similarly situated colleagues amounts to discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court rejected LIC's argument that the matter was barred by res judicata .

Case Background

The petitioners, appointed on a temporary basis between 2003 and 2010, have been continuously working for LIC for 13 to 19 years. Their initial bid for regularization stemmed from a 2011 Supreme Court order in LIC of India & Another Etc. Versus D.V. Anil Kumar Etc. (Civil Appeal Nos. 953-968 of 2005), which approved a one-time LIC scheme to absorb temporary Class IV staff with over five years of service (as of 18.01.2011) through a limited exam.

The current petitioners' applications under that scheme were rejected at the time because they had not completed the requisite five years of service by the cutoff date. Their challenge to this rejection in Writ Petition No. 2703 of 2011 was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on 14.06.2011. A subsequent Special Leave Petition (SLP(C) No. 16446 of 2011) before the Supreme Court was withdrawn by the petitioners on 23.04.2012, with the Apex Court granting liberty to pursue other appropriate remedies and clarifying that any fresh petition should be considered on its own merits.

Crucially, several other individuals who were co-petitioners in the original 2011 writ petition later filed Writ Petition No. 5407 of 2022. In that case, LIC filed an affidavit agreeing to consider those petitioners for appointment under the 2011 scheme as a "special case" (though not as a precedent), leading to the disposal of that petition on 27.03.2023. The present petitioners argued they were similarly situated and being unfairly discriminated against.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners' Counsel (Shri D.N. Mudghale ): * Petitioners have rendered continuous service for 15-19 years. * They are identically situated to the petitioners in WP 5407/2022 who were granted consideration by LIC itself. * Denying them the same opportunity violates Articles 14 and 16 (equality and equal opportunity). * The earlier dismissal and SLP withdrawal do not act as res judicata due to the specific liberty granted by the Supreme Court and the changed circumstances (long service completion and discriminatory treatment). * Other High Courts (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh) have granted similar relief in comparable cases involving LIC temporary staff.

Respondents' Counsel (Shri C.S. Kaptan, Senior Advocate with Shri R.N. Badhe): * The petition is barred by res judicata due to the finality of the 2011 High Court order and the withdrawn SLP. * The decision in WP 5407/2022 was based on a concession specific to those petitioners and explicitly stated not to be a precedent. * Long service does not automatically confer a right to regularization, especially when initial eligibility criteria under the scheme were not met. * Cited Neelima Srivastava v. State of UP and M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka on the finality of judgments and res judicata . * Cited Ranbirsingh v. S. K. Roy cautioning against regularization becoming a "back-door entry" bypassing fair recruitment processes under Articles 14 and 16.

High Court's Analysis and Reasoning

The Division Bench found LIC's differential treatment of similarly situated employees problematic.

Discrimination under Article 14: The Court held that LIC, being 'State' under Article 12, acted in a "most discriminatory manner" by conceding relief to one group of petitioners (in WP 5407/2022) while opposing it for the current petitioners, who were part of the same original litigation group (WP 2703/2011). This violates the mandate of Articles 14 and 16.

Res Judicata Not Applicable: The Court determined that the principle of res judicata did not bar the present petition. It reasoned: > "In the said writ petition [WP 2703/2011], the petitioners’ claim of consideration for grant of permanency was rejected on the ground that they have not completed the tenure of five years... The said claim... was rightly rejected... being contrary to the mandate provided under the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court... The Hon’ble Apex Court... permitted withdrawal of the SLP and granted liberty... permitted filing a fresh petition which was directed to be considered on its own merits." The Court concluded that the issue adjudicated earlier (eligibility under the 5-year rule in 2011) was different from the current issue (regularization after 14+ years of service, coupled with discriminatory treatment).

Principle of Equal Treatment: Citing State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015), the Court reiterated the norm that identically situated employees should receive the same benefits granted by court orders, unless exceptions like laches or acquiescence apply. Here, the Court found no valid reason to deny the benefit, especially given LIC's own inconsistent actions.

LIC's Conduct: The Court also noted that LIC continued the petitioners' temporary employment for over 14 years, despite Clause 6 of the D.V. Anilkumar scheme affidavit suggesting that temporary employees not covered or unsuccessful under the scheme would cease employment.

Final Decision

The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing LIC to: 1. Consider the petitioners' claims for regularization in light of the Court's observations, particularly LIC's stand in WP 5407/2022 and relevant judgments from other High Courts. 2. Communicate the decision to the petitioners within three months.

The Court further clarified that if LIC decides to regularize the petitioners, they "shall be entitled for continuity of service from the date of appointment for all practical purposes."

The Rule was made absolute accordingly.