Attending Meetings of a Non-Banned Group Not a UAPA Offence: Supreme Court Upholds Bail, Sets Key Precedent

New Delhi – In a significant ruling that refines the contours of offenses under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, the Supreme Court has held that mere association with or attendance at meetings of an organization not explicitly banned under the Act does not constitute a prima facie offense. The decision reinforces a critical distinction between proscribed terrorist organizations and other groups, potentially impacting the application of the stringent anti-terror law and the consideration of bail for accused individuals.

The apex court, comprising a bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice KV Viswanathan , dismissed an appeal filed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The agency had challenged the Karnataka High Court's order granting bail to Saleem Khan, who was accused of having links with an organization named 'Al-Hind'.

The bench affirmed the High Court's reasoning, observing that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that 'Al-Hind' was listed as a banned organization in the schedule of the UAPA. This foundational fact, the Court noted, was central to determining whether Khan's alleged activities attracted the harsh provisions of the Act.

"While dealing with the prayer for bail of accused no.11, Saleem Khan, the High Court noticed that the allegations found in the charge-sheet related to his connections with an organisation by the name of AL-Hind, which admittedly is not a banned organisation under the schedule to UAPA," the Supreme Court's order stated. "Therefore, to say that he was attending meetings of the said organisation, AL-Hind and others would not amount to any prima facie offence."

The ruling not only provides relief to the accused but also sets an important precedent for lower courts grappling with UAPA cases where the primary allegation revolves around association rather than direct acts of terror.

Case Background and Procedural History

The case originated from an FIR registered in January 2020 by the Central Crime Branch (CCB) police in Bengaluru. Seventeen individuals, including Saleem Khan, were booked under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)—including 153A (promoting enmity), 121A (conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India), and 120B (criminal conspiracy)—along with Sections 13, 18, and 20 of the UAPA. The investigation was subsequently transferred to the NIA, a central agency specializing in anti-terror probes.

The chargesheet alleged that Khan was connected with 'Al-Hind' and participated in its meetings. However, when the matter of bail came before the Karnataka High Court, it drew a sharp legal distinction. While it denied bail to another accused, Mohd. Zaid, who was alleged to have communicated with ISIS handlers via the dark web, it granted relief to Saleem Khan.

The High Court's order, now upheld by the Supreme Court, was unequivocal in its interpretation. It observed, "Mere attending meetings and becoming Member of Al-Hind Group, which is not a banned organization as contemplated under the Schedule of UA(P) Act and attending jihadi meetings, purchasing training materials and organizing shelters for co-members is not an offence as contemplated under the provisions of section 2(k) or section 2(m) of UA(P) Act."

This reasoning underscores that for the UAPA's provisions on membership and support of a terrorist organization to apply, the organization in question must first be officially proscribed and listed in the Act's schedule.

Legal Analysis: The Threshold for a 'Prima Facie' Offence

The Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 833) is pivotal for its clarification of what constitutes a "prima facie" case under the UAPA, particularly in the context of bail. Section 43D(5) of the UAPA creates a high bar for granting bail, stating that an accused shall not be released if the court, after perusing the case diary or report, "is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true."

This provision has often been interpreted to mean that if the prosecution presents some evidence linking the accused to the alleged offense, bail must be denied. However, the present ruling clarifies that the initial step is to determine whether the alleged actions, even if taken as true, actually constitute an offense under the UAPA.

By holding that attending meetings of a non-scheduled organization is not a prima facie UAPA offense, the Court has effectively raised the initial threshold for the prosecution. It signals that investigative agencies cannot invoke the stringent bail-denial provisions of the UAPA merely by alleging association with any group they deem suspicious; the group's legal status as a banned entity is a prerequisite.

This aligns with the principle of legality ( nullum crimen sine lege ), which requires that criminal liability only be imposed for conduct specifically prohibited by law. In this context, the UAPA explicitly defines a "terrorist organisation" as an organization listed in the Schedule or one operating under the same name. The act of "supporting" such an organization or being a "member" is criminalized. The Court's ruling logically concludes that if the organization is not on the Schedule, these corresponding offenses are not attracted.

Imperative of Speedy Trials in UAPA Cases

Beyond the specifics of bail, the Supreme Court also addressed the broader issue of prolonged pre-trial detention, a recurring concern in UAPA cases. Observing that the accused cannot be "forced to languish in jail as undertrial prisoners for a long time," the bench directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings and set a deadline of two years for completion.

This directive is a crucial judicial intervention that acknowledges the violation of the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Given that UAPA trials are often protracted, accused individuals can spend years in detention before a final verdict is reached. By setting a concrete timeline, the Court is attempting to balance the state's security interests with the individual's right to liberty and a timely judicial process.

This aspect of the order serves as a reminder to trial courts nationwide of their duty to ensure that the stringent provisions of the UAPA do not result in indefinite incarceration without conviction, thereby upholding the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Conclusion and Broader Implications

The Supreme Court's refusal to interfere with the High Court's well-reasoned order in the case of Saleem Khan carries significant weight for UAPA jurisprudence. It provides a clear and authoritative interpretation that membership or association becomes a UAPA offense only when it pertains to an organization officially designated as a terrorist entity under the Act's schedule.

This decision will likely be cited extensively in bail hearings across the country, compelling prosecution agencies to present concrete evidence of an organization's proscribed status before opposing bail on grounds of association. For legal practitioners, this judgment offers a potent tool to challenge overly broad applications of the UAPA and to safeguard the liberty of individuals accused of peripheral involvement with non-banned groups.

Ultimately, the ruling in Union of India v. Saleem Khan strikes a crucial balance. While acknowledging the necessity of a robust anti-terror legal framework, it simultaneously reinforces the principles of statutory precision, individual liberty, and the fundamental right to a speedy trial, ensuring that the law is applied with the rigor and fairness that justice demands.