The has set aside the bail order granted to former Assistant Police Inspector Sachin Waze, effectively returning the accused to . The division bench, comprising Justice G. S. Kulkarni and Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale, delivered a rigorous critique of the trial court’s reasoning, noting that the discretion exercised in granting the bail application failed to adhere to the stringent parameters mandated by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. The order, issued on , quashed the trial court's decision dated , which had originally allowed the applicant to be enlarged on bail.
The case, which concerns the discovery of an explosives-laden Mahindra Scorpio parked near the Antilia residence of the Ambani family on , and the subsequent murder of the vehicle's owner, Mansukh Mishrilal Hiran, involves serious charges under the and the UAPA. The (NIA) had appealed the bail, arguing that the trial court ignored the evidence of a larger conspiracy involving extortion, the staging of a terror threat to regain the accused's status as a 'supercop,' and the eventual silencing of a key witness.
Judicial Scrutiny Of Protective 'Clout'
The High Court emphasized that the trial court's order was fundamentally flawed, particularly in its assertion that the prosecution failed to prove the Ambani family was "terrorized." The bench maintained that the act of planting explosives with a threat note in a residential area of South Mumbai constitutes a clear attempt to strike terror within the meaning of . The court observed that the "clout" and influence enjoyed by Waze as a police officer enabled him to manipulate investigations, influence witnesses, and circumvent standard procedures.
In its 86-page judgment, the court remarked,
"No citizen of this country much less an industrialist of repute, as in the present case who is contributing to the nation and its economy, can suffer even a remotest threat of a terror. A person who suffers threat of a terror can only imagine its adversities, as created by persons who indulge in these unlawful activities."
The court underscored that, as a person in uniform, Waze’s alleged conduct represented a "betrayal of trust" and that the protectors of the law should not become "predators."
Evidence Linking Waze To Terror Conspiracy
During the proceedings, the NIA presented compelling evidence—including witness statements recorded under —linking the accused to the planting of the explosives. Key witnesses, including a police constable, detailed how Waze had instructed them to substitute license plates and handle incriminating evidence, such as DVRs and hard drives, which were later dumped into the Mithi River. The court highlighted that Waze had meticulously orchestrated the theft of the Scorpio car, planted gelatin sticks, and directed the fabrication of a false threat note to simulate a terror attack.
The court specifically addressed the argument regarding the "uselessness" of the explosives due to the absence of a detonator. It pointed out that under the , the definition of an explosive substance is broad enough to cover materials intended for making such substances, rendering the defense's reliance on technicalities untenable at the stage of bail. Furthermore, the court found that the murder of Mansukh Hiran was directly connected to the explosive-laden vehicle incident, as Hiran was perceived as a "weak link" in the conspiracy who might have exposed the accused's actions.
Constitutional Balance And Statutory Embargo
The legal core of the judgment rested on the interpretation of . The court reaffirmed that the legislative intent behind this provision was to impose a rigorous limitation on the grant of bail for offenses under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Relying on the precedent set in , the bench clarified that the court’s responsibility at the bail stage is not to conduct a "mini-trial" or weigh the probative value of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, but to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused.
The court rejected the defense's argument concerning the delay in trial and the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused. The bench clarified that while the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental aspect of , it does not act as a "mechanical formula" for bail in cases involving grave offenses and strong evidence of involvement in terrorist activities.
"The often invoked phrase ‘
’ is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, but those cannot altogether invert the constitutional relationship between liberty and detention when
of Section 43-D(5) apply,"
the court noted, citing the necessity of balancing societal security with individual liberty.
The High Court concluded that the trial court's decision was "legally and factually perverse" for ignoring the mandate of Section 43D(5) and the cumulative evidence pointing toward the accused's complicity. By setting aside the bail, the High Court has ensured that the trial will proceed with the accused in custody, prioritizing the integrity of the witness depositions and the larger interest of the State. The NIA's appeal was thus allowed, with the court noting that the trial is now at a critical stage, with charges framed and testimonies expected to commence. The accused remains barred from his release on bail, as the court found his potential to influence the judicial process—given his past background and access to official records—to be a legitimate and pressing concern.
terrorist act allegations - judicial bail standards