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Bombay HC Declares Toilet Facilities a Basic Human Right Under Article 21, Directs MCGM to Enhance Slum Sanitation
Introduction
In a significant ruling emphasizing the constitutional imperative for basic civic amenities, the has held that access to adequate toilet and sanitation facilities constitutes an integral part of the under , even in unauthorized slum areas on public land. The division bench comprising Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Aarti Sathe, while hearing Writ Petition No. 4225 of 2024 filed by and another against the and others, directed the civic body to construct additional toilet blocks and maintain existing ones in the Buddha Nagar slum in Govandi, Mumbai. This decision underscores the non-negotiable obligations of municipal authorities to provide essential services to slum dwellers, regardless of the legality of encroachments, highlighting a that breaches under Articles 14 and 21. The court's order addresses a longstanding grievance over inadequate facilities serving over 4,000 residents in an area spanning 1,83,000 square meters, where only 60 dilapidated toilet seats exist.
Case Background
The case originates from the dire sanitation conditions in Buddha Nagar, Govandi (West), a sprawling slum pocket situated entirely on land owned by the MCGM. The petitioners, , a social organization, and another individual, approached the under to enforce the provision of basic amenities in this unauthorized settlement. The area, comprising sub-localities like Buddha Nagar 2 (376 hutments), Bhaiyasaheb Nagar (276 hutments), and New Lumbini Baug (202 hutments), houses more than 4,000 residents, including families in residential hutments and encroachers running commercial structures.
The dispute arose from the stark inadequacy of toilet facilities: despite the population size, only 60 toilet seats (spread across four blocks: 20+20+10+10) are available, many in a "ruinous condition" with poor hygiene and no maintenance. Photographs annexed to the petition depicted overflowing septic tanks, broken infrastructure, and unhygienic surroundings, compelling residents—particularly women and children—to resort to open defecation or travel long distances. This situation exacerbated health risks, including the spread of diseases in an already vulnerable community.
A work order under the Slum Sanitation Programme awarded construction to , funded partly by Member of Parliament allocations, but no subsequent repairs or upkeep followed. Complicating matters, a small 1,449.15 square meter portion of the land falls under a scheme, where a Letter of Intent was issued on , to , appointed by . This scheme aims to rehabilitate just 36 eligible slum dwellers (with provisional statuses for some commercial units), involving fewer than 60 hutments. However, the petitioners argued that this limited redevelopment does not excuse neglect of the broader slum area.
The timeline reveals prior efforts: On , the petitioners wrote to the SRA's Chief Executive Officer highlighting the facility shortfall and risks of demolition without alternatives. Despite these representations, no action ensued, prompting the 2024 writ petition. Respondents included MCGM (as primary civic authority), the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (M/East Ward), SRA, and the developer. The hearing on , in the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, addressed these issues, with interim application No. 6016 of 2025 seeking urgent relief.
The core legal questions were twofold: (1) Whether municipal authorities can shirk responsibilities for sanitation in encroached slums under the (MMC Act), and (2) If access to toilets qualifies as a fundamental right under Article 21, imposing enforceable duties on the State and civic bodies.
Arguments Presented
The petitioners, represented by counsel, mounted a compelling case rooted in constitutional and statutory imperatives. They contended that the MCGM's failure to provide and maintain adequate toilets violated the under Article 21, as well as equality under Article 14, by discriminating against slum dwellers compared to formal urban residents. Emphasizing the slum's scale—over 4,000 people in 1,83,000 square meters—they argued that 60 seats were "grossly inadequate," breaching hygiene standards and public health norms. The work order's non-implementation was cited as evidence of "total dereliction," with photographs illustrating dilapidated blocks unfit for use. They stressed that the SRA scheme's pendency for a minor portion could not justify neglecting the majority, invoking the MMC Act's mandate for civic services like sanitation, regardless of land status. The letter to SRA was highlighted to show ignored grievances, warning that demolitions without alternatives would force open defecation, endangering vulnerable groups and contravening human rights.
On the respondents' side, the MCGM, through , appeared defensive but largely non-committal in the judgment's record. They implied that slum status and the SRA scheme complicated interventions, suggesting redevelopment priorities over ad-hoc amenities. The SRA, represented by , detailed the limited scope of the October 2020 LOI, noting it covered only 36 residential and 14 commercial rehabilitations (with provisionals), affecting fewer than 60 hutments. They argued the scheme's progress—now with vacated structures—shifted responsibility to the developer, , represented by . The developer contended that their role was confined to the designated plot, not the entire slum, and no specific grievance from their 60 affected dwellers justified court intervention. Overall, respondents downplayed urgency, positing encroachments as a barrier and redevelopment as the long-term solution, without addressing immediate maintenance duties. The court found these positions unsubstantiated, viewing them as attempts to abdicate statutory roles.
Key factual points included population estimates (4,270 residents), facility counts (60 seats), and land ownership (fully MCGM's), while legal points hinged on interpreting Article 21's scope and MMC Act authorities in slums.
Legal Analysis
The 's reasoning firmly rooted the ruling in constitutional jurisprudence, expanding Article 21's ambit to encompass sanitation as a facet of the right to life and dignity. Justices Kulkarni and Sathe observed that once encroachments lead to large-scale slums, authorities cannot "abdicate" obligations, even on municipal land. This principle was drawn from the MMC Act, 1888, which vests broad powers in corporations for public health and amenities, unhindered by slum declarations.
A pivotal precedent cited was High Court on its own motion in the matter of Jilani Building at Bhiwandi v. Bhiwandi Nizampur Municipal Corporation & Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 386), where the court affirmed municipal authority over slum areas for discharging public duties. The bench applied this to hold MCGM accountable for "catering to basic requirements" like toilets and maintenance, irrespective of SRA overlaps. The judgment critiqued encroachments' permanence, noting they result in "irreversible loss" of public land to private developers under rehabilitation schemes, yet do not absolve hygiene duties.
Further bolstering the analysis, the court invoked the 's recent exposition in Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 81), which linked sanitation to Article 21 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25). There, the apex court recognized clean toilets as essential for health, well-being, and dignity, imposing duties under Directive Principles (Part IV) to maintain them year-round. The bench quoted extensively to equate slum neglect with breaching privacy and increasing risks for women and transgender persons, distinguishing sanitation from "charity" to a " ."
The ruling distinguished between redevelopment (SRA's domain) and immediate civic needs, clarifying that small schemes do not excuse broader neglect. It rejected arguments tying amenities to formal status, emphasizing that policy rewards encroachments with housing but mandates parallel sanitation provisions. Breaches were deemed violations of Article 14 (arbitrary inaction) and Article 21 (unhygienic living). No other precedents were directly cited, but the analysis implicitly referenced evolving jurisprudence on urban poverty, like rights to shelter and water, reinforcing that slums on public land demand proactive governance.
This framework not only resolves the petition but sets a precedent for enforcing municipal accountability, potentially extending to water, clinics, and disease prevention— all "concomitants" of Article 21.
Key Observations
The judgment is replete with poignant observations underscoring the court's dismay at systemic failures. Key excerpts include:
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On municipal duties: “… even in the area in question which is stated to be a slum area and more particularly when the entire land is belonging to the municipal corporation, the municipal corporation would be required to cater to all the basic requirements of not only providing adequate number of toilets commensurate with the population of the area, but also maintain such toilets so that the hygiene and health of the slum dwellers is looked after.” This highlights the of civic responsibilities under the MMC Act.
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On constitutional imperatives: “making adequate provisions for toilets/sanitation facilities concerns the under Article 21 of the Constitution, this notwithstanding the fact that the area in question is a slum created by encroachment on the land belonging to the municipal corporation.” The court emphasized that encroachments do not negate fundamental entitlements.
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Drawing from wisdom: "the right to life encompasses within it the and the . Creation of adequate public toilets also protects the privacy and removes the threat to ladies and transgender persons." This quote from Rajeeb Kalita was deemed "aptly applicable," linking global human rights to Indian constitutionalism.
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On policy critique: "It can never be conceived that municipal officers do not safeguard the municipal land, and permit encroachment leading to the formation of a slum. Once a large population of encroachers, sets up residential and commercial settlements categorized as slums, it cannot be that the Municipal Corporation or the State Government would not recognize such slums, and neglect their obligation to provide the basic civic amenities." This reflects broader concerns over land loss and urban planning.
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Extending duties: "It is also the duty of the Municipal Officers to cater and comply with the other health and hygiene requirements of slum areas so as to prevent spread of disease and infection. This duty includes providing facility of clean drinking water and medical assistance through clinics and dispensaries." The bench broadened the ruling's scope to holistic welfare.
These observations, delivered per Justice Kulkarni, serve as a clarion call against complacency in urban governance.
Court's Decision
The disposed of the writ petition on , with comprehensive directions to enforce sanitation rights. Primarily, it ordered the MCGM to "identify open areas in this large slum area" and construct additional toilet blocks "commensurate with the population/number of residents" within two months. For existing facilities, the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (respondent No. 2) was directed to "forthwith take steps to repair these toilets and also maintain the same," ensuring daily upkeep under strict supervision. The Municipal Commissioner was tasked with broader oversight, including record-keeping on cleanliness, repairs, and hygiene across Mumbai slums, with any breach deemed a violation of Articles 14 and 21.
The court carved out an exception for the SRA plot under the 2020 LOI, noting the 60 affected dwellers had not independently complained. However, it mandated MCGM and SRA to address any grievances, providing alternate toilets if demolitions occur—within 15 days to prevent disruptions. The interim application was rendered infructuous, with no costs imposed.
Practically, this decision compels immediate action in Buddha Nagar, potentially benefiting thousands by averting health crises and upholding dignity. It signals a judicial push for accountability, likely prompting similar petitions in other Mumbai slums, where over 50% of the population resides informally. Future cases may invoke this to demand integrated amenities in rehabilitation schemes, challenging developer-centric models. Broader implications include policy reforms: the judgment critiques encroachment rewards without sanitation mandates, urging the State to impose community toilet obligations on encroachers or enhance municipal funding. For legal professionals, it reinforces Article 21's expansive interpretation in urban poverty contexts, aiding public interest litigation. Ultimately, the ruling transforms abstract rights into tangible duties, fostering a healthier, more equitable metropolis amid Mumbai's densification challenges.
