The High Court of Judicature at Bombay has ruled that Family Courts do not possess the jurisdiction to hear applications seeking the modification of maintenance and rent orders originally passed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 . The decision clarifies the scope of Section 26 of the Act, reinforcing that the judicial authority to alter or set aside existing orders under Section 25(2) remains strictly vested in the Magistrate court that delivered the original judgment. Justice Gauri Godse, presiding over the matter, underscored that the statutory framework does not permit the transfer of such modification proceedings to the Family Court, regardless of other ongoing matrimonial litigations between the parties.

Contested Jurisdictional Boundaries

The case arose from a plea filed by Deepika Jimesh Ranawat, who sought to transfer a modification application filed by her husband, Jimesh Mahendra Ranawat, from the Magistrate Court at Andheri to the Family Court. The husband had sought to reduce or cancel the monthly maintenance and rent payments, citing a change in circumstances. The applicant argued that because divorce, restitution of conjugal rights , and maintenance counterclaims were already pending before the Family Court, consolidating these proceedings would ensure efficiency and reduce the significant hardship caused by juggling time-bound hearings in two separate forums.

The applicant’s legal counsel emphasized the practical challenges of attending daily court appearances, particularly given the responsibilities of caring for a minor daughter during her crucial academic year. Relying on previous judicial observations regarding the purpose of Family Courts , the applicant contended that Section 26 of the DV Act functions as a gateway to permit the consolidation of all family-related grievances under one roof. However, the respondent countered that the Magistrate Court holds exclusive jurisdiction over the DV Act’s operational nuances, as the Act specifically designates the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class as the authority to handle such matters, and that Section 25 is not included in the relief provisions granted to Civil or Family Courts under Section 26.

Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent

In her analysis, Justice Gauri Godse addressed the critical distinction between initiating new claims under the DV Act and seeking to modify an existing order. The High Court observed that while Section 26 of the DV Act acts as an " enabling and supplementary provision " allowing parties to seek specific reliefs—such as protection or maintenance—in pending civil or family proceedings, this does not grant carte blanche authority over every aspect of the Act. The judgment noted that the legislature explicitly excluded Section 25 from the ambit of Section 26.

Reflecting on the limitations of the Family Court, the court stated, "Section 26 of the DV Act, which is only an enabling and supplementary provision , would, therefore, not be the criterion to transfer the modification application." Justice Godse emphasized that the specific powers conferred upon the Magistrate under the DV Act are designed to ensure distinct procedural rigor , including defined timelines for resolution. The court reasoned that transferring an application under Section 25(2) would effectively bypass the statutory mandate that vests the modification power in the court of origin.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that administrative convenience , while a valid consideration under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure , cannot override the fundamental requirement of jurisdictional competence . The court noted: "The objective of speedy disposal, as prescribed under the DV Act, cannot be ignored even while considering the issue of the competent forum." By failing to satisfy the threshold for transfer, the court determined that the existing procedural setup, while challenging for the parties, remained the only legally permissible route.

Procedural History and Final Determination

The underlying dispute has a protracted history involving multiple tiers of the judiciary. In 2019 , the Magistrate Court at Andheri initially awarded the applicant ₹20,000 for rent, ₹20,000 for her daughter’s maintenance, and ₹25,000 for her personal support. These figures were subsequently enhanced by the Sessions Court at Dindoshi , and the High Court confirmed the orders in April 2024 . Although the husband later approached the Supreme Court , he eventually withdrew his challenge to the quantum of maintenance, leading to the disposal of his Special Leave Petition in August 2024 .

The respondent subsequently filed for modification, alleging a change in his financial circumstances. This triggered the current attempt by the applicant to shift the venue to the Family Court. In its ruling, the High Court determined that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient " justifiable and satisfactory grounds " to warrant the exercise of discretionary powers to transfer the case. The court pointed out that the physical distance between the courts and the applicant's residence did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to attendance.

As a result, the application for transfer was dismissed, ensuring the modification proceedings will continue before the Magistrate Court at Andheri . The court explicitly directed that the pending modification application be resolved on its own merits, strictly in accordance with the law, without being influenced by the observations made during the transfer hearing. This ruling effectively stabilizes the current forum for DV Act modification requests, reaffirming that the Magistrate, as the creator of the original order, remains the only authority empowered to review or modify that order under the Act's specific provisions. The parties are now expected to proceed with the pending matters in their respective forums within the established time frames, as previously ordered by the High Court.