Constitutional Law
Subject : Litigation - Writ Petitions
Kolkata, India – In a significant ruling that underscores the doctrine of alternative remedy, the Calcutta High Court on September 8, 2025, dismissed a writ petition challenging the alleged defamatory portrayal of freedom fighter Gopal Chandra Mukherjee, alias ‘Gopal Patha,’ in the film The Bengal Files . Justice Amrita Sinha held that the petition was not maintainable as the petitioner's primary grievance was rooted in the failure to receive information under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, a matter for which the statute itself provides a clear appellate mechanism.
The petition, filed by Gopal Mukherjee’s grandson, Santanu Mukherjee, sought judicial intervention against filmmaker Vivek Agnihotri, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), and state authorities. It alleged a “despicable” and malicious depiction of the historical figure, demanding the removal of scenes, a probe into the CBFC's certification process, and the temporary removal of Agnihotri from his position as a CBFC Board Member to ensure impartiality.
However, the Court decisively focused on the procedural misstep by the petitioner, concluding that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be invoked to bypass statutory remedies.
The crux of the Court's decision lay in the petitioner's approach to redressing his grievances. The petitioner, represented by advocate Debanjan Mukherjee, had filed an RTI application with the CBFC on August 12, 2025, seeking details about the evaluation process for The Bengal Files and the role of Board Members in its approval. When the CBFC failed to respond within the statutory timeframe, the petitioner directly approached the High Court with a writ petition.
Justice Amrita Sinha identified this as the petition's fatal flaw. The Court observed that the grievance was essentially about the denial of information, for which the RTI Act provides a robust, two-tiered appellate process. In its order, the Court stated:
“Petitioner intended to obtain certain information under RTI. The time period within which the information ought to have been provided has expired. In the event the petitioner is aggrieved by inaction on part of the authority to provide information within the statutory time period, then the petitioner ought to avail the remedy prescribed under the RTI Act. Writ petition on said cause of action will not be maintainable.”
This reasoning forms a classic application of the legal principle that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available to the litigant. The Court made it clear that the petitioner ought to have filed a first appeal with the designated appellate authority under the RTI Act, and subsequently a second appeal to the Information Commission if necessary, before seeking judicial review.
During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner argued that he had approached "all possible legal instrumentalities," including lodging complaints with the Bowbazar Police Station and sending legal notices to the filmmaker, but received no relief. He contended that the CBFC had stonewalled his queries about how the depiction of a historical character was evaluated before certification.
When questioned by Justice Sinha about whether a formal representation or complaint—distinct from an RTI query—was filed with the CBFC, the petitioner's counsel admitted to sending emails that reiterated the questions. Justice Sinha orally remarked, "Question and Answer are different things... If you have a prayer, complaint before any authority? Where is the representation?" The Court further noted that an RTI application and its reminder do not constitute the exhaustion of all remedies. "If no explanation is provided there is provision for appeal, there is provision for second appeal. You avail those," the judge advised.
Counsel for the CBFC reinforced this position, submitting that the petitioner had only filed an RTI query and had failed to pursue an appeal after the response time lapsed. The counsel astutely pointed out that the petitioner's substantive complaint of reputational harm had other appropriate legal avenues. "If you look at Complaint, it can be defamatory suit or criminal matter," the counsel submitted, suggesting that a writ was an inappropriate vehicle for a defamation claim.
Counsel for the film's producer and director, Vivek Agnihotri, added a procedural objection, stating that the petition was served late over the weekend. He also argued that the plea had become infructuous since the film, The Bengal Files , had already been released.
This judgment serves as a potent reminder for legal practitioners on the disciplined use of writ jurisdiction. While Article 226 grants High Courts wide powers to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for "any other purpose," this power is exercised with judicial restraint. The courts are generally reluctant to entertain petitions where a litigant has bypassed a structured, statutory remedial framework.
Reinforcing the Doctrine of Alternative Remedy: The ruling is a textbook example of the judiciary's deference to legislative frameworks like the RTI Act. It signals that courts will not permit litigants to use writ petitions as a shortcut, thereby undermining the authority and purpose of specialized appellate bodies.
Distinguishing Information from Substantive Relief: The Court effectively bifurcated the petitioner's grievances. The quest for information (the "how" and "why" of the CBFC's decision) falls squarely within the RTI's domain. The demand for substantive relief (editing the film, claiming defamation) belongs to other legal arenas, such as a civil suit for defamation or a challenge to the film's certification under the Cinematograph Act. The attempt to conflate the two in a single writ petition based on an unanswered RTI was deemed legally untenable.
Clarity on "Exhaustion of Remedies": The judgment clarifies that merely sending applications and reminders does not amount to "exhausting" remedies. The term implies pursuing the entire hierarchical process laid out in the relevant statute—in this case, the first and second appeals under the RTI Act.
While dismissing the writ petition, the Calcutta High Court granted the petitioner the liberty "to approach the competent forum for remedy in accordance with law if so advised." This leaves several legal avenues open for Santanu Mukherjee. He can still pursue the appellate process under the RTI Act to obtain the information he seeks from the CBFC. Separately, he can evaluate filing a civil defamation suit against the filmmakers for monetary damages or initiating criminal defamation proceedings, should the portrayal of his grandfather meet the legal threshold for such actions.
The decision in Santanu Mukherjee v. Union of India & Ors. does not comment on the merits of the petitioner's allegations against the film. Instead, it provides a crucial procedural lesson: choosing the correct legal forum and remedy is as critical as the substance of the grievance itself.
Case Title: Santanu Mukherjee v. Union of India & Ors. Case No.: WPA/20884/2025 Court: Calcutta High Court Coram: Justice Amrita Sinha Date of Order: September 8, 2025
#WritJurisdiction #AlternativeRemedy #FilmCensorship
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