The has declined to grant an on the ’s decision to reorganize the electoral boundaries of the , effectively allowing the city’s municipal expansion to proceed. Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya delivered the order on , rejecting a that sought to invalidate the notification dated . This notification amended the Act, 1980, to increase the number of civic wards from 144 to 209. The court’s refusal to intervene at this stage ensures that the ongoing administrative preparations for the upcoming local elections remain unaffected while the broader legal challenge continues.
In his petition, Dipu Das, a resident within the corporation's limits, had argued that the exercise was fundamentally flawed. The petitioner’s primary contention was that the government prioritized electoral rolls over actual population data, a move he claimed effectively excluded a significant segment of the population from the representative framework. Furthermore, the petitioner alleged that the ward boundaries were drawn without regard for , compactness, or . Asserting that the process was tainted by political bias, the petition characterized the reorganization as a clear instance of “” intended to secure an unfair electoral advantage for the ruling party.
Representing the petitioner, challenged the of the move, arguing that the recommendation for the exercise, which originated from the municipal corporation, was legally infirm because it occurred after the corporation had been dissolved. He posited that following the dissolution of the body under , the Municipal Commissioner—acting solely as an administrative officer—lacked the requisite authority to advise the state on such a fundamental reorganization. Relying on past precedents, the petitioner maintained that such a significant redistribution of constituencies required a more transparent and legally grounded foundation.
The State government and the contested these claims robustly. The , appearing for the municipal body, raised a preliminary objection regarding the of the petition. Citing , the defense highlighted that courts are generally barred from interfering with the of municipal constituencies. The state further clarified that an Administrator had been appointed in following the corporation's dissolution, and this office had been duly vested with the powers of the elected members. The defense maintained that the process was conducted in accordance with the amended provisions of the (Amendment) Act, 2026, which empowered the government to alter the corporation's schedule.
During the proceedings, the court observed that the process involved multiple stages of public consultation. Records indicated that a notice issued on , invited public objections and suggestions regarding the draft boundaries. Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that they had participated in any of these consultative forums. Addressing the petitioner's claim regarding the lack of opportunity for hearings, the judge stated, “A person having not submitted any objection / suggestion against the draft publication on amendment of Schedule II of the 1980 Act cannot be allowed to take a stand at this point of time that no opportunity of hearing was given to him prior to issuance of the notification.”
The court also dismissed the assertion that the Administrative Commissioner acted without jurisdiction. Under the provisions of the 1980 Act, the appointment of an Administrator was intended to bridge the governance gap during the dissolution period. Justice Bhattacharyya held that the Commissioner, while acting as an Administrator, was fully empowered to perform the duties of the Mayor and the councilors, which included facilitating the administrative steps necessary for election preparation. Regarding the , the court emphasized that staying the process would disrupt the mandate to hold timely civic elections, noting that “the and inconvenience is against passing of any interim order in a case of this nature.”
The ruling underscores the principle that the court’s role in electoral matters is restrictive, especially when a petitioner has failed to utilize the provided . The court acknowledged the petitioner's concerns about the alignment of the new wards but concluded that it was not the judiciary’s function to dictate the specific manner in which municipal boundaries are drawn, provided the statutory conditions are satisfied. Justice Bhattacharyya underscored that the had effectively commenced after the formal amendment to the Act, rendering the petitioner's arguments regarding the timing of the preparatory work unconvincing.
Following the refusal of the interim relief, the court has directed the respondents to file their formal within three weeks, with a window of one additional week provided for any subsequent replies. The matter remains open for substantive hearing on the legality of the notification after the exchange of these pleadings. For now, the administration is authorized to move forward with the implementation of the 209-ward structure. The petitioner has been granted leave to file a supplementary affidavit of service to confirm that all parties involved were provided with adequate notice of the hearing proceedings. The court’s order clarifies that the current findings are in nature, intended solely to support the denial of the , and will not preclude a final decision on the merits of the case when it is eventually taken up for final disposal.
ward delimitation - administrative expansion
