Can EVM Verification Be Challenged Via Writ? Madras High Court Says No to MK Stalin

The Madras High Court on Thursday delivered a significant blow to former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and DMK president MK Stalin, dismissing his writ petition that sought to challenge the election of TVK candidate VS Babu from the Kolathur Assembly constituency. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice SA Dharmadhikari and Justice G Arul Murugan held the petition to be not maintainable, ruling that the challenge to an election must be pursued exclusively through an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and not via a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The ruling underscores the constitutional bar under Article 329(b), which prohibits courts from entertaining any challenge to an election except by an election petition presented to the appropriate authority. The detailed reasoning of the court is awaited, but the decision reaffirms the strict separation between post-election scrutiny mechanisms and the remedy provided by the statutory framework.

The Election That Sparked a Legal Battle

The litigation arose from the 2026 Tamil Nadu Assembly elections, which witnessed a dramatic political shift. The newly formed Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) swept the polls and formed the government, defeating the incumbent DMK. In the Kolathur constituency, MK Stalin—a three-time MLA from the seat—finished second, losing to TVK's VS Babu by a margin of 8,795 votes.

Stalin promptly sought verification of 14 Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) sets—representing 5% of the 286 EVMs used in Kolathur—under the mechanism established by the Supreme Court in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India . He submitted his application on May 7, 2026, just three days after the result declaration on May 4, well within the stipulated period.

Verification After the Deadline

According to Stalin's petition, the verification exercise did not commence until July 29—more than two months after his request. This delay became the crux of his procedural grievance. He alleged that the opening and examination of the EVMs and VVPAT machines revealed several discrepancies, including VVPAT failures at polling stations 28 and 75, incorrect address tags at polling station 79, deficiencies in the chain of custody of election equipment at polling station 157, and a Control Unit at polling station 208 that failed to detect a Ballot Unit bearing his name.

Stalin argued that these irregularities came to light only after the verification process was completed—a process that occurred well after the 45-day limitation period for filing an election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act had expired. Consequently, he contended, he was effectively left without any statutory remedy to challenge the election results, making a writ petition the only viable recourse.

Constitutional Hurdle: Article 329(b) and the RP Act

The Election Commission of India (ECI) raised a preliminary objection at the threshold, arguing that the writ petition was a disguised attempt to call the election into question. Relying on Article 329(b) of the Constitution and Sections 80 and 100 of the Representation of the People Act, the ECI submitted that the legislative scheme provides an election petition as the sole remedy for challenging an election. The Commission's counsel described the petition as "artful drafting" designed to bypass the statutory mechanism.

The ECI also pointed to the reliefs sought by Stalin: a declaration that VS Babu's election was void and a consequential declaration that Stalin be treated as the returned candidate. These reliefs, the Commission argued, fell squarely within the domain of an election petition and could not be granted in writ proceedings.

Kapil Sibal's Procedural Argument

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for Stalin, resisted the preliminary objection with a procedural argument that highlighted a potential gap in the legal framework. He emphasized that Stalin had approached the ECI within five days of the result seeking verification, yet the actual opening of the machines occurred after the 45-day period for filing an election petition had elapsed.

"While I file the application within five days, we open the machines after 45 days. So how could I file an election petition ?" Sibal submitted, as reported from the court proceedings.

He maintained that the post-result EVM verification mechanism was a distinct process flowing from the Supreme Court's directions in ADR v. ECI and could not be equated with an ordinary election challenge under the RP Act. To treat an election petition as the only available remedy, he argued, would leave the petitioner without an effective avenue to challenge alleged defects that only became known after the limitation period had expired.

High Court's Verdict: Maintainability Denied

The Division Bench, however, was not persuaded. After hearing both sides, the court dismissed Stalin's writ petition as not maintainable. The precise reasoning is awaited, but the decision aligns with the well-established principle that Article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of courts in election matters except through the prescribed statutory channel.

The ruling also implicitly rejects the argument that the Supreme Court-mandated EVM verification process creates a separate right to challenge an election via writ. The court appears to have drawn a distinction between the verification mechanism—which is an administrative or quasi-judicial process—and the ultimate question of election validity, which remains firmly within the domain of election petitions.

What This Means for Election Law

The judgment highlights a recurring tension in Indian election law: while the Supreme Court has directed post-election EVM verification to enhance transparency, the statutory framework for challenging election results remains tightly circumscribed. The 45-day limitation period for filing an election petition may, in practice, conflict with the timeline for conducting such verification, potentially leaving candidates who discover irregularities after the deadline without a remedy.

Legal experts note that the interplay between Article 329(b) and the Supreme Court's directions in ADR v. ECI may require legislative or judicial clarification. If verification is to serve as a meaningful check on electoral integrity, the limitation period for election petitions may need to be extended, or the verification process must be expedited to occur within the existing window.

For now, the Madras High Court's decision reinforces the strict bar against challenging elections through writ petitions. The ruling serves as a reminder that even when procedural anomalies arise—such as delayed verification—the constitutional and statutory scheme does not permit an end-run around the election petition mechanism.

Impact on Legal Practice

Election law practitioners will take note of the court's firm stance on maintainability. The decision underscores the importance of filing election petitions within the prescribed 45-day period, regardless of ongoing verification processes. It also suggests that any challenge to EVM irregularities must be raised within the election petition itself, and that the verification mechanism, while useful for transparency, does not create a parallel remedial route.

The case may also prompt a broader discussion about the adequacy of the current legal framework. With political parties increasingly relying on post-election verification to question results, the gap between verification timelines and limitation periods could become a recurring issue. Whether the legislature or the Supreme Court will step in to address this remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The dismissal of MK Stalin's petition is a clear victory for the Election Commission and the TVK candidate, but it also leaves open important questions about the accessibility of electoral remedies. As the detailed order is awaited, the legal community will scrutinize the court's reasoning on the exact interplay between the ADR verification mechanism and Article 329(b). For now, the message is unambiguous: an election can only be challenged through an election petition, and no amount of procedural complexity can justify invoking writ jurisdiction to bypass that statutory mandate.