Chandrachud's Ayodhya Remarks Spark Calls for Curative Petition, Questioning Verdict's Integrity

NEW DELHI – A recent post-retirement interview by former Chief Justice of India, D.Y. Chandrachud, has ignited a significant legal debate, with prominent academics and senior lawyers suggesting his comments could form the basis for a curative petition against the Supreme Court's landmark 2019 Ayodhya judgment. The controversy centers on a stark contradiction between the former CJI's remarks and the explicit findings of the Constitution Bench he was a part of, raising profound questions about judicial integrity, transparency, and the finality of one of India's most sensitive legal verdicts.

Speaking at a seminar, legal academic Professor Dr. Mohan G Gopal argued that Justice Chandrachud’s recent statement—that the construction of the Babri Masjid was a "fundamental act of desecration"—provides sufficient new grounds to challenge the 2019 ruling. This assertion has sent ripples through the legal community, as it appears to directly conflict with the carefully worded, unanimous judgment which concluded there was no evidence of a temple being demolished to build the mosque.

The Core Contradiction: Judgment vs. Post-Facto Justification

The 2019 judgment, delivered by a five-judge bench comprising then-CJI Ranjan Gogoi and Justices S.A. Bobde, D.Y. Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan, and S. Abdul Nazeer, granted the disputed land for the construction of a Ram Temple. While it ruled in favour of the Hindu parties on the "balance of probabilities," citing their long and consistent worship, it made a crucial finding of fact. The judgment explicitly recorded: "The A.S.I. report has not commented on the cause of destruction of the underlying structure... Thus, there is no evidence to show that the earlier structure was demolished for the purpose of construction of the mosque."

However, in a recent interview, Justice Chandrachud, widely believed to be the principal author of the unsigned judgment, offered a different perspective. He stated that the very erection of the Babri Masjid was an act of desecration of a prior temple. This post-retirement commentary has been seized upon by critics who argue it reveals a pre-existing belief that was not reflected—and was, in fact, contradicted—by the official judicial reasoning.

Professor Gopal, speaking at the CH Mohammed Koya National Seminar at the University of Calicut, articulated the legal jeopardy this creates for the judgment. "The ultimate responsibility of a court is to deliver judgments that inspire trust," he stated. "Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done, especially by those who lose the case... The question now is whether, we should work together to file a curative petition, in the light of what Justice Chandrachud has said. Maybe we should."

Grounds for a Curative Petition: A Question of Judicial Integrity

A curative petition is the final and rarest legal remedy available in the Indian judicial system, entertained only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct a gross violation of the principles of natural justice, even after a review petition has been dismissed. Professor Gopal's argument posits that the former CJI’s comments reveal a potential bias that was not disclosed during the proceedings, thereby vitiating the verdict.

"If Justice Chandrachud had strong beliefs about the Ayodhya issue, then he should have recused himself from the matter saying he can't take an objective view on this matter because he believed that the construction of Babri Masjid is a desecration," Professor Gopal argued. He framed the issue as a fundamental question of judicial integrity, questioning whether Justice Chandrachud, whom he described as "a good friend of mine and a remarkable jurist," demonstrated the necessary transparency required of a judge in such a monumental case.

This line of reasoning touches upon the bedrock principle of nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause), which extends to situations where a judge's personal beliefs could create a reasonable apprehension of bias. The argument being advanced is that if a judge on the bench personally believed the mosque's construction was an "act of desecration," this belief could have subconsciously influenced the "balance of probabilities" test applied, even if the final text of the judgment stated otherwise.

The "Unreasoned" and "Contrived" Verdict

Beyond the specific comments, Professor Gopal launched a broader critique of the 2019 verdict itself, labeling it "contrived" and "unreasoned." He pointed specifically to the unsigned addendum to the judgment, which delved into theological and historical aspects, as "pure theocracy" and a suspect part of the overall ruling. "The whole judgment is suspect," he declared.

His call for greater judicial transparency resonated with the audience. Citing the late Justice Chinnappa Reddy, who openly identified as a Marxist, and former CJI U.U. Lalit and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat's transparent deliberations in the EWS quota case, Gopal emphasized that the legal system expects honesty, not a façade of ideological neutrality. "We have judges with all kinds of ideologies, that is inevitable," he said. "All we want is sincerity and honesty, and transparency."

Legal and Systemic Implications

The fallout from Justice Chandrachud's comments could be far-reaching. Legally, it provides a potential—though challenging—avenue for parties to re-litigate the Ayodhya dispute through a curative petition. Such a petition would have to convince the Supreme Court that these new revelations constitute a grave error that undermines the very foundation of the original verdict.

Systemically, this episode fuels a critical conversation about the conduct of judges, both on and off the bench. While post-retirement speeches and writings by judges are common, a statement that appears to retrospectively alter the reasoning or foundation of a landmark judgment is highly unusual. It raises questions about the sanctity of the written judicial word and whether the reasoning presented in a judgment is the complete and honest basis for the decision.

For the legal profession, this serves as a potent reminder of the importance of the principle that justice must be seen to be done. The confidence of the public, and particularly the losing party, in the judicial process hinges on the belief that judges are impartial arbiters. When a judge's subsequent comments cast doubt on that impartiality, it erodes the institutional legitimacy of the court itself, a concern that now hangs over one of the most consequential judgments in the history of the Indian Supreme Court.