Consensual Relations & Broken Marriage Promise Don't Constitute S.376 IPC; FIR Quashable: Supreme Court - 2025-05-10

Supreme Court: Consensual Relations Followed by Broken Marriage Promise Not Rape Under S.376 IPC; FIR Quashed

New Delhi: The Supreme Court recently quashed an FIR registered under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, observing that consensual physical relations between adults over several years, even if followed by a broken promise of marriage, do not prima facie constitute the offence of rape. The order, authored by Justice Rajesh Bindal , also recorded the amicable settlement of financial disputes between the parties, leading to the disposal of related cases.

The Court masked the names of the parties as "ABC" (petitioner/complainant) and "XYZ" (respondent) due to the sensitivity of the allegations involving Section 376 IPC.

Case Background: From Financial Dispute to Quashing of Rape FIR

The matter initially reached the Supreme Court as a Transfer Petition seeking the transfer of a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (cheque bounce case) from Alipur, West Bengal, to Rohini Court, Delhi.

With the consent of both parties, the dispute was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre on July 23, 2024. The mediation was successful, and the parties amicably settled their financial disputes, which included: * Criminal Complaint Number AC4033 of 2018 (under Section 138 NI Act) * Civil Suit No. CS DJ 971 of 2018 * Complaint Case No. 15306 of 2018

As per the settlement agreement dated November 28, 2024, the respondent agreed to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the petitioner, which was duly paid via demand drafts. The parties moved an application under Article 142 of the Constitution for the disposal of these pending disputes in terms of the settlement.

However, a related FIR No. 331 of 2018, registered by the petitioner against the respondent under Sections 376 and 506 IPC at Police Station Prashant Vihar, became a focal point. The Court noted that an offence under Section 376 IPC could not be the subject matter of mediation or settlement between the parties.

Court's Examination and Reasoning for Quashing FIR

The Supreme Court, therefore, examined the contents of the FIR to determine if a prima facie case was made out. The Court observed: "The perusal of the FIR shows that the parties with consent had intimate relations and made certain financial transactions between them. They had physical relations by consent. The relations continued for a period of 04-05 years, as alleged, due to not fulfilling the promise of marriage. The FIR was registered, alleging that the respondent got married breaking the promise with the petitioner/complainant."

Based on this, the Court concluded:

"Contents of the FIR clearly suggest that both the parties being adult had consensual relations for years before the complaint was filed alleging that there was backing out of promise to marry. This Court has consistently opined that under these admitted facts no case is made out under Section 376 IPC."

The Supreme Court referred to its previous judgments in XXXX v. State of M.P. , [2024] 3 SCR 309 : 2024 INSC 181 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra , [2019] 11 SCR 423 to support its view. Consequently, the Court held that the FIR and all subsequent proceedings deserved to be quashed.

Final Orders and Implications

In light of the settlement for financial disputes and its own findings on the FIR, the Supreme Court ordered:

Disposal of Financial Cases: Case AC 4033 of 2018, Civil Suit No. CS DJ 971 of 2018, and Complaint Case No. 15306 of 2018 were disposed of as withdrawn in view of the settlement.

Quashing of FIR: FIR No. 331 of 2018 under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, and all subsequent proceedings, were quashed as no prima facie case was made out.

Anonymity: The names of the parties were masked in the order.

Disposal of Transfer Petition: The initial Transfer Petition was disposed of accordingly.

This judgment reiterates the distinction drawn by the apex court between a false promise of marriage made with the sole intention to sexually exploit (which may constitute rape) and a breach of promise arising from a consensual relationship where the intent to marry might have been genuine at one point but did not materialize. It underscores that the criminal justice system should not be used to settle scores arising from failed consensual relationships, especially when the allegations do not meet the essential ingredients of the offence.