Criminal Acquittal No Bar to Departmental Action If Charges Differ; Rule 27(ccc) CRPF Rules Inapplicable: J&K and Ladakh High Court - 2025-08-30

J&K High Court Upholds CRPF Constable's Dismissal, Clarifies Scope of Departmental Action Post-Acquittal

Jammu, J&K - The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has upheld the dismissal of a CRPF constable, Gautam Ray, ruling that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not automatically preclude departmental punishment if the charges are distinct. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice N. Kotiswar Singh and Justice Rajnesh Oswal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the constable was lawfully dismissed for 'misconduct' involving the misuse of his service weapon, despite being acquitted of murder charges related to the same incident.

Case Background

The case originates from an incident on May 31, 1992, where CRPF Constable Gautam Ray allegedly fired a single round from his service rifle (SLR), which struck and killed Assistant Commandant Mohd. Israil. Following the incident, Ray faced both a criminal trial for murder under Section 302 of the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC) and departmental disciplinary proceedings.

While Ray was acquitted by the criminal court on February 10, 1998, due to the prosecution's failure to prove its case, the CRPF initiated a fresh departmental inquiry against him. This inquiry led to his dismissal from service on September 13, 2003, for the misconduct of misusing his government-issued arms and ammunition. Ray challenged this dismissal, leading to a prolonged legal battle that culminated in the present appeal before the Division Bench.

Key Arguments

Appellant's Contentions:

Mr. Rakesh Sharma, counsel for Gautam Ray, argued that the departmental action was illegal and violated Rule 27(ccc) of the CRPF Rules, 1955. This rule bars departmental punishment on the same or similar charges for which a force member has been acquitted by a criminal court, except with prior sanction from the Inspector General. He further contended that the inquiry was procedurally flawed because no Presenting Officer was appointed, which prejudiced his client's defence.

Respondent's Defence:

Representing the Union of India, Deputy Solicitor General of India Mr. Vishal Sharma submitted that the departmental proceedings were conducted de novo as per court directions in a previous round of litigation. He argued that the dismissal was for 'misconduct' under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949, and was based on a different set of allegations than the criminal trial for murder.

Court's Legal Analysis and Ruling

The High Court meticulously examined the distinction between the charges in the criminal trial and the departmental inquiry. The bench observed that while the criminal trial focused on proving the offence of murder (Section 302 RPC), the departmental charge was narrower, concerning the "misuse of the Government Arms and Ammunition."

On the Effect of Criminal Acquittal (Rule 27(ccc)):

The court found that the two proceedings operated on different standards of proof and addressed distinct allegations. Justice Oswal, writing for the bench, noted:

"The respondents have proceeded against the appellant on the different set of allegations, as such, Rule 27(ccc) of the Rules, shall have no application in the present case."

The court reinforced this position by citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Southern Railway Officers Association vs. Union of India , which established that "Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority."

On Procedural Fairness and Absence of Presenting Officer:

Addressing the procedural challenge, the court found no merit in the appellant's claim of prejudice. It noted that Rule 27(c) of the CRPF Rules does not mandate the appointment of a Presenting Officer. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma , the bench held that the absence of a Presenting Officer does not automatically vitiate an inquiry. The crucial test is whether the Enquiry Officer acted as a prosecutor, thereby causing prejudice. In this case, the court found no evidence of such bias.

"The appellant has not been able to demonstrate that questions put forth by the Enquiry Officer were leading questions, causing prejudice to the appellant," the judgment stated. The court confirmed that Ray was given a memorandum of charges, an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and to submit his own defence.

Final Decision

Finding no legal or procedural infirmity in the departmental proceedings or the subsequent judgment of the single-judge Writ Court, the Division Bench concluded that the dismissal order was valid.

"We are of the considered view that the enquiry was conducted by the respondents in accordance with law and the order dated 13.09.2003 in respect of dismissal of the appellant from service does not call for any interference," the court declared.

The appeal was dismissed, bringing a final resolution to a case that has spanned over two decades.