Delhi Court Imposes ₹6 Lakh Cost on Lawyer for 'Frivolous' Ayodhya Verdict Challenge, Citing 'Luxurious Litigation'

New Delhi – In a stern rebuke against what it termed "frivolous and luxurious litigation," a Delhi court has significantly increased the financial penalty on advocate Mehmood Pracha, imposing a total of ₹6 lakh in costs for his attempt to have the landmark 2019 Ayodhya verdict set aside. The court condemned the lawsuit as an abuse of the legal process and a part of a "negative trend" to target public functionaries after they demit office.

District Judge Dharmender Rana of the Patiala House Courts was hearing an appeal filed by Pracha against a trial court's order that had dismissed his suit and imposed a preliminary cost of ₹1 lakh. Upholding the dismissal, Judge Rana not only validated the initial penalty but enhanced it by an additional ₹5 lakh, underscoring the court's view that the initial amount failed to deter the appellant.

“Evidently, the cost imposed by the Ld. Trial Court has failed to achieve the intended goal of deterrent effect,” Judge Rana observed in the order. “Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that in order to effectively check the menace of frivolous and luxurious litigation the cost amount needs to be suitably enhanced to fetch the desired results.”

The court directed that the total sum of ₹6 lakh be deposited with the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DLSA) within 30 days.

The Basis of the Unprecedented Challenge

The case originated from a civil suit filed by Pracha seeking to declare the Supreme Court's 2019 Ayodhya judgment null and void on the grounds of fraud. The central pillar of his argument rested on remarks made by former Chief Justice of India, D.Y. Chandrachud (who was part of the five-judge bench that delivered the unanimous verdict), during a public speech.

Pracha contended that Justice Chandrachud's admission that he had prayed to a deity to "show him the way" to solve the complex Ayodhya case amounted to "unlawful interference." He argued that this created a situation where the judge was in "active communication with one of the litigants (the deity)," thereby vitiating the entire judgment through fraud.

Pracha’s plea argued that this supposed communication meant the verdict was pronounced based on a solution provided by the litigant itself, which compromised the impartiality of the proceedings. The trial court had dismissed this suit in April, finding no valid cause of action, and imposed the initial ₹1 lakh cost. Pracha's appeal challenged this imposition of costs, rather than the dismissal on merits.

Court's Scrutiny: Distinguishing the 'Supreme God' from the 'Juristic Personality'

In a detailed dismissal of the appeal, Judge Rana meticulously deconstructed Pracha's argument, identifying what he described as a fundamental misunderstanding of both law and religion. The court drew a critical distinction between the abstract concept of a "Supreme Being" or "almighty" and the specific legal status of the deity as a "juristic personality" litigating before the court.

“The appellant seems to have missed the subtle distinction between the 'Supreme God' and the 'Juristic Personality' litigating before the Court, probably on account of misunderstanding the law and religion,” the order stated. The judge suggested that a careful reading of the Ayodhya judgment itself would have clarified this distinction for the appellant.

The court unequivocally held that a judge "seeking guidance from the almighty" cannot be characterized as a fraudulent act intended to gain an unfair advantage. Such an act, the court noted, is a matter of personal faith and cannot be used to impugn a judicial decision. Consequently, the court found that even when taking Pracha's claims at face value, his plaint failed to disclose any valid cause of action, justifying the trial court's initial dismissal.

A Strong Message Against Vexatious Litigation

Beyond the specifics of the case, Judge Rana's order delivered a powerful commentary on the broader issue of vexatious litigation, particularly when directed at the judiciary. The judge expressed dismay over a growing trend of targeting public functionaries, including judges, with malicious litigation after they leave office, under a "misconceived notion that upon demitting office an ex-public functionary becomes vulnerable."

In a striking observation, the court lamented the role of a senior lawyer in perpetuating such a practice. “The situation becomes distressful when the protector himself turns predator,” the judge remarked. “In the case at hand, the appellant, despite being a fairly senior counsel, has opted to choose the wrong color of jersey. Instead of participating in the solution, he has opted to augment the problem.”

The court also dismissed Pracha’s insistence on impleading Justice Chandrachud as a party to the proceedings, labeling the attempt as "bad in law" and motivated by an "oblique intent."

This judgment serves as a significant precedent and a stark warning to potential litigants and members of the bar against filing suits that lack legal merit and appear designed to harass or undermine the integrity of the judicial system. The substantial six-figure cost underscores the judiciary's increasing intolerance for actions that clog the courts and misuse the legal process for collateral purposes.