Delhi High Court Waives Cost Amid Lament Over Indiscriminate Adjournments Culture

In a pointed critique of longstanding courtroom practices, the Delhi High Court has expressed dismay over the pervasive "culture of adjournments" that has taken root in Indian courts, leading to what it described as a "misplaced expectation" that such requests will be routinely granted. While waiving a Rs. 20,000 cost imposed on a petitioner for seeking an adjournment, Justice Neena Bansal Krishna emphasized the need for a shift away from this trend, noting that adjournments are often sought "indiscriminately, with no regard to the other counsel or to the time of the Court." This observation came in the context of a miscellaneous application in the case of Dheeraj Arora v. Pariney Khanna , highlighting broader concerns about judicial efficiency and the impact on timely justice delivery.

The decision, delivered on December 10, 2025, addresses not just the specific plea for cost waiver but also underscores systemic issues plaguing the judiciary. As Indian courts grapple with mounting backlogs—estimated at over 50 million cases nationwide—this ruling serves as a reminder of the human and procedural elements contributing to delays. For legal professionals, it reinforces the importance of mindful scheduling and accountability in appearances, potentially influencing how advocates approach adjournment requests in the future.

Case Background

The case originated as a criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.M.C. 2318/2021) before the Delhi High Court, involving petitioner Dheeraj Arora and respondent Pariney Khanna. While the underlying details of the main petition are not elaborated in the recent order, the focus shifted to ancillary applications concerning procedural costs and modifications.

On July 8, 2025, an order was passed imposing a cost of Rs. 20,000 on the petitioner, apparently for failing to appear or related to an adjournment request. A subsequent application under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC)—now corresponding to Section 403 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)—was filed seeking clarification or modification. The petitioner argued that the cost had been mistakenly attributed to a trial court (Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts) when it was actually imposed by the High Court itself. This relatively straightforward request was allowed, clarifying the source of the imposition without further contest.

The more substantive matter arose from another application, CRL.M.A. 19220/2025, filed under Section 482 CrPC (or Section 528 BNSS) for waiver of the Rs. 20,000 cost. The timeline traces back to May 7, 2025, when the cost was initially levied. The petitioner's advocate, Ms. Sudershani Ray, appeared in person alongside her client to argue the waiver. The core contention was that the counsel's absence on the relevant date stemmed from her involvement in a time-bound matter before a coordinate bench of the same court at Tis Hazari. This professional commitment, the application claimed, prevented her attendance, compounded by personal challenges as a single mother of two facing "multiple difficulties in her life."

The relationship between the parties remains opaque from the order, but the case appears to involve civil or quasi-criminal elements, given the CRL.M.C. filing, which often pertains to quashing of proceedings or related reliefs under Section 482 CrPC. No appearance was noted for the respondent, Pariney Khanna, suggesting the matter proceeded ex parte on this application. This procedural hiccup exemplifies the very issues the court critiqued: how routine absences can cascade into delays, affecting not just the parties but the court's docket.

The broader context of such applications is rooted in the Indian judiciary's ongoing battle against delays. Adjournments, while sometimes necessary, have been a flashpoint in judicial reforms. Reports from bodies like the Law Commission of India have repeatedly flagged excessive adjournments as a primary cause of pendency, with some courts granting up to three per case under rules like those in the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules. This case, pending since at least 2021, illustrates how even ancillary matters can prolong resolution.

Arguments Presented

The petitioner's arguments centered on practical and empathetic grounds for the waiver. Ms. Sudershani Ray, representing Dheeraj Arora, detailed the constraints faced on the date of the original hearing. She explained that the matter at Tis Hazari was "time-bound by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court," implying a fixed schedule that could not be deferred without risking contempt or further complications. This professional obligation, she argued, was unavoidable and not a deliberate neglect of the High Court proceedings.

To bolster the plea, the advocate invoked personal circumstances, portraying herself as a "single lady with two children" navigating "multiple difficulties in her life." This narrative framed the absence not as negligence but as a confluence of systemic pressures on solo practitioners, particularly women in the legal profession. The submission urged the court to consider these factors holistically, seeking relief from the financial burden of the cost, which was seen as punitive rather than remedial in this instance. No counter-affidavits or arguments from the respondent were presented, as none appeared, leaving the petitioner's contentions largely unopposed.

Implicit in the arguments was a reliance on the discretionary powers under Section 482 CrPC, which allows high courts to act to secure the ends of justice, including waiving procedural penalties where equity demands. The petitioner did not delve into legal precedents but focused on factual mitigation, emphasizing that the lapse was isolated and not indicative of a pattern of disregard for court time.

From the court's perspective—though not framed as an "argument" per se—the bench implicitly countered by distinguishing between genuine hardships and routine professional conflicts. The order notes the counsel's attempt to "justify her absence by alleging it was a personal difficulty when in fact, it was a professional involvement in another case." This reframing challenged the petitioner's portrayal, suggesting that overlapping commitments are foreseeable and manageable through better planning, rather than excusing them as personal woes.

Legal Analysis

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna's reasoning in the order is both concise and incisive, blending empathy with a firm stance on procedural discipline. The court exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (mirrored in Section 528 BNSS post the 2023 overhaul) to waive the cost, recognizing the equities in the specific scenario. However, this relief was not granted without qualification; it served as a platform to address a deeper malaise in judicial practice.

Central to the analysis is the court's observation on the "culture of adjournments," which it deemed "unfortunate." The judge articulated how this has evolved "over a period of time in the Courts," fostering a "misplaced expectation" that adjournments are a default entitlement "whatever be the matter." This critique aligns with established principles under Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (applicable analogously in criminal matters), which limits adjournments to exceptional cases and permits costs to deter abuse. In criminal jurisprudence, similar safeguards exist under CrPC provisions to prevent dilatory tactics that undermine the right to speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

No specific precedents were cited in the order, but the reasoning echoes landmark rulings like Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chabra (Supreme Court, 2022), where the apex court decried adjournments as antithetical to justice delivery, and Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI (2018), which capped adjournments at three per case with mandatory costs thereafter. These cases underscore the relevance here: adjournments must be justified, not routine, to preserve judicial resources and fairness to opposing parties.

The court drew a clear distinction between personal difficulties—which might warrant leniency—and professional involvements, which it viewed as manageable through scheduling. By noting that the counsel's claim was "not the personal difficulty as is being vehemently argued," the bench highlighted a tendency to blur lines for sympathy, potentially perpetuating the very culture it criticized. This analysis promotes accountability: advocates must prioritize High Court matters, especially when coordinate benches set time-bound hearings, reflecting the hierarchy and coordination within the judiciary.

Furthermore, the waiver's conditional tone—"Though, this is most least appreciated"—signals that future lapses may not escape sanction. Legally, this invokes the doctrine of judicial discretion, tempered by public interest. In the Indian context, where women lawyers face documented barriers (as per Bar Council reports), the order navigates sensitivity without excusing professional duties. It applies principles of natural justice, ensuring costs serve deterrence rather than hardship, while hoping for systemic reform to reduce such incidents.

The integration of BNSS references acknowledges the transition from CrPC, ensuring continuity in powers like modification (Section 403 BNSS) and waiver (Section 528). This forward-looking nod reinforces the judgment's timeliness amid ongoing codification changes.

Key Observations

The Delhi High Court's order is replete with direct commentary on procedural norms, providing quotable insights for legal discourse. Key excerpts include:

• On the evolving practice: "Unfortunately, there is a culture of adjournments, which has developed over a period of time in the Courts and misplaced and expectation has emerged that whatever be the matter, the adjournments shall be granted at the asking."

• Regarding disregard for others: "The adjournments have been sought indiscriminately, with no regard to the other Counsel or to the time of the Court."

• Distinguishing reasons: "The Counsel is trying to justify her absence by alleging it was a personal difficulty when in fact, it was a professional involvement in another case. It is not the personal difficulty as is being vehemently argued by the learned Counsel."

• Balancing relief with critique: "Though, this is most least appreciated and it is hoped that this culture of seeking adjournments would change over a period of time, the cost of Rs.20,000/- is waived."

These observations, attributed to Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, encapsulate the court's dual role: administering justice in the instant case while advocating for broader change. They highlight the tension between individual accommodations and collective efficiency, offering practitioners a blueprint for ethical advocacy.

Court's Decision

In its order dated December 10, 2025, the Delhi High Court allowed both applications. The modification plea under Section 362 CrPC/Section 403 BNSS was granted, clarifying that the Rs. 20,000 cost was imposed by the High Court, not the trial court at Tis Hazari. More significantly, the waiver application under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS was allowed, exonerating the petitioner from the financial penalty.

The decision's implications are twofold. Practically, it provides immediate relief to Dheeraj Arora, alleviating a burden that could have deterred access to justice for resource-constrained litigants. By waiving the cost, the court exercised compassion, acknowledging the advocate's genuine professional conflict without endorsing it as a norm.

On a systemic level, the ruling's cautionary tone signals a push for reform. It may embolden judges to impose stricter scrutiny on adjournment requests, potentially reducing casual absences and streamlining calendars. For future cases, this could mean heightened emphasis on advance coordination between courts and advocates, with costs more routinely levied to discourage patterns of delay. In an era of digital case management and e-filing, such observations could accelerate adoption of tools to minimize physical appearances where possible.

Broader effects ripple through the legal community. For advocates, especially those in high-volume practices, it underscores the need for robust calendaring and delegation to avoid overlaps. Women lawyers, facing disproportionate personal-professional strains, may find validation in the empathetic waiver but also a call for institutional support like creches or flexible hearings. For the judiciary, it reinforces the narrative of self-reflection: as pendency swells, internal critiques like this pave the way for guidelines curbing adjournments, aligning with national initiatives like the e-Courts project.

Ultimately, while the waiver resolves this skirmish, the hope expressed—"it is hoped that this culture of seeking adjournments would change over a period of time"—casts a visionary gaze. If heeded, it could contribute to a more efficient justice system, ensuring that the right to remedy under Article 39A of the Constitution is not undermined by procedural inertia. Legal professionals monitoring such developments will watch how this ripples into practice, potentially inspiring similar judicial interventions across benches.