Delhi High Court Dismisses Petition Challenging Mark Alteration in Judicial Services Exam, Upholding Examiner Discretion

Introduction

In a ruling that underscores the limited scope of judicial intervention in academic evaluations, the Delhi High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by Prerna Gupta, who alleged arbitrary interpolation and reduction of her marks in the Delhi Judicial Services Examination (DJSE) 2023 Mains. The Division Bench, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla (with Justice Shukla delivering the judgment), emphasized that without evidence of mala fide , bias, or material error, courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the examiner. The decision, pronounced on February 6, 2026, in W.P.(C) 10517/2025, Prerna Gupta v. Registrar General of Delhi High Court & Ors., reinforces the autonomy of examining authorities in competitive examinations, particularly where rules explicitly prohibit re-evaluation. The petitioner, appearing in-person , sought restoration of 20 marks allegedly deducted from her Paper-I score, which she claimed would elevate her from the waiting list to a selected position. Respondents included the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court (R-1), the last selected candidate (R-2), and the first wait-listed candidate (R-3), who argued against unsettling established appointments. This outcome highlights the balance between individual grievances and the broader need for administrative stability in judicial recruitment processes.

Case Background

The Delhi Judicial Services (DJS) Examination is a prestigious competitive process governed by the Delhi Judicial Services Rules, 1970, aimed at recruiting civil judges (junior division) for the National Capital Territory of Delhi. In November 2023, the Delhi High Court, through Respondent No. 1 (the Registrar General), issued a notification inviting applications for 53 vacancies—44 existing and 9 anticipated—distributed across categories: 34 General, 5 Scheduled Castes, and 14 Scheduled Tribes. The selection involved three stages: a Preliminary Examination, a Mains Examination (comprising four papers), and a viva voce interview. To qualify for the interview stage, candidates needed at least 35% in each Mains paper and 45% aggregate.

The Mains Examination was held on April 13 and 14, 2024. Results, declaring 153 candidates (including the petitioner) qualified for interviews, were announced on January 7, 2025. Following interviews, a notification on August 13, 2025, recommended 53 candidates for appointment, with the final merit list issued on March 4, 2025. Prerna Gupta, a General category candidate, secured 605 total marks, placing her at Rank 45 (Serial No. 12 on the waiting list). The last selected General category candidate (R-2) obtained 615 marks, while the first wait-listed candidate (R-3) scored 612.

Unsatisfied with her result, Gupta filed an RTI application on April 10, 2025, seeking copies of her answer scripts. These were provided in May 2025, revealing alleged alterations in Paper-I (Legal Knowledge and Language). Specifically, marks for Question 5 were reduced from 25 to 15, and for Question 8 from 30 to 20, leading to an aggregate change from 191 to 171 (later corrected to 169 due to an arithmetical error). The total in words was overwritten to "One Hundred Sixty Nine only." Gupta contended that these changes, made after initial evaluation and totaling, were unauthorized and arbitrary, dropping her merit position significantly. Had the original 191 marks been retained, she argued, her total would have exceeded the cutoff, securing her appointment.

This case arose amid a broader context of high-stakes judicial recruitment, where vacancies directly impact the functioning of subordinate courts in Delhi. The 2023 cycle saw intense competition, with alterations in marks raising questions about procedural integrity in anonymous evaluations. Gupta's petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, did not challenge the overall selection process or the appointment notification but focused narrowly on the 20-mark deduction in one paper, discovered post-results via RTI.

Arguments Presented

The petitioner, Prerna Gupta, appearing in-person , mounted a detailed challenge centered on procedural fairness and arbitrariness. She asserted that the reductions in Questions 5 and 8 were not bona fide corrections but unexplained interventions after the initial marks were totaled and recorded in figures and words on the answer booklet's front page. Arguing that the examiner became functus officio (functionally concluded) post-totalling, Gupta claimed no rule permitted post-evaluation revisions without recorded reasons or safeguards. She highlighted the one-year delay between the Mains exam and results, which prevented timely detection, and noted the lack of disclosure on whether similar changes affected other candidates, suggesting she was "singled out" without intelligible differentia.

Gupta invoked the Allahabad High Court's ruling in K.K. Wadhwani v. Sunita Singh & Ors. (2005), where mark interpolation vitiated the process, leading to restoration of original scores. She stressed that while DJS Rules prohibit re-evaluation, Article 226 empowers writ courts to intervene against manifest arbitrariness, citing the maxim fiat justitia ruat caelum (let justice be done though the heavens fall). In rebuttal, she dismissed notions of linguistic errors justifying reductions, arguing such issues should have been addressed initially, and refuted estoppel claims by noting her prompt challenge upon discovering the alterations via RTI.

Respondents, represented by counsel including Ms. Kanika Agnihotri for R-1, countered that the grievance involved subjective answers, falling within the examiner's exclusive domain. They denied "interpolation," a term implying mala fide absent here, and affirmed evaluations were anonymous, with examiner identities blurred in RTI responses to maintain confidentiality. Counsel for R-1 argued revisions occurred "at the first blush" before scripts reached the authority, per Nirmala Singh v. High Court of Delhi (2024), and were initialled by the examiner. They cited Hardeep v. University of Delhi (2024) to bar judicial substitution of examiner judgments.

Rule 15 of the DJS Rules explicitly prohibits re-evaluation, limiting review to re-totalling alone, as in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) and Registrar General, High Court of Delhi v. Ravinder Singh (SLP 2023). Respondents distinguished K.K. Wadhwani due to its unique facts involving admitted errors and non-anonymity. For R-2 and R-3—innocent third parties who joined service (R-2 on August 21, 2025; R-3 resigning from Haryana Judicial Service on September 22, 2025)—counsel urged equity, citing Anmol Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand (2021), Rajesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand (2025), and Ran Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018). They argued Gupta's participation without objection estopped her challenge, and interference would disrupt 51 joined appointees, creating a "ripple effect." Only four candidates scored 170+ in Paper-I, making 191 implausible, and potential further reductions for errors were noted.

Legal Analysis

The Court's reasoning pivoted on the settled jurisprudence limiting judicial review in examination matters, particularly where statutes or rules bar re-evaluation. Justice Shukla's judgment meticulously dissected the core issue: whether mark changes constituted impermissible arbitrariness under Article 226. The Bench rejected "interpolation" as unfounded without pleaded mala fide , aligning with precedents like Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth (1984) and CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava (2014), which mandate restraint in academic domains to avoid substituting court opinion for expert judgment.

Central to the analysis was Appendix D(3) to Rule 15 of the DJS Rules: "There shall be no re-evaluation of answer sheets... No request for re-evaluation... shall be entertained." Drawing from Ran Vijay Singh (supra), the Court outlined five principles:

(i) re-evaluation only if rules permit as a right;

(ii) court-permitted only for clear material errors in exceptional cases, without inferential reasoning;

(iii) no court re-evaluation due to lack of expertise;

(iv) presume key correctness;

(v) benefit to authority in doubt. Gupta's case failed this threshold, as Questions 5 and 8 were subjective, lacking objective benchmarks for judicial verification. Any court-directed re-evaluation risked substituting one subjectivity for another, impermissible per Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission (2004), which warned of delays, unfilled vacancies, and reciprocal claims.

The Bench clarified that "first blush" revisions, as in Nirmala Singh (supra), remain valid if pre-submission to authorities, rejecting Gupta's functus officio argument as impractical. It distinguished K.K. Wadhwani (supra) for its tampering evidence, absent here. Estoppel barred Gupta's late challenge, per Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar (1997) and others, as she participated knowingly. Critically, protecting third-party rights was paramount: R-2 and R-3's untainted appointments, unchallenged notifications, and position alterations invoked equity from Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra (1997), preventing "floodgates" of litigation.

Broader distinctions emerged: re-totalling (permitted) vs. re-evaluation (barred); subjective vs. objective questions; individual vs. systemic errors. The Court presumed evaluation correctness, noting beneficial revisions for others, ensuring parity. This aligns with service jurisprudence prioritizing stability over isolated claims, as in Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (recent). No fraud or bias alleged, and only four high Paper-I scorers underscored plausibility of 169 over 191. Thus, without exceptional circumstances, interference was unwarranted, balancing candidate rights against process integrity.

Key Observations

The judgment featured several pivotal excerpts illuminating the Court's stance:

• On the scope of interference: "In the absence of any allegations of mala fide , bias, or fraud, the examiner’s discretion in the evaluative process cannot be questioned... Evaluation of such answers necessarily involves academic judgment, and there exists no objective or infallible standard by which the Court can determine whether the initial or revised marks were correct."

• Reiterating the re-evaluation bar: "The Appendix to Rule 15 of the DJS Rules... expressly prohibits re-evaluation... courts may interfere only in rare and exceptional cases involving demonstrable material error or manifest arbitrariness."

• From Ran Vijay Singh (integrated): "The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidate—it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics;... In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate."

• On third-party equities: "Where appointments are made without any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the appointees, such appointments ought not to be disturbed merely due to errors attributable to the examining authority."

• Guiding philosophy: "Sympathy cannot govern the examination process. While individual grievances may arise, redressal must be balanced against the larger imperative of preserving fairness, stability, and integrity of the selection system."

These observations, directly from the judgment, encapsulate the restraint demanded in such disputes.

Court's Decision

The Division Bench unequivocally dismissed the writ petition, finding no merit in Gupta's claims and declining restoration of marks or re-evaluation directions. "Consequently, this Court finds no justification to restore the alleged original marks or to direct re-evaluation of the impugned answers, having due regard to the autonomy of the examiner and the settled limits of judicial review," the order stated. Pending applications were disposed of without costs.

Practically, this upholds the final DJS 2023 merit list and appointments, shielding 53 judicial officers (51 joined) from displacement. It signals to future candidates that challenges to subjective evaluations require concrete evidence of illegality, not mere dissatisfaction. Implications extend to other competitive exams under similar rules, like civil services or bar exams, reinforcing examiner autonomy and reducing litigation risks. For the judiciary, it ensures timely vacancy fillings, critical amid backlogs in Delhi courts. However, it may prompt calls for transparent evaluation protocols or RTI enhancements to preempt disputes. Overall, the ruling prioritizes systemic efficiency, reminding aspirants that participation implies acceptance of rules, and courts intervene sparingly to safeguard public interest in a robust judicial cadre.

In the evolving landscape of judicial recruitment, this decision serves as a bulwark against procedural nitpicking, yet underscores the need for robust safeguards to maintain candidate trust. As Delhi's subordinate judiciary grapples with rising caseloads, stable appointments like these are indispensable for justice delivery.