The Delhi High Court has dismissed a challenge to the constitution of a new Internal Complaints Committee (IC) at Kalindi College , ruling that a mere apprehension of bias is legally insufficient to invalidate a committee’s formation under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ( PoSH Act ). Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma emphasized that for such a challenge to succeed, petitioners must present cogent, concrete evidence demonstrating a real likelihood of bias, rather than relying on generalized suspicions regarding the administrative authority responsible for the nomination process.

The litigation stemmed from a joint complaint filed in July 2025 by two Associate Professors from the Zoology and Political Science departments at Kalindi College , a constituent unit of the University of Delhi . The petitioners alleged that they had been subjected to harassment, intimidation, and the use of derogatory and sexually colored remarks by several faculty members, particularly in the context of a Staff Association WhatsApp group and during a departmental meeting held on July 3, 2025 . Following a previous inquiry by an earlier committee that concluded the allegations were not sexual in nature, the petitioners sought to have the report set aside and a fresh investigation conducted by an impartial, newly constituted body.

Allegations and Judicial Scrutiny

The petitioners argued that the Principal of the college, who serves as the Executive Authority responsible for appointing the committee, was biased due to her prior handling of the complaint and her refusal to recuse certain members during the initial phase of the dispute. They contended that because the Principal was the member-secretary of the governing body, her involvement in selecting members for the new committee inherently undermined its impartiality. Counsel for the petitioners suggested that the presence of certain faculty members on the new committee, who had attended the meeting where the alleged incidents occurred, was contrary to the principles of natural justice .

However, the Court found these arguments to be unsupported by evidence of direct involvement or personal interest. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma clarified that administrative decisions alone, such as the initial rejection of a recusal request, do not equate to a disqualifying bias against the complainants. In its judgment, the Court observed: “The mere apprehension of bias is not enough and there must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion.”

The Court underscored that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Delhi had already provided significant relief to the petitioners by setting aside the findings of the first inquiry and directing the college to ensure the new committee strictly adhered to the University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations, 2015. By excluding all members who had participated in the previous, unsatisfactory investigation, the college had demonstrated compliance with the spirit of the law, the Court noted.

Statutory Framework and Committee Autonomy

The judgment delved into the statutory framework governing internal committees within educational institutions. Under Section 4 of the PoSH Act , the employer is mandated to constitute an internal committee to address complaints. The Court reiterated that the Principal, in her capacity as the Executive Authority, is statutorily empowered and obligated to nominate members for this committee.

Justice Sharma cautioned against the creation of parallel or ad-hoc fact-finding bodies that operate outside the statutory scheme , noting that the PoSH Act provides a self-contained, time-bound mechanism for addressing grievances. “The PoSH Act specifically creates a self-contained mechanism for redressal of such complaints through the Internal Complaints Committee/Local Committee. Once the legislature has expressly designated the ICC/Local Committee as the authority which shall inquire into such complaints, the constitution of any parallel or pre-ICC fact-finding body would be outside the statutory scheme ,” the Court noted.

The Court also addressed the petitioners' concern regarding the participation of a faculty member who had been present at the staff meeting in question. The Bench reasoned that mere presence at a meeting does not render a faculty member a person "directly or indirectly connected with, involved in, or interested in the subject matter" of a harassment complaint. To hold otherwise would lead to a scenario where entire departments could be excluded from serving on such committees, rendering the institutional mechanism unworkable.

Procedural Hurdles in Institutional Inquiries

Regarding the petitioners' claim that they were denied a personal hearing before the Vice-Chancellor, the Court found no procedural infirmity. It ruled that the absence of a personal hearing does not automatically invalidate a decision, provided the authority has thoroughly considered the written representations and the underlying records. The Court highlighted that the Vice-Chancellor’s decision to order a fresh inquiry successfully addressed the petitioners' primary demand for a de novo investigation by an independent body.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the request for a committee to be constituted at the university level rather than the college level, pointing out that both the complainants and the respondents are employees of the college, and the relevant regulations do not empower the Vice-Chancellor to bypass the statutory authority of the college's executive head in the first instance.

The judgment concluded that while the petitioners’ concerns were urged with fervor, they ultimately lacked the necessary foundation in law to justify the dissolution of the current committee. To ensure justice is served without further delay, the Court issued specific directions to expedite the process. The new committee is now mandated to proceed with the inquiry into the July 2025 complaint and must endeavor to complete the proceedings within 90 days from the date of the judgment, in strict accordance with Section 11(4) of the PoSH Act and applicable UGC regulations. This direction effectively brings the 15-month-long procedural impasse to a close, requiring all parties to engage with the inquiry process before the newly constituted, independent body.