Delhi High Court Probes Limits of Centre's Revisional Authority in 'Udaipur Files' Controversy

NEW DELHI – The Delhi High Court has cast a critical eye on the scope of the Central Government's authority to mandate specific edits to a film, raising fundamental questions about the statutory limits of its revisional powers under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The scrutiny arose during the ongoing legal battle over the release of the film 'Udaipur Files: Kanhaiya Lal Tailor Murder', a cinematic depiction of the brutal 2022 murder of a tailor in Udaipur.

A division bench comprising Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela on Wednesday orally challenged the Centre's order directing six cuts to the film. The court is hearing a plea from Mohammed Javed, one of the accused in the Kanhaiya Lal murder case, who argues that the film's release would irrevocably prejudice his constitutional right to a fair trial.

The bench pointedly asked Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Chetan Sharma, representing the Centre, whether the current version of Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act grants the government the power to act as a "super-censor" by directing specific cuts, a power historically vested with the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC).

"The nature of order you passed, you said effect six cuts etc, whether this authority is available under the statute?" the bench questioned. "In the earlier round, this Court has noticed the change of the provision Section 6, as it existed then and now."

This judicial inquiry cuts to the heart of a significant legal evolution. The previous iteration of Section 6 conferred vast, almost unbridled, powers upon the Central Government. However, following key judgments from the Karnataka High Court and the Supreme Court that declared these extensive powers ultra vires, the provision was amended to curtail the Centre's role.

The court emphasized this legislative shift, stating, "You have to exercise the powers within the four corners of the statute. You can't go beyond that... Earlier there was a vast power with you (Centre), you could pass orders as you may deem fit. The provision was declared ultra vires."

Balancing Article 21 and Article 19(1)(a)

The case presents a classic constitutional dilemma, pitting the sacrosanct right to a fair trial under Article 21 against the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).

Representing the accused, Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy delivered a powerful argument on the potential for the film to subvert the trial process. She contended that with 160 witnesses yet to be examined, the release of a film that admittedly lifts dialogues directly from the police chargesheet would create an atmosphere of prejudice.

"The promise of Article 21, right to fair trial is an essential component of what it means to be a citizen in this country," Guruswamy argued. "When such a movie is released in 1,800 theaters, are we expecting every citizen, every judge, every court master, every witness to be unreasonably prudent?"

She asserted that the film contains "an enormous amount of hate speech" and reminded the court that free speech in India is not absolute, being subject to the reasonable restrictions outlined in Article 19(2). "There are no fetters on Article 21, fair trial. There are enumerable textual fetters on Article 19(1)(a)," she concluded, underscoring the gravity of compromising the judicial process.

The Centre's Exercise of Revisional Power

Guruswamy further dissected the statutory scheme of the Cinematograph Act, arguing that the Centre had overstepped its legal mandate. She submitted that the government's revisional powers are confined to three specific actions: prohibiting broadcast, altering the certification category (e.g., from 'U/A' to 'A'), or suspending the certificate.

"What it cannot do, is what it has done here. Which is suggest cuts, remove dialogues, add disclaimers, modify disclaimers like the censor board, which it cannot do," she stated emphatically. This interpretation suggests the Centre's role is one of broad oversight, not granular content editing, which remains the domain of the expert body, the CBFC.

A "Two-Stage Filter Test" and Presumption of Validity

In defense of the certification process, ASG Chetan Sharma, also appearing for the CBFC, detailed a rigorous "two-stage filter test" the film underwent. Initially, the CBFC's examining committee suggested 55 cuts, primarily to remove "generic overtones." Subsequently, following the High Court's July 10 order relegating the petitioners to the Centre's revisional jurisdiction, a high-level committee was constituted.

This committee, comprising senior officials from multiple ministries and independent advisory panel members, reviewed the film and recommended six additional cuts and a fortified disclaimer. Sharma argued that this exhaustive process ensures that any anxieties about the film's content have been addressed.

He also contended that films depicting controversial subjects must necessarily portray the controversy. "If it is controversial, it has to portray it. It is incumbent," he submitted.

The Chief Justice, however, drew attention to a 2021 Supreme Court judgment which established that once a film is cleared by an expert body like the CBFC, there is a "legal presumption in favour of the film being fit for publication," thereby limiting the scope of judicial review. This places the bench in the delicate position of determining what exceptional circumstances would warrant judicial interference with a certified film.

The Core of the Dispute: The Scope of Section 6

Despite the ASG's defense of the process, the court repeatedly circled back to the central legal question: whether the Centre’s order to "effect six cuts" was a legally permissible exercise of its power under the amended Section 6. The court noted that its previous order on July 10 simply relegated the petitioners to their statutory remedy under Section 6; it did not authorize the Centre to act outside the provision's defined contours.

The bench's persistent questioning suggests a deep concern that the Central Government, in its attempt to address the petitioners' grievances, may have acted as an appellate body to the CBFC, a role the amended statute does not appear to sanction. The distinction is crucial: revisional power implies a review of legality and propriety, whereas appellate power often includes the ability to substitute one's own judgment on the merits, including directing specific edits.

The matter is scheduled for further hearing, and the court's final determination will have significant implications for the film industry, the Censor Board, and the executive's role in regulating artistic expression, especially when it intersects with ongoing criminal proceedings. The judgment is poised to become a key precedent clarifying the separation of powers between the CBFC and the Central Government in the post-amendment era of the Cinematograph Act.