New Reviera Coor Housing Society: Harjang Singh Grewal [retd. ] vs Special Land Acquisition Officer: Union Of India

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1995 Supreme(SC) 1254

1996(1) Supreme 238
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy & K.S. Paripoornan, JJ.
New Reviera Co-op. Housing Society
& Anr. etc. -Appellants
versus
Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors. etc. -Respondents
C.A. No. 11876, 11877 of 1995
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10181, 13371 of 1993)
AND
Harjang Singh Grewal (Regd.) - Petitioner
versus
Union of India & Anr. -Respondents
W.P. (C) No. 853 of 1993
Decided on 4-12-1995

Headnote:(i) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4(1), 6 and 11-A-Delay in making award-Proceedings under Section 4(1) and Section 6 declaration lapsed by operation of Section 11-A-Point not argued before High Court-Learned Counsel contending that point raised in High Court but not dealt with-Mixed questions or facts of law or disputed questions cannot be permitted to be raised for first time in appeal.
(ii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4(1), 6 and 11-A-Determination of compensation-51,000 sq.ft. land involved-Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs.50/- per sq. ft.-Reference proceedings pending in High Court-Theory of restitutive compensation not applicable to determine compensation under Section 23(1)-Once award made and compensation deposited Land Acquisition Officer entitled to take possession and possession so taken stands vested in State-Court declined to issue directions not to eject appellant till reference proceedings becoming final.
(iii) Constitution of India, 1950-Article 21-Whether applicable to acquisition of land by State exercising its power of eminent domain? (Yes)-State with a view to serve public purpose is entitled to acquire land by exercising its power of eminent domain-Owner if dissatisfied with determination of compensation reference under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act provided for-Acquisition of land does not violate right to life offending Article 21 of the Constitution-All flats acquired for public purpose question of mala fide does not arise.
Held : The State with a view to serve public purpose is entitled to acquire the land by exercising its power of eminent domain and the L.A.O. is empowered under Section 23 of the Act to determine the comppensation to the land acquired. Under the scheme of the Act if the owner is dissatisfied with the determination of compensation made by the Collector under Section 11, a reference under Section 18 is provided for and the court would, on adduction of evidence by the parties determine proper compensation payable to the acquired land under Section 23(1) of the Act. Burden is on the claimant to prove the compensation offered is inadequate and seek determination of compensation under Section 23(1). (Para 6)
Right to shelter is undoubtedly a fundamental right. A person may be rendered shelterless, but it may be to serve a larger public purpose. Far from saying that he will be rendered shelterless this Court did not circumscribe the state s power of eminent domain, even though a person whose land is being acquired compulsorily for the public purpose is rendered shelterless. If that contention is given credence no land can be acquired under the Act for any public purpose since in all such cases the owner/interested person would be deprived of his property. He is deprived of it according to law. Since the owner is unwilling for the acquisition of his property for public purpose, Section 23(2) provides solatium for compulsory acquisition against his wishes. Under those circumstances, it cannot be held that the acquisition for public purpose violates Art. 21 of the Constitution or the right to livelihood or right to shelter or dignity of person. (Para 7)
It is true that on the earlier occasion when the flats were requisitioned by the State for public purpose, namely, allotment to officers, Central or State Governments at the instance of the owners, litigation had ended by an amendment to the local Act giving further life for the eviction of the person in possession. It is not necessary in this case to dilate on that aspect of the matter. There was a dispute with regard to the title between the appellant and his predecessor in title. That is not a ground to hold that the acquisition is mala fide. As stated earlier, since all the flats including flat No. 27 have been acquired for public purpose, the question of mala fides does not arise. (Para 9)

ORDER

Leave granted.

It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the delay in making the award renders the proceedings under Section 4(1) and Section 6 declaration lapsed by operation of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Unfortunately, this point was not argued before the High Court. Learned counsel contends that this question was raised in the High Court but was not dealt with. It is settled law that this Court would consider only matters dealt with or stated in the order of the High Court. Several grounds might have been raised, but it often times happens that only a few would be argued when the case was heard. We cannot look into the averments made in affidavits filed by the parties in this Court. Under these circumstances, it can be assumed that though the contention was raised, the counsel had not argued the matter. Therefore, we cannot permit the counsel, to raise mixed questions or facts of law or disputed questions for the first time in the appeal.

2. It is next contended that the Land Acquisition Officer awarded at Rs. 50/- per sq. ft. A total extent of 51,000 sq. ft. land is involved in these proceedings and in the city of Bombay it would be difficult for the appellants to acquire alternative flats with the amount offered by the Land Acquisition Officer. The theory of restitutive compensation is not applicable to determine compensation under Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894. It is also sought to be contended that the respondents admitted in the affidavit filed in the High Court that the value of the compensation is much more than what was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer. Since reference proceedings are pending in the High Court on the original side for determination of compensation, we decline to go into the question. It is, therefore, argued that a direction may be issued not to have the appellants ejected till the reference proceedings become final. We cannot accede to the contention. Once the award has been made and compensation has been deposited or paid under Section 31 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer is entitled to take possession and the possession thereby taken stands vested in the State under Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances. Under those circumstances, we cannot give the direction sought for. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

3. It is needless to mention that a request may be made to the learned Judge of the original side to dispose of the reference application as expediously as possible.

C.A. @ SLP (C) No. 13371/93 & WP (C) No. 853/93 :

4. Leave granted. The appeal and the Writ Petition are disposed of together.

5. The only controversy raised in these cases is whether Art. 21 of the Constitution would apply when the land is acquired by the State exercising its power of eminent domain. Admittedly, New Reviera Coop. Housing Society, Bombay consists of several flats which was notified for acquiring the land for public purpose. Flat No. 27 which belonged to the appellant is part of the above flats. Consequent to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Act followed by declaration under Section 6, the Land Acquisition Officer made his award under Section 11 on 22.1.1993. He determined the compensation at a sum of Rs. 13,11,299/- for the entire building. Dissatisfied with the amount offered by the Land Acquisition Officer, a reference under Section 18 was sought for and the matter is now pending decision in the court for determination of compensation.

6. The appellant herein filled a writ petition contending that the acquisition is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution violating his dignity of person, and deprives his right to shelter and also make him shelterless. He referred to various steps taken by him to have his title to the flat established. It is not necessary to dilate upon all the details in that behalf. Suffice it to state that as on the date of the notification, he was the owner of flat No. 27. The q

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