1996(5) SUPREME 1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Suhas C. Sen, JJ.
Union of India & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Ltd. -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 7722 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6034 of 1996)
Decided 6-5-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Respondent : Mr. Hidayatullah
Held : Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 27 (both before and after amendment) provide for filing an application for amendment within a period of six months of the payment of duty except in a case where it has been paid under protest. According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. The question is whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Article 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the Rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. May be the High Court or a Civil Court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of Civil Court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. (Para 8)
ORDER
Leave granted. Heard the counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal is directed against, what is called, "Minutes of the order" made by the Bombay High Court on 23rd June, 1995. The order reads :
"1. The Petitioners will file an application for refund, in respect of the consignments imported as referred to in this Petition, in the prescribed from as per the amended Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962, within 2 weeks from today.
2. The Respondents will dispose of the aforesaid Refund Claim, on merits, within 10 weeks from the filing of the same.
3. The Respondents shall not reject the refund application on the ground that it is time barred.
4. The Petition is disposed of accordingly.
5. No order as to costs."
3. The Revenue is questioning the validity and correctness of clause (3) of the said order whereby the High Court has directed the authorities under the Customs Act not to reject the respondent s application for refund on the ground that it is time barred and to dispose it of on merits.
4. The respondent imported certain goods between February 1983 and July 1985. There was a dispute between the respondent and the Customs Authorities with respect to the classification of goods. The duty as demanded by the authorities was paid by the respondent and the goods cleared. Thereafter, the respondent filed the refund application. The appellant says that the respondent preferred an appeal which was rejected by the Appellate Authority and that instead of filing the further appeal, the respondent approached the Bombay High Court. The respondent disputes this statement. He says that he did not file any appeal but approached the High Court straight away. Be that as it may. The prayer in the writ petition was to issue an appropriate writ, order and direction to the Customs Authorities to refund the excess customs duty levied upon the goods imported by the respondent and collected from it. The respondent also claimed interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the said order. The writ petition was filed in the year 1987.
5. The appellants state that they contested the writ petition but the High Court passed the impugned minutes of the order . Indeed Mr. Hidayatullah, learned counsel for the respondent states that the order impugned herein is the standard order which is usually passed by the Bombay High Court in all such matters.
6. In this appeal we are not concerned either with the maintainability of the writ petition or its merits. The only contention raised and which we are considering is whether the direction given by the High Court that the Customs Authorities "shall not reject the refund application on the ground that it is time barred", is valid in law. With respect we think that it is not.
7. In Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. M/s Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Jalandhar1, this Court had observed :
"6. It appears that where the duty has been levied without the authority of law or without reference to any statutory authority or the specific provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have no application, the decision will be guided by the general law and the date of limitation would be the starting point when the mistake or the error comes to light. But in making claims for refund before the departmental authority, an assessee is bound within four corners of the Statute and the period of limitation prescribed in the Central Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder must be adhered to. The authorities functioning under the Act are bound by the provisions of the Act. If the proceedings are taken under the Act by the department, the provisions of limitation prescribed in the Act will prevail. It may, however, be open to the department to initiate proceedings in the Civil Court for recovery of the amount due to the department in case when such a remedy is open on the ground that the money received by the assessee was not in the nature of refund. This was the view taken by the Tribuna
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