1996 Supreme(SC) 1049

1996(5) Supreme 414
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S. Anand and M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.
S. Gopal Reddy -Appellant
versus
State of Andhra Pradesh -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 1994
Decided on 11-7-1996

VERY IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Any demand of dowry made before at or after the marriage, where such demand is made as a consideration for marriage would attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. For offence u/s. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, marriage would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all.
3. In the appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court, generally speaking, does not interfere with the findings recorded on appreciation of evidence by the courts below except where there appears to have occurred gross miscarriage of justice or there exist sufficient reasons which justify the examination of some of the relevant evidence by this court itself.

Headnote:(i) Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961-Section 2-Dowry-Definition-Any demand of dowry made before, at or after marriage, where such demand is made as a consideration for marriage would attract provisions of Section 4 of the Act-Marriage would include a proposed marriage also-Voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or bridegroom, of a traditional nature which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection or regard-Not to fall within mischief of expression dowry punishable under the Act.

       Held : Interpreting the expression dowry and demand in the context of the scheme of the Act, we are of the opinion that any demand of dowry made before at or after the marriage, where such demand is made as a consideration for marriage would attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. (Para 11)

       Further held : Any "demand" of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of dowry under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is relatable only to the consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the "demand of dowry" leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression dowry under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative factor. The Act is a piece of social legislature which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro quo for marriage is prohibited and not to the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection or regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression dowry made punishable under the Act. (Para 8)

       (ii) Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961-Section 4-Conviction for offence under-Marriage between parties did not take place-No satisfactory evidence to show that appellant cancelled marriage on account of non-fulfilment of dowry demand allegedly made by him-PW 1, sole witness being interested witness-His evidence suffers from serious incon-sistencies and exaggerations-Letters which PW 1 claims to have him- self received from appellant regarding cancellation of marriage not produced-Prosecution failed to establish either genuineness or authorship of disputed letters allegedly written by appellants-Conviction of appellant not legally sustainble-High Court rightly found elder brother of appellant guilty of offence.

       Held : The evidence of PW1, who is the sole witness, suffers from serious inconsistencies and exaggerations. He admittedly is the most interested person to establish his case. He is the complainant in the case. It was he who had made two complaints to the Director of National Police Academy against the appellant before lodging the FIR, Ex. P20. He is a lawyer by profession. He would be presumed to know the importance of the demand made by the appellant on the two occasions. He, however, has offered no explanation as to why those facts are conspicuous by their absence from the FIR and the two complaints made to the Director of the Academy. PE1, does not appear to us to be a wholly reliable witness. He has made conscious improvements at the terial to implicate the appellant by indulging in exaggerations and that detracts materially from his reliability. Prudence, therefore, requires that the Court should look for corroboration of his evidence in material particulars before accepting the same. Neither Ms. Vani nor Shri Narsingh Rao in whose presence the appellant is said to have demanded dowry have been examined as witnesses. The failure to examine them is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case. It was Ms. Vani who could have deposed about the circumstances which led to the breakdown of the matrimonial negotiations, before its maturity. Various letter which PW1 produced at the trial were allegedly written by the appellant to Ms. Vani. None of them had been addressed to PW1, yet he came forward to prove those letters and the courts allowed him to do so. Since, the appellant has denied the authorship of those letters and claimed that the same have been fabricated, it was desirable for the prosecution to examine Ms. Vani in connection with those letters. The appellant is alleged to be the author of the letters more particularly letters Ex. P-1, P-6, P-7, and P-9. from the opinion of PW3, the handwriting expert prosecution has sought to corroborate the evidence of PW1 regarding the authorship of those letters. The opinion of PW3, the Assistant Director in the State Forensic & Science Laboratory, Hyderabad, in our view can not be said to be of a clinching type to attribute the authorship of those letters to the appellant. (Para 20)

       Further held that the demand of dowry in connection with and as consideration for the marriage of the appellant with Ms. Vani was made by the second accused, the elder brother of the appellant and that no such demand is established to have been directly made by the appellant. The High Court rightly found the second accused, guilty of an offence under Section 4 of the Act against which S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2336 of 1990, as earlier noticed stands dismissed by this Court on 15.2.1991. The evidence on the record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Act was made by the appellant. May be the appellant was in agreement with his elder brother regarding demand of dowry but convictions cannot be based on such assumptions without the offence being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The courts below appear to have allowed emotions and sentiments, rather than legally admissible and trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment. The evidence on the record does not establish the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 23)

       (iii) EVIDENCE-Expert evidence -Admissibility-Document evidence -Mode of proof.

       Held : The evidence of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally consider it as offering conclusive proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking independent and reliable corroboration. (Para 21)

       Further held : Section 67 of the Evidence Act enjoins that before a document can be looked into, it has to be proved. Section 67, of course, does not prescribe any particular mode of proof. Section 47 of the Evidence Act which occurs in the chapter relating to`relevancy of facts` provides that the opinion of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of a particular person is a relevant fact. Similarly, opinion of a handwriting expert is also a relevant fact for identifying any handwriting. The oridinary method or proving a document is by calling as a witness the person who had executed the document or saw it being executed or signed or is otherwise qualified and competent to express his opinion as to the handwriting. There are some other modes of proof of documents also as by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or through the evidence of a handwriting expert under Section 45 of the Act, besides by the admission of the person against whom the document is intended to be used. The receiver of the document, on establishing his acquaintance with the handwriting of the person and competence to identify the writing with which he is familiar, may also prove a document. These modes are legitimate methods of proving documents but before they can be accepted they must bear sufficient strength to carry conviction. (Para 22)

       (iv) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES-Text and context of entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in the statute-Purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary-Penal statute must be strictly construed-Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is not proper to look to dictionaries etc. to find out meaning of expression. (Paras 8, 9 & 12)

       (v) Constitution of India-Article 136-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Supreme Court does not interfere with findings recorded on appreciation of evidence by courts below except where there appears to have occurred gross miscarriage of justice or there exist sufficient reasons which justify examination of some of the relevant evidence of this court itself. (Para 13)