IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Publication of declaration u/s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, accords conclusiveness to public purpose and it is for the appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose of that of the appropriate Government.
2. Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose.
3. So long as the public purpose subsists the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be questioned.

ORDER

We have heard Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the Act ) was published on May 17, 1988 acquiring land over which the workshop was situated for public purpose, namely, for the expansion of dockyard for defence purpose. The petitioner had challenged the validity of the said notification and the declaration published under Section 6 on May 25, 1989 on diverse grounds. Subsequently, the award came to be passed on January 15, 1991 and the same also came to be challenged by the petitioners-Union. The main controversy raised by the petitioner is that they are the persons interested within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act and in conducting enquiry under Section 5(A), the Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice under sub-section (2) of Section 5A. Issuance of notice and hearing of it is mandatory and the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement vitiates the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. We find no force in the contention.

2. The only scope of the enquiry under Section 5A is whether the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land is suitable for the purpose or is an arable land. Besides these questions, the inter se claim of the employer and the workmen of payment of wages and extent thereof are alien to the enquiry. Sub-section (3) of Section 5A makes the scope beyond pale of doubt. If the interested person is entitled to compensation or by implication bound by award of compensation or excess compensation is an interested person. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim to be persons interested for the purpose of an enquiry under Section 5A.

3. Obvious, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisition is not for a public purpose; it is a mala fide acquisition and a vague public purpose of defence and so acquisition is not valid in law. Precedents have been copiously cited in the High Court in that behalf. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench elaborately considered them and held that acquisition for defence purpose is a public purpose. Rodrigue case to Tamil Nadu Housing Board case settled the controversy holding that acquisition for housing development is not a vague purpose. Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose. Publication of declaration under Section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is for the appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. We wholly agree with the view taken by the High Court in that behalf. As regards person interested this Court dealt with the controversy from Himalayan Tiles to Neively Lignites Corporation case and the Constitution Bench decision, per majority. The petitioner, therefore, is not a person interested. Notice and hearing of it under Section 5A(2) is not mandatory.

4. It is next contended that since the management has gone before the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act for closure of the workshop and the Government had refused to give such permission, in the absence of such a permission, the acquisition cannot be proceeded with. While the Industrial Disputes Act permits the workshop to be continued in operation, the Act deprives the workmen of that right and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be heard in that behalf. We find that the contention is wholly misconceived and the petitioner has chartered out a mistaken course of action. It is true that as a consequence of the acquisition of land, the workshop was likely to be closed. The material circumstance to be considered is whether the State is entitled to acquire the land over which the workshop stands. The very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent domain by the S