IMPORTANT POINT
Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be refused arbitrarily and it should be exercised on sound principles of law.

ORDER

 This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras made on 12.6.1996 in LPA No. 72/91. The petitioner had filed O.S. No. 6/77 on September 10, 1980 before the Second Additional Sub-Judge at Pondicherry for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated October 18, 1976 to convey the property in possession as tenants under the agreement. It is their case that a sum of Rs. 31,000/- was sale consideration and a sum of Rs. 4,000/- and odd was paid as part consideration. The balance consideration was Rs. 28,500/-. He was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract but the respondents were avoiding to execute the sale deed. Though the trial court found that respondents 1 and 2 committed breach of the agreement of sale but denied to them specific performance of the agreement on the ground that respondent No. 3 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of prior agreement with the petitioner. The petitioner filed the appeal in the High Court. Pending appeal, he died. Therefore, his legal representatives have come on record. The learned Single Judge by judgment and decree dated September 11, 1980 agreed with those findings and held that the 3rd respondent was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the agreement. In the impugned judgment the Division Bench rejected the claim on the additional ground that the plaintiff did not come to the Court with clean hands. Therefore, he is disentitled to relief of the specific performance. Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, (for short, the Act ) the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be refused arbitrarily. The discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate Court.

2. It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief must come to the Court with clean hands. In "other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. The Division Bench has pointed out in the judgment three grounds which disentitle the plaintiff to the equitable relief as he came with a positive case of incorrect and false facts as, set out in paragraphs 4 to 6 thus:

"On a perusal of the records we are entirely in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. It is quite clear that the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. There are three circumstances which are pointed out by the learned Judge and we find that they are sufficient to warrant refusal of the claim for specific performance. First is that the plaintiff claimed that he was already in possession of Door No. 2/53 as a lessee and he was given possession of Door No. 1/53 on the date of the agreement itself, viz., 18.10.1976 by defendants 1 and 2. But, in the course of evidence he did not say anything about taking possession pursuant to the sale agreement. On the contrary, he deposed falsely that he did not mention in the plaint about getting possession of Door No. 1/53 on 18.10.1976. It is mentioned " in the evidence that Door No. 1/53 was not given to the plaintiff at any time in December, 1976. The tenant who was occupying the said portion has vacated the same and gave possession to defendants 1 and 2 who is turn handed over the same to third defendant. Thus, the case of the plaintiff regarding possession of Door No.1/53 is false. Learned counsel contends that there was no mention in the plaint as to the date on which he took possession of Door No. 1/53. This contention is not correct. In paragraph 5 of the plaint it is mentioned specifically that in pursuance of the agreement, the plaintiff who was in possession of item No. 2 was given possession of item No. 1 on that date and that he was in possession of both the items since then under the agreement dated 18.10.1976. This plea is cl