ORDER

Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

2. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated March 22, 1994 made by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in RFA (OS) No. 27/94. The admitted facts are that the respondent came to be appointed on March 7, 1956 as Section Officer in the Central Public Works Department. Thereafter, the Executive Engineer discovered on October 6, 1956 that he had the appointment on producing false certificates. Consequently, a report was laid under Sections 420, 468 and 127, Indian Penal Code and he was kept under suspension. Independent thereof, exercising the power under Rule 5 of the Central Government Services. (Temporary) Service Rules 1949, his services were terminated by order dated September 10, 1957. The respondent after his acquittal by the criminal court laid the suit in forma pauperis on August 13, 1965 seeking declaration that the termination of his service was wrong, unconstitutional, that he should be deemed to have continued in service and that he was entitled to Rs. 84,000/- by way of salary and damages by way of expenses incurred by him to defend the criminal cases etc. The trial Judge (single Judge of the High Court) by his judgment dated March 22, 1994, though held that the termination order was unconstitutional, since he was terminated without compliance of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. On appeal, the Division Bench held that the suit was not barred by limitation for the reason that he had laid the suit after the rejection of his application for reinstatement and consequent to the acquittal by the criminal court on May 8, 1964 and that, therefore, it was within limitation. The suit was decreed.

3. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned counsel for the Union of India, contended that the Division Bench has committed grievous error of law in decreeing the suit. According to the learned counsel, cause of action for the suit had arisen on September 10, 1957; the limitation for the declaration of the suit is 3 years from the date of the dismissal. Since the suit was filed on August 13, 1965, it was clearly barred by limitation. In support thereof she placed reliance on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh1. The learned counsel also contended that this is not a case of dismissal on the basis of misconduct and criminal charge but is independent thereof and that, therefore, the acquittal does not furnish any cause of action to lay the suit as emphasised by the respondent-plaintiff. The High Court was wrong in laying emphasis in that behalf.

4. Shri Keshav Dayal, learned senior counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the order of suspension does indicate that the respondent was kept under suspension pending criminal proceedings; he was ultimately acquitted. Thereafter, he made a representation for reinstatement; on its rejection, the suit came to be laid and, therefore, the suit was not barred by limitation. In support thereof he placed reliance on two judgments of this Court, viz., Babulal v. State of Haryana & Ors.2 and State of M.P. v. Syed Qamarali3. He also contended that the appeal was incompetent since the respondent had impleaded the Union of India as the first party-defendant and the aggrieved person would be only the Union of India and not the Secretary. The Special Leave Petition also was barred by limitation. He also contends that on the peculiar facts and circumstances, since the respondent was under suspension right from 1957 and he had the relief from the Division Bench in 1994 with all consequential benefits, it may not warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

5. Having given due consideration to the contentions of the counsel and having gone through the facts and circumstances of the case, first question that arises is: whether the appeal has been competently laid? It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Unio