1996(7) Supreme 753
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy, Faizan Uddin and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. -Appellants
versus
D.R. Laxmi & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1993
Decided on 12-9-1996
Counsel of the Parties :
For the Appellants : Aruneshwar Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Rajinder Sachhar, Sr. Advocate, H.K. Puri, Ujjwal Banerjee and Rajesh Srivastava, Advocates.
For the Respondent Nos. 5-6 : Ms. Niranjana Singh, Advocate for Ms. Sushma Suri, Advocate.
(ii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 17(4)-High Court held that the acquired land was not an arable or waste land and the exercise of power u/s 17(4) of the Act was bad in law-Though lands were situated in urban area, it were capable of raising crops then it remained to be arable lands-Exercise of power u/s 17(4) of the Act was not bad in law.
Held : In considering the question whether the land is arable or waste, dictionary meaning does not help the Court to solve the problem. Pragmatic approach is required to be adopted in considering the question on the facts in each case. Though the lands in this case were situated in urban area, the Urban Land Ceiling Act itself recognises existence of the agricultural lands within the urban agglomeration and they are dealt with accordingly. When the lands were capable of the raising crops, they remained to be arable lands. Therefore, the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) by the Government was not bad in law. On facts, it is an arable land capable to cultivation. It is seen that it being a small area comprising servant quarters as part of a large area, including six areas of respondent s lands, it cannot be said that the rest of the land is occupied by the buildings or is within the compound though situated in urban area. The view of the High Court, therefore, was clearly erroneous. (Para 6)
(iii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 4(1)-Substance of notification was not published in the locality-Acquisition had become final-Award of Court u/s 26 enhancing compensation was accepted-High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6 of the Act.
Held : Extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. (Para 10)
Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act does not require the notification to specify whether the land is arable or waste land (!) (!) .
Once land has vested in the State under land acquisition proceedings, courts are generally not justified in interfering with the notification published under the appropriate provisions of the Act (!) (!) .
The object of publishing a Section 4(1) notification is to inform that land is needed for a public purpose or likely to be needed, and to authorize entry and measurement, rather than to specify the nature of the land (!) (!) .
The question of whether land is arable or waste involves a mixed question of fact and law, requiring a pragmatic and case-specific approach rather than reliance solely on dictionary meanings (!) (!) .
The exercise of powers under Section 17(4) is justified if the land is capable of cultivation, even if situated in an urban area, and the mere fact that land is within an urban area does not negate its arability (!) .
The publication of the substance of the notification in the locality is a mandatory requirement, and failure to do so can impact the validity of subsequent proceedings, although proceedings may still be considered final if they have become so after certain stages (!) (!) .
Delay in challenging acquisition proceedings and finality of the proceedings, including possession and compensation awards, limit the court's discretion to interfere with notifications and declarations under the Act (!) (!) .
The acquisition process, once final, including the passing of awards and acceptance of compensation, generally cannot be invalidated by courts unless there has been a procedural violation that renders the proceedings void ab initio (!) .
The non-publication of the substance of the notification in the locality, if proven, can be a ground to quash the notification and subsequent proceedings, but this must be considered in the context of the entire acquisition process and its finality (!) .
The court's extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with land acquisition proceedings is limited when proceedings are final, possession has been taken, and compensation has been determined and accepted (!) .
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ORDER
This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan made on September 2, 1985 in W.P. No. 602/78. The admitted facts are that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the Act ) was published in the State Gazette on March 23, 1977 acquiring 31.28 acres of land for defence purpose. Enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with in exercise of the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and declaration under Section 6 was published on April 28, 1976. Possession was taken on May 19, 1977. The award was passed under Section 11 on March 21, 1978. The reference under Section 18 was sought and made in March 1978 to Civil Court for enhancement of the compensation. In September 1978, the respondent filed writ petition in the High Court seeking to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6. The learned single Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench has held that the acquired land is not an arable or waste land and, therefore, the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) of the Act was bad in law. Substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was not published in the locality. The notification under Section 4(1) did not mention that it was a waste or arable land. On these grounds, the learned Judges have quashed the notification. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
2. Shri Aruneshwar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, has contended that the view of the High Court is clearly erroneous. It is not necessary that the notification under Section 4(1) should contain a declaration that the needed land is a waste or arable land. The finding that it is neither waste nor arable land is not correct so long as the land is capable of cultivation. If no cultivation was made it would still be arable land. Therefore, the view that it is neither waste nor arable land is not correct. It is difficult to accept that the entire six acres of land which is now claimed by the respondents was within the compound wall as found by the High Court. The view that substance of the notification was not published in the locality was not correct in law without any further discussion on facts or legal principles. Even the finding cannot be well supported by any material on record; in law the High Court was wrong in interfering under Article 226 of the Constitution. Shri Rajinder Sachar, learned senior counsel for the respondents, contended that since the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was not published which is mandatory, the notification under Section 4(1), and declaration under Section 6 could be challenged at any time even after the award was made or possession was taken. Since publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is the foundation for taking further steps for the acquisition, procedural steps required under the Act should be followed. The substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was not published in the locality. So all the proceedings which had subsequently been taken place stand nullified. Therefore, the Court would in an appropriate case grant the declaration including to quash the award and future steps. He also contended that it would be difficult to accept that the lands are arable lands, if not waste land. The finding that the land is arable land is based on consideration of the material on record. Therefore, it is not arable land. Further, it is contended that the respondent had stated in the High Court that he was prepared to accept the compensation provided the date of notification under Section 4(1) was shifted to four or five years later to the actual date of the notification under Section 4(1) Published on March 23, 1977. He would stand by the same offer and, therefore, it is not a case warranting interference.
3. The questions, therefore, are: (1) whether the notification under Section 4(1) should contain the declaration that the lands are waste
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