IMPORTANT POINT
It is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Headnote:(i) Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Section 2(6A)-Expression member of family -Whether a Foster son would be a member of family in relation to a landlord within the meaning of Section 2(6A) ?-(Yes, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case)-It is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person-It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
       Held that Arunachala Bakthar is the brother s son of the Appellant s husband who, therefore, was related to the appellant s husband by blood and was his heir not only under the old Mitakshara Law (as brother s son) but also under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as a class-II heir. Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by the appellant and her husband and was living all along with them. He apparently acted as a devoted son to the appellant s husband and helped him in all possible ways including the business which he carried on. Appellant s husband acted also as a devoted father to Arunachala Bakthar in whose favour he also executed a will and after reciting therein that Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by him, he bequeathed his business jointly to him and the appellant specifying further that after the death of the appellant, the business shall be carried on by Arunachala Bakthar. Appellant s husband also, significantly, did not bequeath the residential house absolutely in favour of the appellant but created only a life estate therein for her. The remainder was bequeathed to the children of Arunachala Bakthar. (Para 32)
       In view of the above facts an circumstances, Arunachala Bakthar was clearly a member of the family of the appellant s husband within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act and consequently, the appellant could well file an application for eviction of the respondent from the premises in question not only for her need but also for the need of her "Foster Son", Arunachala Bakthar. (Para 33)
       (ii) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES-While interpreting a definition, a construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat purpose of Act has to be ignored and not accepted-Where definition or expression is preceded by words unless the context otherwise requires -Definition set out in the Section is to applied-However, normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that definition could not be applied. (Paras 11 & 12)
       (iii) WORDS AND PHRASES-Word family -Word son -Meanings. (Paras 14 to 22)

JUDGMENT

S. Saghir Ahmad, J.-Whether a "Forster Son" would be a "member of family" in relation to a landlord within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short, the Act) is the question involved in this appeal which is directed against the Judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court laying down that a "Forster Son" would, under a given set of facts, be a member of the landlord s family and thus overruled the Single Judge decision in Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan1.

2. The appellant is the tenant in respect of a non-residential building since 1972 when it was owned by one Gnanasambandam who on 10.5.1979 transferred the said building in favour of the respondent.

3. An application under Section 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was filed by the respondent for the eviction of the appellant on the ground inter alia of personal need and wilful default. It was pointed out by the respondent in her application that her husband Thiruvannamalai

1. 1981(1) Madras Law Journal 250.

Bakthar who carried on the lime-shell business had, together with the respondent, brought up one Arunachala Bakthar as their son and member of their family. Thiruvannamalai Bakthar died leaving behind a will dated 30th November, 1970 in which it was specified that Arunachala Bakthar who was the son of his real brother was brought up by him and it was through him that he was carrying on the lime-shell business. The will created a life estate in favour of the respondent in respect of the residential house and the remainder was vested in the children of Arunachala Bakthar. The will further recited that the lime-shell business would be carried on by the respondent and Arunachala Bakthar but after the death of the respondent, Arunachala Bakthar alone would carry on the business. The premises in occupation of the appellant were said to be required for carrying on the lime-shell business for herself and for her son Arunachala Bakthar.

4. The appellant contested the application and raised the plea that Arunachala Bakthar was not the natural son of the petitioner and consequently he would not be a "member of the family" within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act. The petition, it was contended, was not maintainable and he was not liable to be evicted particularly as he had not committed wilful default in the payment of rent.

5. It was found by the Rent Controller that Arunachala Bakthar was the son of deceased Thiruvannamalai Bakthar and, therefore, the petition was maintainable for the eviction of the appellant from the premises in question on the ground of bona fide need of the respondent herself and that of Arunachala Bakthar. He consequently allowed the petition on the ground of bona fide need, though it was found by him that the appellant had not committed wilful default in payment of rent.

6. The appellate authority, however, following the decision of the Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan (supra), reversed the decision of the Rent Controller and held that Arunachala Bakthar was merely a Foster Son of Thiruvannamalai Bakthar and, therefore, he would not be a member of his family.

7. The respondent challenged this decision in the High Court where a learned Single Judge (S. Mohan, J., as he then was) doubted the decision in Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan, (supra) and referred the matter to a Division Bench for decision on the question whether a Foster Son would be a member of the family of the landlord within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act. The Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that a "Foster Son" would be a member of the family and, therefore, the petition filed by the respondent for the eviction of the appellant from the premises in question for bona fide need of herself and that of her "Foster Son" Arunachala Bakthar was maintainable. It is against this

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1996 Supreme(SC) 2193

1997(1) Supreme 13SUPREME COURT OF INDIAKuldip Singh and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.K. V. Muthu -AppellantversusAngamuthu Ammal -RespondentCivil Appeal No. 10538 of 1983Decided on 17-12-1996Counsel for the Parties :For the Appellant : K.K. Mani, Advocate.For the Respondent : A.T.M. Sampath, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINTIt is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Cases Referred (3)

IMPORTANT POINT
It is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.