IMPORTANT POINT
Unless prosecution proved that money paid was not towards any lawful collection or legal remuneration, the Court can not take recourse to presumption of law contemplated in Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, though Court is not precluded from drawing appropriate presumption u/s 114 of Evidence Act.

JUDGMENT

Thomas, J.-Appellant was a Sub-Registrar in the Registration Department under Maharashtra Government. The Special Judge at Latur convicted him under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ( the Act for short) for receiving a sum of Rs. 60/- as illegal gratification from one Shesherao Patil (PW-1). Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- on each count. High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.

2. The official duties of the Sub-Registrar included, among other things, receiving applications for certified copies of registered documents and issuance of such copies. Appellant was Sub-Registrar of Nilanga Sub- Registry office. PW-1 Shesherao Patil, an employee of postal department, was in need of certified copies of three sale deeds. When he approached the appellant he was told to submit necessary applications on stamp paper and to pay an amount of Rs. 20/- for each certified copy. PW-1 reported the matter to the Anti Corruption Bureau. A trap was arranged to catch the appellant red-handed. On 8.8.1986 PW-1 went to the office of the appellant and presented the applications for copies of the sale deeds which he required and then he paid Rs. 60/- to the appellant. As soon as appellant put the amount in his shirt pocket PW-1 transmitted a signal to the waiting anti corruption squad and they rushed to the office and caught him red-handed. These are the facts found against the appellant.

3. There is no scope for any dispute that appellant received the amount of Rs. 60/- from PW-1. In fact learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute the aforesaid finding. The stand of the appellant is that he received the amount as advance money which he was required to collect as per the Rules in force. His further case is that before he could make any entry in the books he was caught by the anti corruption officials on the premise that he received illegal gratification from PW-1.

4. Appellant, when questioned by the trial Judge under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated, inter alia, thus : "On 7.8.1986 the complainant came to my office and told me that he required copies of three sale deeds. I had asked him to submit three applications in writing and bring Rs. 20/- for each copy to be paid in advance. On 8.6.1986 the complainant gave me applications and paid Rs. 20/- for each copy. Thus in all he paid Rs. 60/-. I was about to issue receipt but just then people rushed into my office and therefore I could not issue receipts." His contention was repelled by the trial Judge as well as by the High Court. Learned single Judge of the High Court while confirming the conviction and sentence has mainly relied on the presumption of law envisaged in Section 4(1) of the Act.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both courts failed to take into account certain broad probabilities in this case and it resulted in the wrong conclusion that he received the amount as illegal gratification.

6. The presumption of law contemplated in Section 4(1) of the Act is in para materia the same as the legal presumption mentioned in Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 4(1) of the Act enjoins that upon proof of a certain premise "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved that" he accepted the gratification as a motive or reward etc. If the primary condition specified in the sub-section is satisfied by the prosecution the court is legally bound to proceed on the footing that the public servant/accused has accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing any official work in exercise of official functions. The burden stands shifted to the accused to prove the contrary. But such shifting would not become necessary until prosecution proves that what the accused has acc