IMPORTANT POINTS
1. The settlement contemplated by Section 2(P) of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules is a written settlement and not an oral agreement and a written settlement arrived at between the parties could not be varied or modified except by a written settlement.
2. Where money due is on the basis of some amount predetermined, the rate of which stands determined in terms of the settlement, an award or under Chapter VA or VB, and the period for which the arrears are claimed is also known, the case would be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 33(C) of the Industrial Disputes Act as only a calculation of the amount is required to be made.

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 2(p) and 33C(1) and (2)-Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957-Rule 58-Written settlement between appellant and employees union relating to service conditions of workmen for period from 1986 to 1988-Rate of VDA (variable dearness allowance) fixed-No oral or written agreement superseding 1986 settlement-Obligations under old settlement even after expiry of period of its operation, would continue in force-No oral agreement could be pleaded to vary, modify or supersede a written settlement-Claim for recovery of VDA, seeking to enforce obligations under earlier agreement-Petition u/s 33C(1)-Whether maintainable ?-(Yes)-Distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 33(C).
       Held : A conjoint reading of Section 2(p) of the Act and Rule 58 (supra) unmistakably shows that the settlement contemplated by the said provisions is a written settlement and no an oral settlement. It is not in dispute that the 1986 settlement was a written settlement arrived at between the parties. It could not, therefore, be varied or modified except by a written settlement or by a written memorandum duly signed by the parties incorporating the terms of the so called understanding. Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 also lays down that when the terms of any contract, grant or settlement, as are required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved as per the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, no evidence of any oral agreement of settlement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. Thus, both on facts of the instant case as well as on the interpretation of law, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that there was no oral understanding between the parties and that the so called oral agreement pleaded by the appellants could not in any case vary the terms of the 1986 settlement is unexceptionable. (Para 10)
       In the instant case the period of earlier settlement of 1986 had expired but the expiry of that period would not affect the enforcement of the binding obligations flowing from the earlier settlement till substituted by a fresh settlement. The obligations arising from the earlier settlement would continue to remain in force, though as a contract and not as a binding settlement, but that would make no difference to the maintainability of a claim petition under Section 33(1) of the Act so long as the requirements of that sub-section are satisfied and the obligations sought to be enforced flow from an earlier settlement or an award or under Chapter VA or VB of the Act. (Para 13)
       Further held : An analysis of the scheme of Sections 33C(1) and 33C(2) shows that the difference between the two sub-sections is quite obvious. While the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, sub-section (2) deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Thus, where the amount due to the workmen, flowing from the obligations under a settlement, is pre-determined and ascertained or can be arrived at by any arithmetical calculation or simplicitor verification and the only inquiry that is required to be made is whether it is due to the workman or not, recourse to the summary proceedings under Section 33C(1) of the Act is not only appropriate but also desirable to prevent harassment to the workmen. Sub-section (1) of Section 33C entitles the workmen to apply to the appropriate Government for issuance of a certificate of recovery for any money due to them under an award or a settlement or under the provisions of Chapter VA and the Government, if satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. After the requisite certificate is issued by the Government to the Collector, the Collector is under a statutory duty to recover the amounts due under the certificate issued to him. The procedure is aimed at providing a speedy, cheap and summary manner of recovery of the amount due, which the employer has wrongfully withheld. It, therefore, follows that where money due is on the basis of some amount predetermined like the VDA, the rate of which stands determined in terms of the settlement an award or under Chapter VA or VB, and the period for which the arrears are claimed is also known the case would be covered by sub-section (1) as only a calculation of the amount is required to be made. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT

Dr. Anand, J.-Leave granted in both special leave petitions.

2. The appellants are sister concerns. Their Letters Patent Appeals were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 19.6.1995 upholding the judgment and order passed by the learned Singles Judge on 18.7.1994 dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants. These appeals are directed against the common judgment and order dated 19.6.1995.

3. On 9th of December 1986 a settlement was arrived at between the appellants and the employees union relating to service conditions of the workmen for the period 1.4.86 to 30.6.88. The settlement inter alia provided that VDA (Variable dearness allowance) shall be paid at Rs. 2/- per point of rise per month beyond AICPI 450 and the wages of the employees were linked with the VDA. The employees union issued a notice of its intention to terminate the settlement with a view to submit a fresh charter of demands on 1.7.88. A fresh charter of demands was submitted by the employees union demanding an increase in the salary etc. on 17.7.88 but it was mentioned therein that the service conditions in force would continue to remain unchanged unless specifically agreed to otherwise. The employees union did not seek any change in the charter of demands in so far as the rate of VDA was concerned. No fresh settlement appears to have been arrived at between the parties but the appellants relying upon the notice of termination and the new charter of demands, unilaterally freezed VDA with effect from 4.8.88. Negotiations between the employees union and the appellant, did not, however, produce any fresh settlement. The employees union (respondent No. 3) issued a demand notice to the employer on 21.1.91 demanding VDA with effect from 1.7.88. It was claimed that the unilateral freezing of the VDA was illegal and that the obligations in the settlement dated 9.12.1986 were in force and binding on the parties. The employees union, it appears apart from filing an application before the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act alleging illegal deduction from wages, also approached the State Government for issuance of the recovery certificate for the arrears of VDA. The Labour Commissioner, on behalf of the State Government, issued a notice to the appellants on the application filed by the employees union with regard to the payment of VDA on 14.5.91. The appellants were required by the Labour Commissioner to reply to the claims of the respondent union. The appellants took the stand in their reply that the settlement of 1986 stood terminated and referred to the letter of the employees union dated 1.7.88 conveying their intention to terminate the settlement and the fresh charter of demands. The appellants further resisted the claim of the union inter-alia by taking the plea that there was an oral agreement arrived at between the parties to freeze the VDA at June, 1988 point and therefore the claim of the employees union was untenable. The appellants, however, produced no evidence in support of its plea of oral agreement. The Labour Commissioner found that no oral agreement had been proved and that obligation of the employer to pay the VDA under the 1986 continued to be in force and with a view to ensure implementation of the settlement, a notice of demand was issued to the appellants by the Labour Commissioner for payment of the VDA to the workmen for the period 1.7.88 to 28.2.91. An order for payment of Rs. 2,14,990.30 p. towards the VDA for the period 1.3.91 to 30.9.91 was also issued. Coercive process for recovery of Rs. 5,29,720/- as arrears of VDA between 1.7.88 and 28.2.91 was initiated.

4. The appellant filed writ petitions No. 37 and 38 of 1994 in the High Court of Bombay challenging the notices dated 13.9.91 and 27.12.91 and certain other notices and proceedings taken by the Labour Commissioner in connection with the claim of the workmen regarding payment of VDA. The main plea raised by the appellants in the writ petiti

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1997 Supreme(SC) 164

Cases Referred (1)