1997 Supreme(SC) 615

1997(5) Supreme 94
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.
Venkamamidi Venkata Subba Rao    -Appellant
versus
Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 711 of 1986
Decided on 2-4-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : C. Sitaramiah, Sr. Advocate, G. Prabhakar and G. Narasimhulu, Advocates.
For the Respondent : A. Subba Rao and K. Ram Kumar, Advocates.

Headnote:(i) Hindu Succession Act, 1956-Sections 14(1) and (2)-Right of a Hindu Woman-Suit for partition between mother and appellant son-Compromise decree passed in July, 1955-Mother acknowledged her life interest in the properties-Appellant and mother executed gift deeds and sale deed in 1959 in favour of third party-She had specifically stated that she had a life interest in terms of compromise decree-Sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not sub-section (1) of Section 14 stands attracted.

       Held that if the right by a Hindu woman under any instrument is in recognition of pre-existing right, the limited right though prescribed under the instrument, gets enlarged into an absolute right by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. On the other hand, if a right is acquired for the first time under the document, then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted and, therefore, the right acquired under the instrument by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 14 does not get enlarged. (Para 9)

       Further held that a compromise decree was passed in July, 1955; it was in recognition of her pre-existing right. But how she has understood her limited right gets reflected in subsequent documents to which she was admittedly a party and dealt with after the Act came into force pursuant to the compromise decree. (Para 13)

       Raghavamma, the mother of the first respondent and the first appellant had executed a sale deed, Ex. B-3, in favour of the third party alienating 1.50 acres of land had under the compromise decree. Therein she has specifically stated that she had a life interest in terms of the compromise decree, Ex. A-11. Similarly, a gift deed was executed in favour of Raghavamma by the first appellant in respect of 1.90 acres of land. Thereunder also, she had acknowledged not only the limited estate had under the compromise decree but also her limited right under Ex. 4 for enjoyment during her life time and the possession given as per the compromise decree. Thus, it could be seen that after the Act had come into force, in 1959 she had acknowledged in Ex. A-3 and A-4 that what she obtained under the compromise decree, Ex. A-11, was a limited right with the provision that the property would revert to her son, the first appellant. Thus, it could be seen that she had admitted that she had only limited right acquired for the first time under the compromise decree. Thereby, sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act and not sub-section (1) of Section 14 stands attracted. That apart, even the Settlement Officer has passed an order granting ryotwari patta under Section 15 of the Abolition Act which became final. (Para 14)

       (ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section 9-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts-Normal rule of law that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded-Exclusion would be an exception-When jurisdiction conferred on a Tribunal-Courts examine whether essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed-Civil Court s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy-Land reform laws-By necessary implication, jurisdiction of Civil Court stands excluded-Civil Court cannot unsettle patta which has become final. (AP (AA) Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948).

       Held; each case requires examination whether the statute provides right and remedies and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect thereof. After the advent of independence, the land reforms was one of the policies of the Government abolishing fudal system of land tenures and conforment of the Ryotwari patta on the tiller of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish pre-existing rights and create new rights under the Act. The Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunals in matters relating thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions are provided thereunder giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to take cognizance of the suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decisions of the Tribunal but also ensuring expeditious, inexpensive and simple procedure for disposal of the matters by the Tribunal and make the Ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil procedure, the jurisdiction of the trial of the civil suits in relation to the matters covered under the Acts being time consuming and tardy the lack of his financial support or otherwise incapacity in defending or working the rights in the civil courts and by hierarchy of appeals defeat justice. Obviously, therefore, the civil suits by necessary implication stands excluded unless the fundamental principles of procedure are not followed by the Tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands excluded. (Para 15)