1. Convictions for rioting and attempt to commit murder under Sections 147, 148, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1997 Supreme(SC) 1102
1997(7) Supreme 362
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.K. Mukherjee & S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.
Ananta Kathod Pawar & Ors. -Appellants
versus
State of Maharashtra -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1994
Decided on 14-8-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : I.G. Shah, V.N. Ganpule, Sr. Advocates, A.M. Khanwilkar, Kailash Vasdev, (D.M. Nargolkar) Advocate for S.M. Jadhav, Advocate/Advocates.
Important Points
IMPORTANT POINT
Where evidence established incident as a sudden and free fight between two groups in which members of both groups sustained injuries, members of one group can not be convicted under Section 147 or 148 I.P.C. substantive offences with aid of Section 149 I.P.C.
Where evidence established incident as a sudden and free fight between two groups in which members of both groups sustained injuries, members of one group can not be convicted under Section 147 or 148 I.P.C. substantive offences with aid of Section 149 I.P.C.
Subject
Criminal Law - Assault and Battery
Act Referred
Headnote
Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 148, 323/149, 324/149-Having regard to injuries found on persons of accused and one of them succumbed to injuries, finding by trial Court that it was free fight between two groups-Evidence found establishing the findings recorded by trial Court-There was no scope for convicting members of one group under Section 147 or 148 I.P.C. and for other substantive offences with aid of Section 149 I.P.C.-Accused could be made liable for their individual act-Conviction was unsustainable. (Paras 4 & 5)
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Prosecution alleged an unlawful assembly with a common object; defence contended the incident was a result of an attack by the complainant party. (Para 2 , 3 )
3. The evidence indicated a sudden free fight between two armed groups, and the prosecution suppressed the true genesis of the occurrence. (Para 4 , 5 )
4. In a sudden free fight between two armed groups, accused persons are liable for individual acts and not vicariously under Section 149 IPC. (Para 5 )
5. Appeal allowed, convictions and sentences set aside, and appellants acquitted. (Para 6 )
6. What is the legal effect of a free fight on vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC?
In a sudden and free fight between two armed groups where members of both sides sustain injuries, there is no scope for vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC; accused persons are liable only for their individual acts. (Para 5 )
7. How does the suppression of the genesis of an occurrence affect a criminal conviction?
When the prosecution suppresses the origin of the occurrence and fails to present the true version of how the incident started, it suggests the witnesses may be untruthful on material points, undermining the conviction. (Para 4 )
8. Can a conviction for rioting under Sections 147 or 148 IPC be sustained in a free fight scenario?
No, if the court finds the incident was a sudden and free fight between two groups, members of those groups cannot be convicted for rioting under Section 147 or 148 IPC. (Para 5 )
JUDGMENT
Mukherjee, J.-The 6 appellants before us and 5 others were arraigned before the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane for rioting, attempting to commit murder and other related offences. The trial ended in convictions of all of them under Sections 148, 323/149, 324/149 I.P.C. and sentences of different terms of imprisonment. In appeal, the High Court affirmed their convictions but reduced the sentences to the period already undergone and imposed a fine of Rs. 250/- each. The above judgment of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal.
2. According to the prosecution on June 24, 1978 between 7.00 and 7.30 A.M. the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly armed with swords, spears, iron rods and sticks in village Arwali will the common object of assaulting Tukaram (P.W.2), Ballaram (P.W. 3), Gajanan (P.W.4), Vasant (P.W. 5), Ankush (P.W. 6), Nagubai (P.W.7), Ganpat (P.W.8) and of attempting to commit the murder of Pundalik (P.W. 9) and in prosecution of the said common object used force and violence against all of them.
3. The defence of the accused persons was that it was the complainant party which attacked them with various weapons as a result of which one of them, namely, Haribhau died while others sustained injuries. According to the defence, to save their skin they filed a false case against them.
4. On consideration of the evidence adduced during trial, the trial Court held that the incident did not take place in the manner alleged by the prosecution witnesses. The trial Court further held that having regard to the injuries found on the persons of the accused and the fact that one of them, namely, Haribhau succumbed to the injuries, it was clear that there was a free fight between the two groups, each one coming armed with weapons. The trial Court observed that every prosecution witness tried to feign ignorance about the injuries sustained by some of the appellants and about the cause of death of Haribhau. It then referred to the judgment of this Court in Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar1, and concluded as under :
"If these principles are applied to the facts of the present case, it can be said that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and origin of the occurrence and has not presented the true version as to how the incident started. It can equally be said that the prosecution witnesses are telling lies on material point."
5. In our considered view, with the above observations and findings, the trial Court was not at all justified in convicting the appellants for rioting or for the other offences with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. Equally untenable is the High Court s affirmation of the above convictions for the evidence on record clearly establishes the findings recorded by the trial Court. Once the trial Court found that there was a sudden and free fight between the two groups in which members of both the groups sustained injuries, the trial Court should have held that there was no scope for convicting members of one of those groups under Section 147 or 148 I.P.C. and for that matter for substantive offences with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. In such a case, the accused persons would be liable for their individual acts and would not be liable vicariously. In the instant case, we are unable to convict the appellants for their individual acts also as no specific evidence was led by the prosecution in that regard.
6. For the foregoing discussion, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of convictions and sentences and acquit the appellants of the charges levelled against them. The fine if paid, be refunded to the appellants.
Appeal allowed.
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