IMPORTANT POINT
The Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but the accused can also approach the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceedings quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him.

Headnote:(i) Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227-Writ petition-Petitioners seeking quashing of complaint filed against them under Section 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act-Maintainability-Jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 Cr.P.C.-High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters-Caution to be exercised invoking these powers-Principles for exercise of powers-Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant-When complaint does not make out any case-Accused can approach High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of Constitution to have proceeding quashed against him-Held, on facts, High Court not justified in holding that appellants should approach the Court for their discharge under Section 245 Cr.P.C.
       Held : Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guideline is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. (Para 19)
       Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the court can certainly treate the petition one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the Code of revision and appeal but sometime for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate Courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution. (Para 20)
       Further held : No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. (Para 23)
       Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In our view High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it. (Para 24)
       (ii) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Section 7/16-Complaint filed against appellants under-Complainant purchased 500 ml. bottle of Lehar Pepsi for drinking-Allegation that bottle contained many white particles-Order of Magistrate summoning appellants-Writ petition-Complaint not revealing role of appellants in manufacture of the beverage alleged to be adulterated-Only allegation that appellants are manufacturer of bottle-Preliminary evidence does not substantiate the allegation-Name of appellant not mentioned as a manufacturer on top cap of the bottle-Nothing on record to show if appellants held the licence for manufacture of offending beverage-High Court was not justified in dismissing writ petition while holding that appellants could move an application under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C.-Miscarriage of justice-This was a case where High Court should have exercised power of judicial review. (Constitution of India-Articles 226, 227; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 482; Fruit Products Order, 1995).
       Held : If, however, we refer to the impugned judgment of the High Court it has come to the conclusion, though without referring to any material on record, that "in the present case it cannot be said at this stage that the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there exists no sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused." We do not think that the High Court was correct in coming to such a conclusion and in coming to that it has also foreclosed the matter for the Magistrate as well, as the Magistrate will not give any different conclusion on an application filed under Section 245 of the Code. The High Court says that the appellants could very well appear before the court and move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code and that the Magistrate could discharge them if he found the charge to be groundless and at the same time it has itself returned the finding that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the appellants. If we now refer to the facts of the case before us it is clear to us that not only that allegation against the appellants make out any case for an offence under Section 7 of the Act and also that there is no basis for the complainant to make such allegation. The allegations in the complaint merely show that the appellants have given their brand name to "Residency Foods & Beverages Ltd." for bottling the beverage "Lehar Pepsi". The complaint does not show what is the role of the appellants in the manufacture of the beverage which is said to be adulterated. (Para 23)
       Further held : The Fruit Order defines the manufacturer and also sets out as to what the manufacturer is required to do in regard to the packaging, marking and labeling of containers of fruit products. One of such requirement is that when a bottle is used in packing any fruit products, it shall be so sealed that it cannot be opened without destroying the licence number and the special identification mark of the manufacturer to be displayed on the top or neck of the bottle. The licence number of manufacturer shall also be exhibited prominently on the side label on such bottle [clause (8)(1)(b)]. Admittedly, the name of the first appellant is not mentioned as a manufacturer on the top cap of the bottle. (Para 23)
       What we find in the present case is that there was nothing on record to show if the appellants held the licence for the manufacture of the offending beverage and if, as noted above, the first appellant was the manufacturer thereof. (Para 23)
        It is no comfortable thought for the appellants to be told that they could appear before the court which is at a far off place in the Ghazipur in the State of Uttar Pradesh, seek their release on bail and then to either move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code or to face trial when the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded makes out no case against them. It is certainly one of those cases where there is an abuse of the process of the law and the courts and the High Court should not have shied away in exercising its jurisdiction. Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In our view High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it. (Para 24)
       (iii) JUDICIAL REVIEW-Power of -Discretionary-Exercise of-Scope (Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227). (Paras 19, 23 & 24)
       (iv) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE -Nomenclature under which petition is filed-Not relevant-That does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses-Writ petition filed under Article 226, Constitution of India-Court can treat the petition under Article 227 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. when. (Para 20)
       (v) Criminal Trial-Order of Summoning-Writ petition for quashing complaint-No allegation of personal bias against Presiding Officer-It was not necessary to implead him as a party to the proceedings-A Court not to be equated with a tribunal exercising quasi judicial powers. (Para 21)
       (vi) Criminal Trial-Summoning of accused-Order of Magistrate must reflect that he has applied his mind to facts of the case and law applicable thereto. (Para 22)

Judgement Key Points

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JUDGMENT

D.P. Wadhwa, J.-Leave granted.

2. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated September 23, 1996 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) dismissing their writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The appellants sought quashing of the complaint filed against them under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short the Act ). The prayers in the writ petition were worded as under :

" (a) issue a writ of prohibition or a writ, order or direction in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting the Opposite Party Number-1 to proceed with case No. 699 of 1994 (Anurag Narain v. Nitin Sachdeva and others);

(b) issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings in Case No. 699 of 1994 together with the consequential order dated 9.5.1994 and the complaint dated 6.5.1993 in so far as it pertains to the petitioners;

(c) issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Opposite Party Number-1 not to proceed with the Case No. 699 of 1994 during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition;

(d) issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon ble Court may deem just and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be passed; and

(e) to allow the writ petition with costs."

3. There are two appellants, second appellant is the Managing Director of first appellant. The respondents are three. First respondent is the court where the appellants alongwith others have been summoned for having committed offences under Sections 7/16 of the Act. The second respondent is the complainant and the third respondent is the State of Uttar Pradesh.

4. The allegation in the complaint is that complainant was sold a bottle of beverage under the brand "Lehar Pepsi" which was adulterated. The bottle was purchased by the complainant on September 13, 1993. He filed the complaint on May 6, 1994. After recording preliminary evidence the Magistrate passed orders summoning the appellants and others on May 9, 1994. It appears that when the summons reached the appellants they immediately approached the High Court seeking aforesaid reliefs. The High Court, however, refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellants should approach the 1st respondent for their discharge under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short `the Code ), if the complaint did not disclose commission of any offence by the appellants and the Court considered the charge to be groundless. The High Court did not approve of the appellants approaching it under writ jurisdiction when sufficient remedy was available under the Code. The High Court was also of the opinion that it could not be said at that stage that the allegations in the complaint were so absurb and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there existed no sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. On the plea of the appellants that the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act read with Rule 9-A of the Rules framed under the Act were violated and on that account the inquiry or trial stood vitiated the High Court said that the appellants could well approach the court for that purpose and that it was no stage for the High Court to record its finding. Yet another plea of the appellants that provisions of Section 203 and 245(2) of the Code did not provide an adequate remedy for a person charged on flimsy grounds and that in view of the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Ors.1, the court should interfere also did not find favour with the High Court. It was of the opinion that Chaudhary Bhajan Lal s case pertained to a cognizable offence where police had taken cognizance of the matt

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1997 Supreme(SC) 1410

Cases Referred (5)