1998(4) Supreme 155
Supreme Court of India
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
K. Venkataswami & A.P. Misra, JJ.
Shreenath & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Rajesh & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2929 of 1985
Decided on 13-4-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S.K. Gambhir, Advocate.
For the Respondents : H.K. Puri and J.M. Khanna, Advocates.
Held : In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding the justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the receipient of justice is not to be followed. (Para 3)
Order 21, Rule 97 conceives of resistance or obstruction to the possession of immovable property when made in execution of a decree by “any person”. This may be either by the person bound by the decree, claiming title through judgment debtor or claiming independent right of his own including tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. A decree holder, in such case, may make an application to the Executing Court complaining such resistance, for delivery of possession of the property. Sub-clause (2) after 1976 substitution empowers the Executing Courts when such claim is made to proceed to adjudicate upon the applicants claim in accordance with provisions contained hereinafter. This refers to Order 21, Rule 101 (As amended by 1976 Act) under which all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99 shall be determined by the Court and not by a separate suit. By the amendment, one has not to go for a fresh suit but all matter pertaining to that property even if obstructed by a stranger is adjudicated and finality given even in the executing proceedings. We find the expression “any person” under sub-clause (1) is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the Executing Court could adjudicate the claim made in any such application under Order 21, Rule 97. Thus by the use of the words `any person’ it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property even those not bound by the decree, includes tenants or other persons claiming right on their own including a stranger. So, under Order 21, Rule 101 all disputes between the decree-holder and any such person is to be adjudicated by the Executing Court. A party is not thrown out to religate itself to the long drawn out arduous procedure of a fresh suit. This is to salvage the possible hardship both to the decree-holder and other person claiming title on their own right to get it adjudicated in the very execution proceedings. (Paras 9 & 10)
We find both either under the old law or the present law the right of a tenant or any person claiming right on his own of the property in case he resists, his objection under Order 21, Rule 97, has to be decided by the Executing Court itself. Rule 100 of the old law, as referred in the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is a situation different from what is covered by Rule 97. Under Rule 100 (old law) and Order 99 the new law covers cases where persons other than judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder, of course, such cases are also covered to be decided by the Executing Court. But this will not defeat the right of such person to get his objection decided under Rule 97 which is a stage prior to his dispossession or a case where he is in possession. In other words, when such person is in possession the adjudication to be under Rule 97 and in case dispossessed adjudication to be under Rule 100 (old law) and Rule 99 under the new law. Thus a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97. One has not to wait for his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. This shows that such person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree-holder. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find the Full Bench in Smt. Usha Jain (supra) correctly decided the law. (Paras 13 & 14)
Consequently held : In view of the aforesaid finding and the law being well settled the interpretation given by the aforesaid full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the case of Usha Jain v. Manmohan Bajaj (supra) cannot be held to be a good law. As we have recorded above, both the Executing Court and the High Court have rejected the application of the applicant under Order 21, Rule 97 only on the basis of the said Full Bench decision, hence the said order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, both the orders dated 20th February, 1985 passed by the High Court in Civil Revision No. 406 of 1983 and the order dated 20th April, 1983 passed by the Executing Court in execution case No. 1-A/70/81 is herewith quashed. (Para 17)
Judgment
Misra, J.-The seekers of justice many a time has to take a long circuitous routes, both on account of hierarchy of Courts and the procedural law. Such persons are and can be dragged till the last ladder of the said hierarchy for receiving justice but even here he only breaths tearness of receiving the fruits of that justice for which he has been aspiring to receive. To reach this stage is in itself an achievement and satisfaction as he, by then has passed through a long arduous journey of the procedural law with many hurdles replica of mountain certain with ridges and furrows. When he is ready to take the bite of that fruit, he has to pass through the same terrain of the procedural law in the execution proceedings the morose is writ large on his face. What looked inevitable to him to receive it at his hands distance is deluded back into the horizon. The creation of hierarchy of Courts was for a reasonable objective for confering greater satisfaction to the parties that errors, if any, by any of the lower Courts under the scruitiny of a higher Court be rectified and long procedural laws also with good intention to exclude and filter out all unwanted who may be the cause of obstruction to such seekers in his journey to justice. But this obviously is one of the causes of delay in justice. Of course, under this pattern the party wrongfully gaining within permissible limits also stretches the litigation as much as possible. Thus, this has been the cause of anxiety and concern of various authorities, Legislators and Courts. How to eliminate such a long consuming justice? We must confess that we have still to go long way before true satisfaction in this regard is received. Even after one reaches the stage of final decree, he has to undergo a long distance by passing through the ordained procedure in the execution proceedings before he receives the bowl of justice.
2. The Courts within its limitations have been interpreting the procedural laws so as to conclude all possible disputes pertaining to the decreetal property which is within its fold in an execution proceeding i.e., including what may be raised later by way of another bout of litigations through a fresh suit. Similarly legislatures equally are also endeavouring by amendments to achieve the same objective. The present case is one in this regard. Keeping this in view, we now proceed to examine the present case.
3. In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding the justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the receipient of justice is not to be followed.
4. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in Civil Revision No. 406 of 1983.
5. The question raised is, whether the third party in possession of a property claiming independent right as a tenant not party to a decree under execution could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objections under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code?
6. The respondent No. 1, Rajesh, filed a suit for the redemption of his mortgage against respondent No. 2, Prem Shankar, which was decreed. The decree directed the delivery of vacant possession of the mortgaged property to the applicant (Respondent No. 1). In the said suit, admittedly, the present appellants were not parties. The decree-holder put his decree in execution in which the present appellants obstructed on the ground that vacant possession cannot be delivered in execution because they were the tenants in the shop from the year 1952 much before the execution of the mortgage which was in the year 1962, hence, only symbolical possession can be given. There has been two rounds of proceedings in execution. Initially, the Executing Court held that the decree-holder was not entitled to take actual possession in execution
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.