1998(5) Supreme 39
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
K. Venkataswami & A.P. Misra, JJ.
Kannan & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Tamil Talir Kalvi Kazhagam -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 1703-1704 of 1997
Decided on 15-5-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S. Sivasubramaniam, Sr. Advocate, V. Balachandran & S. Arvind, Advocates.
For the Respondent : R. Venkataramani, Sr. Advocate, and Satya Mitra Garg, Advocate.
Held : On the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that in the year 1980 a dispute did arose which caused the appellants to doubt as to whom rent be payable, hence tender of the rent to the Controller in the year 1982 was bona fide and valid. The question which remains for adjudication is, as submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Venkataramani, whether after the aforesaid 1983 suit came to an end, the rent should have been tendered to the landlord or not? (Para 12)
Also held : The use of the words “... the dispute is settled by the decision of a competent court” in Section 9(3) refers to settlement of dispute by a competent court not dismissal of a suit for default. A dismissal for default is not a settlement of a dispute by a competent court. Further the very sub-section uses the words; “... by a settlement between the parties or until Controller makes an order”. The present is not a case of settlement between the parties. (Paras 10 & 11)
Further held : the dispute not being settled by any competent court, the preceding words; “until the doubt is removed”, are of significance. In a case of this kind, is it inferable that merely on dismissal of suit for default, the doubt would be said to have been removed from the mind of a tenant, even if he was a party to such a suit. On the contrary, hope of removal of all possible doubts by decision in the suit of the contending rights was washed away when the suit was dismissed for default. The doubt, which was prior to the suit, returned back. Thus mere culmination of the suit in the present case would have no effect as to create any obligation on the tenant to stop tendering rent under Section 9(3) and start paying to the landlord. In other words, in case he continues to deposit the rent regularly with the Prescribed Authority it would not constitute to be a case of default under the Act. (Paras 11 & 12)
Finally held : Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, both the judgment and order dated 28th November, 1988 passed by the First Principal District Judge, Pondicherry, the first Appellate Authority, and the revisional orders of the High Court dated 17th September, 1988, are hereby quashed. However, the landlord-respondent can withdraw the rent deposited with the prescribed Authority by obtaining orders from it. (Para 18)
(ii) Words and Phrases-Words “the dispute is settled by the decision of a competent Court” appearing in Section 9(3) of Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969-Meaning of. (Para 10)
Judgment
Misra, J.-Since both the aforesaid appeals arise out of a common order, the subject matter of dispute including pleadings and documents being the same with common evidence resulting into a common order, hence they are being disposed of by means of this common judgment.
2. The present appellants are the tenants and respondent, the landlord. The short question raised is whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellants are validly depositing the rent under Section 9(3) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease And Rent Control) Act, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), could they be treated as defaulters liable for eviction, when they continued to deposit the said rent as aforesaid in spite of inter se dispute between the landlord culminating by dismissal of the suit for default?
3. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to dwell on the facts of this case. Out of the two appellants, one appellant is a tenant in respect of the demised premises running the cycle store business in HRCOP No. 132 of 1986 for a monthly rent of Rs. 75/- and the other appellant-tenant is running an Engineering Workshop for a monthly rent of Rs. 85/- in HRCOP No. 133 of 1986. It is not in dispute that some internal squabbles arose in the administration of Tamil Thalir Kalvi Kazhagam (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kazhagam’) who, in fact, is the landlord receiving rent through its President. The appellants took the demised premises on lease from one Mr. Kogilasamy, the then President of the said Kazhagam. Later, on 10th August, 1980 one Mr. Thirumurugan is said to have replaced the said Mr. Kogilasamy as he was elected to be the new President. This led to an election dispute between the outgoing and the incoming President. Thereafter, on 7th September, 1980 Mr. Thirumurugan, as the President, issued a notice to the appellants directing them to pay the rent to the treasurer in future, though the name of the treasurer was not indicated therein. On the other hand, the earlier President Mr. Kogilasamy still demanded rent to be paid to him. In this background, a bona fide doubt arose in the mind of the appellants as to whom they should pay the rent. Hence, they filed RCOP Nos. 55 and 56 of 1982 before the Rent Controller under Section 9(3) of the Act for permitting them to deposit the present and the future rent. The appellants impleaded both the outgoing President Mr. Kogilasamy and the incoming President Mr. Thirumurugan. In spite of notice, none appeared. The Rent Controller consequently permitted the appellants to deposit the rent. The order of the Rent Controller reveals that many other persons also claimed right to collect the rent of the demised property. Though the election of the President, as aforesaid, was on 10th August, 1980 and the dispute erupting immediately thereafter but the earlier President Mr. Kogilasamy filed a suit only in the year 1983, being O.S. No. 92 of 1983, before the Second Additional Sub-Judge, Pondicherry, for declaring the election held on 10th August, 1980 as null and void and for permanent injunction restraining the office bearers from carrying out the administration. The said suit was dismissed for default on the 6th February, 1984.
4. The submission of the respondent-landlord is, the period of limitation being 30 years for setting aside the said order, it was not necessary to wait for the said period to expire, hence, notice dated 8th August, 1985 was issued by the incoming President to the appellants to pay the arrears of rent within a week. Instead of paying the rent, as a part of dilatory tactics, in reply, sought for certain clarifications which were also replied back on 25th November, 1985. The submission is, at least from the date of the aforesaid suit of 1983 coming to an end and in any case from the date of the said notice there being no dispute it was obligatory for the appellants-tenants to have tendered the rent to the respondent-landlord, in not doing so, they defaulte
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