1. Dispute over land possession under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 — Special Court finding of adverse possession — Review petition under Section 17A. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1998 Supreme(SC) 759
1998(6) Supreme 389
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
Revenue Divisional Officer & Ors. -Appellants
versus
A. Aruna & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3641 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6493 of 1997)
Decided on 5-8-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : A. Raghuvir, Sr. Advocate, C. Balasubramani, Ms. Santhi Narayanan, Asha G. Nair, K. Ram Kumar, Advocates.
For the Respondents : P.P. Rao, Sr. Advocate, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, Advocates.
Review jurisdiction under Section 17A of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act is not appellate. A 'mistake of fact' must be patent, go to the root of the matter, and have a direct nexus with the final order, rather than being a mere error in the appreciation of evidence.
Headnote:A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-Section 17A-Review-Appellant’s application to Special Court that respondents were land grabbers of plot No. 9 in Jubilee Hills, Hydrabad City dismissed-They moved review application under Section 17A on ground that judgment a order passed was based on a mistake of fact - Admitted for hearing by majority-Respondents moved High Court which set aside the order-Whether correct? (Yes)-Appeal dismissed. (C.P.C., 1908-Order 47 Rule 1).
Held : Before a review petitioner can invoke Section 17A of the Act it should be shown that the mistake of fact is a patent mistake and not a latent one. Mere mistakes in appreciation of evidence or in any inferences drawn from facts could be corrected only in proceedings before a higher forum and not in review proceedings. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the learned senior counsel for the appellants that once a mistake of fact is pointed out and once it is shown that the inference of fact is drawn which is conjectural, that by itself would be a ground for review under Section 17A of the Act. In our view, the High Court was right when it held that on the facts of the present case the earlier decision of 31st October 1995 was arrived at by the Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and the conclusion was reached on facts that the respondents were in adverse possession of plot No. 9 even though the title of the appellants was held proved. As this finding was reached on appreciation of number of documents on record and also on consideration of oral evidence it could not be said that there was any such mistake of fact which was so patent that but for such mistake the final conclusion about adverse possession of respondents would have been different. Under these circumstances, therefore, we cannot find fault with the High Court when it took the view that the majority of the Members were not justified in re-opening the earlier decision of the Special Court. (Para 7)
In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. (Para 10)
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2. Whether misidentification of property or misappreciation of evidence constitutes a patent error of fact justifying review under Section 17A of the Act. (Para 3 , 4 )
3. Review jurisdiction is limited to preventing miscarriage of justice and requires a patent mistake of fact with a direct nexus to the final order. (Para 5 , 7 )
4. Review under Section 17A requires a patent mistake of fact going to the root of the matter, distinct from mere misappreciation of evidence or conjectural inferences. (Para 7 )
5. Appeal dismissed; High Court order setting aside the review proceedings upheld. (Para 10 )
6. What is the scope of review jurisdiction under Section 17A of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982?
Review is intended to prevent miscarriage of justice and is limited to mistakes of fact, ignorance of material facts, or errors apparent on the face of the record. It is not a full-fledged power of reconsideration or an appeal in disguise. (Para 6 , 7 )
7. What constitutes a mistake of fact sufficient to invoke review jurisdiction?
The mistake must be patent, not latent, and must have a direct nexus with the ultimate order, meaning the order would not have been rendered but for the mistake. It must go to the root of the matter. (Para 7 )
8. Does misappreciation of evidence or drawing conjectural inferences justify a review?
No. Mere mistakes in the appreciation of evidence or inferences drawn from facts are not patent errors of fact. Such errors can only be corrected by a higher appellate forum, not through review proceedings. (Para 7 )
Judgment
S.B. Majmudar, J.-Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for the parties finally. This appeal arises out of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upsetting the majority view arrived at by two members of the Special Court functioning under the provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The appellants are the authorities functioning under the said Act. They had moved the Special Court on the ground that the respondents were in illegal possession and were land grabbers of a plot of land being plot No. 9 situated at Jubilee Hills in Hyderabad city. That application was moved in 1991. The Full Bench of the Special Court consisting of the Chairman and the two Members decided the said application after hearing the parties and after considering the evidence led by them and came to the conclusion that though the appellants had established their title to plot No. 9 it was adversely possessed by the respondents and, therefore, no relief could be granted to the appellants in the said proceedings. That decision was rendered on 31st October 1995. An application for review under Section 17A of the Act was moved by the appellants before the Special Court. In the said application two grounds were sought to be relied upon - (i) that the Special Court had relied upon Ex. B-12 which was not legally admissible on the record of the case; and (ii) that the decision rendered by the Court suffered from an error of fact. The said Review Petition was heard by the Full Bench of the Special Court. The learned Chairman who presided over the Bench, took the view that there was no question of invoking the review jurisdiction and, therefore, he was inclined to dismiss the said proceedings. However the other two Members took a contrary view and held that the order sought to be reviewed required re-consideration and, therefore, they were inclined to re-hear the matter by granting the review application. Accordingly by majority Review Petition was allowed. That resulted in a writ petition on behalf of the respondents before the High Court.
2. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 25th November 1996 held that the review jurisdiction was wrongly sought to be invoked by the appellants and review proceedings were not maintainable. It was held that the first ground, namely, Ex. B-12 was inadmissible in evidence, could not be sustained for supporting the review petition as it was admitted in the evidence earlier without any objection. On the second ground it was held by the High Court that the earlier judgment on 31st October 1995 was based on the relevant facts, both oral and documentary, namely Ex. B-12 and B-13 and B-15 which were earlier judgments of the Special Court wherein it was held that for plot No. 9 situated at Jubilee Hills the State authorities had no title and the plot was a fully paid up plot belonging to the erstwhile occupants and consequently the earlier proceedings filed under the very same Act by the same appellants seeking eviction of alleged unauthorised occupants of this very plot were dismissed. It is also pertinent to note that nothing was brought out on the record of these proceedings to show that the earlier decisions of the very same Court at Ex. B-13 and B-15 which were relied upon by it while passing the order dated 31st October 1995, were ever carried higher up or were sub judice before any other higher authority. In fact such was not even the ground on which review was sought by the appellants. The High Court, therefore, took the view that when the earlier decision was rendered on consideration of all relevant facts and on appreciation of evidence, both oral and documentary, it could not be said that the said decision suffered from any patent error of fact which could have enabled the appellants to seek review of the said order under Section 17A of the Act. Consequently the writ petition was allowe
