1998(7) Supreme 325
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
Aundiappa Nadar -Appellant
versus
Gnanambal Ammal & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 4753-4754 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6636-6637 of 1997)
Decided on 14-9-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : K.V. Vijayakumar, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Advocate.
Held : From the express language of Section 1(3) as substituted by Madras Act II/1980, it is clear that it is to apply “to tenancies of land created” before the date of the gazette publication of that Act i.e. 3.3.1980. Therefore, it is clear that so far as Section 3(iii) of Act II/1980 which amended Section 1(3) of the Principal Act was concerned, it made the Act retrospective for the period anterior to 9.1.1974. In our view, Section 1(2) cannot, therefore, restrict the retrospectivity created by Section 3(iii) of Act II of 1980. No doubt, Section 1(2) of the Act II/1980 states that except Section 9, 10 of the Amending Act, other provisions shall be deemed to have come into force on 9.1.1974. But these words, in our view, were intended merely to validate certain executive orders issued with effect from 9.1.1974 extending the Act to other townships and were not intended to override the express provisions of Section 3(iii) of the Amending Act II/80. (Para 19)
Learned senior counsel contended that the words ‘uniform date’ meant 9.1.1974 and hence the date of retrospectivity is only from 9.1.1974 for all purposes. We are unable to agree. This contention ignores the latter part of the above passage which says that the said idea of giving uniform retrospectivity is confined to the applicability of the Act to areas already extended and to areas proposed to be extended. It does not affect the width and amplitude of Section 3(iii) of the Amending Act by which a new Section 1(3) was substituted. This aspect is also clear from Sections 9 and 10 of Act II/1980 which proceed to validate actions taken by executive orders subsequent to 9.1.1974. (Para 20)
We accordingly hold that Act III of 1922 applies to all tenancies created before 3.3.1980 and also applies to the tenancies created during the period from 9.1.1974 to 3.3.1980 in respect of areas to which the Act was applicable before 1955. (Para 21)
On the facts of this case, going by the admission of the respondent-landlady referred to above, the position is that the land was leased in 1954, the tenant put up the structure in 1965, the termination notice was given thereafter on 12.12.1968 and the eviction suit was filed in 1970. The Amending Act II/80 applies to all tenancies created before 3.3.1980 provided the construction is made before 3.3.1980 and before the date of termination of the tenancy, i.e. 12.12.1968. It does not matter if the construction is after 12.9.1955. (Para 22)
24. Once the conclusion is reached that the tenant is entitled to purchase the land beneath the structure put up by him in Schedule ‘B’, the question arises as to the extent of land appurtenant to the said structure, that he could be allowed to purchase. (Para 24)
Judgment
M. Jagannadha Rao, J.-Leave granted.
2. These two appeals have been preferred by the tenant against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 20.8.1996 in S.A. No. 1922 of 1984 and C.R.P. No. 4646 of 1984, reversing the judgment of the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras dated 25.4.1982 in A.S. No. 225/81 and CMA No. 172/81 and restoring the judgment of the IInd Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Madras dated 23.7.1980 in O.S. No. 2990 of 1970 and IA No. 12515 of 1970. The matters arise under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (Act III of 1922) (hereinafter called the ‘Act’). That Act, as amended by Act 19/55, confers certain rights on the tenant of the land to purchase the same if he or his predecessor-in-interest has put up a structure before 12.9.55, on the leased land. On the facts of the case before us, the suit was filed in 1970 by the respondent and such a right was indeed available to the tenant as per the amendment by Act 19/55, provided the tenancy in land was created on or before 12.9.1955 and superstructure was also put up by the tenant before 12.9.1955 and before the tenancy of the land was terminated. Though the appellant in this case exercised such an option, the trial Court rejected the same and decreed the eviction suit filed by the respondents-landlords while the first appellate Court dismissed the suit. The High Court set aside the appellate Court’s judgment and restored the trial Court’s judgment decreeing the suit in favour of the respondent-landlord. That is how the tenant is in appeal before us.
3. The suit for eviction was filed by the respondents on 22.6.1970 after issuing a notice of termination of tenancy dated 12.12.68 in respect of a rectangular piece of land, B Schedule 25 x 40’ and for injunction against the appellant from constructing a structure in an area around the northern and eastern side of B-schedule (which piece was called C schedule) wherein the tenant was making preparation to put up further constructions instead of removing the existing constructions already made as directed in an earlier suit OS No. 2051/65 which was then pending in Second Appeal. The sum total of B and the C schedule is described as A schedule (25.75 x 142 ). In other words if C is the encroached portion, eviction in regard not only for the tenanted portion B (25.75 x 40 ) but also for C,-in all for A (25.75 x 142 ) was sought. Damages of Rs. 4500/- as Rs. 125/- per month were also claimed.
4. The appellant-tenant filed, within the prescribed period, an application IA No. 12515 of 1970 on 14.8.1970 under Section 9 of the Act claiming a right to purchase the entire A schedule i.e. B + C. According to him the B schedule was leased to him in 1954, soon thereafter he put up the structure and subsequently, the landlord had orally leased the C schedule strip also. The plea for purchase of B + C schedules was put up in spite of a Judgment in OS 2051/65 by the trial Court and first appellate Court that only B schedule was leased to him. This was because the tenant’s Second Appeal against the Judgment of the first appellate Court was pending in the High Court when the tenant filed the above I.A. 12515/1970 in the trial Court in the present suit.
5. A counter affidavit was filed by the landlady-plaintiff in that IA in November, 1970 stating that the appellant was a tenant only of the plot B (27.75 x 40 ) and not of C schedule. In regard to the question whether any construction was made by the appellant-tenant, the respondent-plaintiff in her counter in the IA admitted in para 4 that the tenant had put up a structure in 1965 but not before the crucial dated 12.9.1955. That admission reads as follows:
“At the time when the defendant came to occupy the land, only a small superstructure of the extent of 8 x 10 was in existence and only in the year 1965, the defendant removed the original thatched superstructure and proceeded to construct the pucca superstructure over an area of about 14 x 4
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