Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948-Section 32-C read with Sections 32-G, 43A(1)(b) and 88-C - Tenant-Statu­tory pur­chase-Right to-Applica­tion made by landlord under Section 88-C on the footing that lands were Zirayat lands and obtained certificate of exemption-Subse­quent proceedings under Section 33-B and tenant became deemed purchaser in terms of Section 32-Thereafter proceedings under Section 32-G were initiated but dropped on basis of alleged joint statement of landlord and tenant that lands were leased out to tenant for culti­vation of growing sugar cane-While so on the earlier application of landlord u/s 33-B, final order came to be passed rejecting the applica­tion-Suit for recovery and damage also dismissed-Tenant’s applica­tion there­after for fixing purchase price-Appeal by landlord against price fixed dismissed-Concurrent findings by three tenancy authori­ties that alleged admissions made by tenant in Section 33-G proceed­ings not proved and nothing on record to prove lands were leased out to cultivate suger cane-High Court in revision setting aside concur­rent findings and holding that alleged admission made by tenant was binding upon him and lands were leased out for cultivation and there­fore Section 43A(1)(b) applies-High Court, therefore, holding that tenant not entitled to purchase land u/s 32-C-Not sustainable-Glar­ing mistake committed by High Court by overlooking very admission of landlord in his application u/s 88-C describing the lands as Zirayat lands.

       Held : The impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The High Court while remanding the matter by its judg­ment and order dated 14.2.1978, directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to consider not only the so called admission of the tenant in 32(G) proceedings but also other evidence on record. The Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the Revenue Tribunal did consider the entire evi­dence led by the parties on record and thereafter held that the tenant is entitled to purchase the land under Section 33-C on the postponed date and accordingly the application made by him on 31.10.1969 for fixing the purchase price under Section 33-C of the Act was maintain­able and accordingly the price was fixed by the Tehsildar and upheld by the Dy. Collector and Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. In the face of these findings based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in inter­fering with the finding of fact recorded by the tenancy authorities. A glaring mistake that appears to have been committed by the High Court is that while considering the so called admission of the tenant in 32-G proceedings, it has overlooked the very admission of the landlord in his application under Section 88-C of the Act wherein he described the lands as Zirayat lands. The conduct of the landlord unmistakably indicates that he wanted to take advantage of the certificate obtained by him under Section 88-C of the Act by treating these lands as Ziray­at lands and accordingly applied for possession under Section 33-B of the Act. After failing in these proceedings, in our opinion, it would not lie in the mouth of the landlord to say that the lands were given to the tenant for growing sugar cane and therefore covered by Section 43-A(1)(b) of the Act and therefore exempted from the operation of Section 32-G as well as 33-C of the Act. (Para 6)

       It is not clear from the order under Section 32-G dropping the proceedings as to whether any separate state­ment of the tenant was recorded at all in the said proceeding. All that the order recites is that “both parties present. They state that land S.No. 189/7 of village Are is leased to the tenant for cultivation of sugar cane and that sugar cane and paddy are grown by rotation. The entries in VF. VII-A x XII support their contention. In view of this the proceedings under Section 32 G are dropped.” This, in our opinion, could not be said to be an admission of the tenant which could be said to be a conclusive proof against him. The tenant was an illiterate person. He did not seem to have been represented by an Advocate before the said tenancy authority. Moreover, why such pro­ceedings were required to be initiated is also a mystery because at that time admittedly the landlord’s application under Section 33-B of the Act after obtaining the certificate under Section 88-C of the Act was pending. This landlord in his statement has nowhere given any explanation whatsoever in this behalf. The landlord in his statement recorded in the present proceeding, did not give any explanation as to how he described these lands in his 88-C application as Zirayat lands. In the absence of any explanation from the landlord, we are of the opinion that this admission is also binding upon him. Assuming therefore, that the tenant has made an admission in favour of the landlord that the lands were leased out to him for growing sugar cane but at the same time the landlord has also made an admission that the lands were Zirayat while making an application under Section 88-C of the Act. In this view of the matter, instead of laying much emphasis on the admissions given by the respective parties, we prefer to accept the revenue record which was not disputed by either parties in the courts below. The revenue record did not disclose except for two or three years that one of these lands was under the cultivation of sugar cane. On the contrary, Zirayat crops were grown continuously on these lands. The landlord had also not produced any rent receipt given by the tenant indicating that the rent was paid on the basis that sugar cane was grown. No evidence was also produced by the landlord to indicate that sugar cane was grown on these lands and it was sold to any sugar factory. These are the vital circumstances on which the landlord ought to have led evidence to non suit the tenant from his rights under Section 33-C of the Act. In our opinion, the High Court has failed to consider all these circumstances and eventually com­mit­ted an error while upsetting the findings recorded by all the tenancy authorities including the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained.