1998(9) Supreme 179
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
S.B. Majumdar & K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Indu Kakkar -Petitioner
versus
Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. -Respondents
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8368 of 1998
Decided on 2-12-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Petitioner : R.F. Nariman, Sr. Advocate, Manoj Swarup, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ravindra Bana, Advocate.
Held : For a transferee to deal with interest in the property transferred “as if there were no such direction” regarding the particular manner of enjoyment of the property, the instrument of transfer should evidence that an absolute interest in favour of the transferee has been created. This is clearly discernible from Section 11 of the TP Act. The Section rests on a principle that any condition which is repugnant to the interest created is void and when property is transferred absolutely it must be done with all its legal incidents. That apart, Section 31 of the T.P. Act is enough to meet the aforesaid contention. The Section provides that “on a transfer of property an interest therein may be created with the condition superadded that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen (Para 16)
All that Section 32 of the Transfer of Property Act provides is that “in order that a condition that an interest shall cease to exist may be valid; it is necessary, that the event to which it relates be on which could legally constitute the condition of the creation of an interest.” If the condition is invalid it cannot be set up as a condition precedent for crystallization of the interest created. The condition that the industrial unit shall be established within a specified period failing which the interest shall cease, is a valid condition. (Para 17)
In the instant case the allottee has contended before the trial Court that clause 7 of the Agreement is unenforceable. In view of Section 11 of the TP Act. But that contention was repelled according to us rightly, because the Deed of Conveyance had not created any absolute interest in favour of the allottee in respect of the plot conveyed. Clause 7 of the Agreement between the parties is, therefore, valid and is binding on the parties thereto. (Para 16)
(ii) Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Section 52-Pendente lite transfer - Extent of transferee’s right-State Industrial Corporation allotted industrial plot to allottee-Plot resumed by allotor for failure on part of allottee to construct building within time permitted-Suit by allottee to declare resumption invalid-Petitioner purchasing plot from allottee-Impleading herself as plaintiff and questioning validity of resumption-Held petitioner has no locu standi-A party to a contract cannot transfer his liabilities under the contract without consent of other party.
Held : The real question is whether the assignee has a legal right to claim performance of any part from the allottor. Answer of the said question depends upon the terms of allotment. Assignment by act of parties may cause assignment of rights or of liabilities under a contract. As a rule a party to a contract cannot transfer his liabilities under the contract without consent of the other party. This rule applies both at the Common Law and in Equity (vide para 337 of Holsburys Laws of England, fourth Edition, part 9). Where a contract involves mutual rights and obligations an assignee of a right cannot enforce that right without fulfilling the co-relative obligations. (Para 19)
The Agreement was entered into between the Corporation and the allottee as a sequel to the request made by the allottee to give him an industrial plot for the purpose of setting up an industry. Corporation reciprocated to the request on being satisfied that the allottee was able to carry out the obligations so as to accomplish the purpose of allotment. The assurance given by of the allottee that he shall start construction of the building for setting up the industry within a period of six months and complete the construction thereof within two years from the date of issue of allotment letter was verified and found acceptable to the Corporation and then only the Corporation has chosen to enter into the agreement with the allottee. It is a matter of confidence which the Corporation acquired in the promise made by the allottee that the latter would perform such obligations. If the allottee evacuates from the scene after inducting someone else into the plot without consent of the Corporation it is not legality permissible for the inductee to compell the Corporation to recognize him as the allottee. The High Court was correct in its conclusion that the petitioner had no locus standi to question the validity of resumption. (Para 20)
Judgment
Thomas, J.-Petitioner who virtually purchased a litigation has now reached the Supreme Court seeking special leave to appeal against a judgment by which the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has dismissed a Second Appeal. The suit was filed by M/s. York Printers and during its pendency the present petitioner bought the rights which the original plaintiff had in the subject-matter of the suit for a consideration of Rupees forty thousand. Petitioner got himself impleaded as additional plaintiff and from then on it was the petitioner who fought the litigation, as the original plaintiff has vacated from the scene.
2. M/s. York Printers filed the suit on the following facts:
On 28.7.1977 a plot of land admeasuring approximately 450 Sq. metres has been allotted to M/s. York Printers (which will hereinafter be referred to as the allottee) as per a letter of allotment issued by Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited (‘Corporation’ for short). The said plot is situated within the industrial complex at Dundahera in Gurgaon District (Haryana). The price for such allotment was tentatively fixed as Rs. 13,455/- and the allottee was put in possession thereof. On completion of remittance of the entire amount payable by the allottee a registered Deed of Conveyance was executed on 10.12.1982 by the Corporation in favour of the allottee. In fact the said plot was transferred by Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA-its acronym) in favour of the Corporation for facilitating the objects and purposes of Haryana Urban Development (Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulation 1978.
3. As the allottee failed to establish the industrial unit till the end of 1983 a notice was issued by the Corporation on 6.1.1984 calling upon the allottee to show cause why the plot should not be resumed. In the reply which allottee sent to the Corporation certain reasons were highlighted for showing why it could not complete construction of the building for the proposed industrial unit. But the Corporation was not satisfied with the reply and hence on 16.3.1984 the Corporation resumed the plot.
4. The allottee thereafter made representation to the Corporation for revocation of the resumption order. According to the allottee the construction work was actually commenced but its progress was hampered on account of power supply not being made available by Haryana State Electricity Board for more than two years, besides the difficulty regarding availability of water. However, the Corporation was unwilling to revoke the resumption order and hence the representations made by the allottee were rejected.
5. On 3.8.1985 the allottee filed the civil suit for a declaration that the order of resumption is illegal and void and also for certain other consequential reliefs. During pendency of the suit the petitioner got a registered sale deed from the Allottee on 27.12.1989 of his rights in respect of the plot in question and got herself impleaded as second plaintiff in the suit.
6. Trial Court decreed the suit and declared the resumption order as “manifestly illegal and beyond jurisdiction.” But the first appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit holding that the Corporation was well within its power to resume and that the resumption was made in accordance with the terms of allotment. The first appellate court further found that the petitioner has no locus standi as the sale in her favour was hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
7. In the Second Appeal petitioner assailed the said findings before the High Court. Learned Single Judge who heard the appeal agreed with the contention of the petitioner that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not a bar against transferring property pendente lite. However, learned Judge has observed the following:
“The question in this case is not in regard to validity of the sale of plot to second plaintiff by the allottee, but the question is whether second plaintiff has any locus standi t
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