1999 Supreme(SC) 92

1999(1) Supreme 265
Supreme Court of India
(From Allahabad High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & S.N. Phukan, JJ.
Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda -Appellant
versus
The Presiding Officer, Central Govt.Industrial Tribunal & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 10880 of 1996
With I.A. No. 2
Decided on 28-1-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Pramod B. Aggarwala and Ms. Praveena Gautam, Advocates.
For the Respondents : N.B. Shetye, Sr. Advocate, P.N. Gupta, Advocate.

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Termination of service-False state­ment in employment appli­cation-Workman selected as clerk in Bank -In application form he stated he was never been prosecuted for any of­fence-FIR for offence u/s 307 IPC pending at that time-Convic­tion two years after appointment-Show cause notice after one year of conviction - Termination order three years thereafter - Labour Court while holding that workman had made deliberate false statement it should not be deemed to be such a grave misconduct which visit him with extreme punishment of termination of service-Reinstate­ment without backwages ordered-High Court affirming order-Warrants no interference-Prosecu­tion was not for an offence involving cheating or misappropriation-Bank itself awaited for result of prosecution-If workman was acquitted, it seems, bank would not have taken any action-Ultimately workmen acquitted of offence-From date of acquit­tal he be treated as fresh recruit-Workmen entitled to back wages from date of Labour Court’s order.

       Held : It is true that the respondent made a wrong statement while replying to query No. 27 of the application form that he had not been prosecuted at any time. It is equally true that the Labour Court itself found that giving a false statement should not be deemed to be such a grave misconduct which may be visited with extreme punishment of termi­nation from service. However, it has also to be noted that the appellant-Management while issuing show cause notice for the first time on 26.2.1980 has in terms noted in the said notice that only the criminal proceedings were pending but had ultimately ended in convic­tion of the respondent. The appellant itself thought it fit to await the decision of the criminal case before taking any precipitate action against the respondent for his misconduct. Thus, according to the respondent this suppression was not so grave as to immediately require the appellant to remove the respondent from service. On the contrary, in its wisdom, the appellant thought it fit to await the decision of the criminal proceedings. This may be presumably so because the charge against the respondent was that he was alleged to have involved him­self in an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. It was not an offence involving cheating or misappropriation which would have a direct impact on the decision of the appointing Bank whether to employ such a person at all. We may not delve further into the liberal approach of the appellant itself when it did not think it fit to immediately take action against the respondent but wait till the decision of the criminal case. Be that as it may, once the Sessions Court convicted the respondent, the appellant issued the impugned notice dated 26.2.1980. It can therefore be safely presumed that if the Sessions Court itself had acquitted the respondent, the appellant would not have decided to terminate his services on this ground. So far as the notice dated 26.2.1980 is concerned, in the reply to the said show cause notice filed by the respondent he had mentioned that an appeal was pending in the High Court against the said conviction. In that view of the matter, once the High Court ultimately acquitted the respondent for any reason, with which strictly we are not con­cerned, the net result that follows is by the time the Labour Court decided the matter the respondent was already acquitted and hence there remained no real occasion for the appellant to pursue the termi­nation order. Consequently, that was a sufficient ground for not visiting the respondent with the extreme punishment of termination of service. But even that apart, though the conviction was rendered by the Sessions Court on 20.2.1979, the show cause notice for the first time was issued by the appellant after one year i.e. on 26.2.1980 and thereafter the termination order was passed on 18.4.1983. That itself by the passage of time created a situation wherein the original sup­pression of involvement of the respondent in the prosecution for an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code did not remain so pernicious a misconduct on his part as to visit him with the grave punishment of termination from service on these peculiar facts of the case and especially when the Labour Court also did not award any back wages to the respondent from 1983 till respondent’s reinstatement by its order dated 29.9.1995 and one month thereafter and when the High Court also did not think it fit to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the peculiar facts of this case. In our opinion, interest of justice will be served by maintaining the order passed by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the High Court subject to a slight modification that the respondent may be treated to be fresh recruit from the date when he was exonerated by the High Court i.e. from 13.1.1988 which can be treated as 1.1.1988 for the sake of convenience. It is ordered accordingly. From 1.1.1988 the respondent will be treated to have been reinstated into the services of the Bank on the basis that he will be treated as a fresh recruit from that date and will be entitled to be placed at the bottom of the revised scale of pay for Clerks and will also be entitled to other allowances which were available in the cadre of Clerks in the Bank’s service. The respondent will be entitled to back wages with effect from 1.11.1995 i.e. from the date when the Labour Court awarded the reinstatement of the respondent. It also directed that the appellant Bank will work out appropriate back wages payable to the respondent from 1.11.1995 in the time scale of Clerks as available from 1.1.1988 treating his services to be continuous from that date and accordingly working out of his salary and emoluments on notional basis with usual increments from 1.1.1998 and actual arrears of pay and other permissible emoluments from 1.11.1995 till reinstatement of the respondent by the appellant. (Para 9)