Important Point
Where dominant object of lease was lease of building and landed portion was added as appendage or incidental thereto, the tenant could not claim to be a cultivating tenant so as to fall outside Section 3 to be entitled to benefit under Section 72-B.

Headnote:Kerala Land Reforms, 1963-Section 3(1)(ii) read with Section 72-B-Right of cultivating tenant-Exclusion of tenancy of building with appurtenant land from purview of Chapter II-House leased out originally - At request of lessee some portion of land adjoining leased building was given possession-Tenant claiming protection/ right of cultivating tenant u/s 72-B -Plea that dominant object was lease of land-Not tenable-Lease was of a building with land appurtenant thereto-Fact that another building situated within boundaries retained by lessor indicated that land was only to be used as adjunct to residential building - Further there was interdict in lease deed against making improvement on land.
       Held : The emphasis on the monosyllable ‘only’ occurring in Section 3(1)(ii) to bolster up the contention that the legislative intent was to limit the exemption to leases of buildings cannot be accepted. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim “noscittur a sociis” (meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words) has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory provision. If the clause was worded as “lease of buildings” there would have been difficulties in cases where land also adjoins the building. But the legislature chose to frame the clause as “leases only of the buildings with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto”. The legislature was conscious of many such leases where the dominant factor is the building, or the object of the lease is to demise building which has landed areas as adjunct or appendage or incident to the building. (Paras 6 & 7)
       The word ‘appurtenant’ when used in connection with leases of properties, has gained wider as well as narrower interpretations through judicial pronouncements. Such divergence in the interpretation was necessitated to comply with legislative intent while considering facts of each case. (Para 8)
       The appellant first pointed out the situation at which both parties were placed then. The lessor having such a pucca residential building with a sprawling compound attached to it had to remain in New Delhi as he was working as Secretary to the Government of India. The lessee who was a public servant working at Kasarcodu needed a house to live in at that place. Such facts, according to the learned counsel, would clearly show that it was the building which was of prime consideration for the lease. The attached compound could not have been left out, for practical reasons, uncared by any one and hence it became necessary to include that compound area also as part of the lease. The said contention cannot be sidelined as without force. (Para 19)
       The fact that another building situated within the boundaries has been retained by the lessor is a pointer indicating that the land was only to be used as adjunct to the residential building. Over and above all those, the interdict against making any improvement on the land is a stirring feature which is in conflict with the idea of land becoming the dominant factor of the lease. No lease of land can possibly be conceived without the lessee being given freedom to use the land to generate profit therefrom. Here the lease imposed a complete ban on the lessee to use the land for such purposes. All that he is permitted thereon is to take usufructs of the trees already standing on the land. A reading of the lease deed from the above angles indicates that there was no idea for the lessor to create a right to enjoy the land independent of the building but only to take usufruct of the trees standing thereon while residing in the building. The area of the land alone cannot be a determinative factor. It was common practice in olden days for residential buildings to have sprawling areas as adjuncts to such buildings. That practice could well have been followed by the parties in the lease deed which is subject matter of the case. For the aforesaid reasons we take the view that the lease was of building with the landed area meant as appurtenant thereto. Its corollary is that the lease is exempted from Chapter II of the Act and the consequence is that respondent cannot claim any right under Section 72-B of the Act. (Paras 21 to 23)

Judgment

Thomas, J.-Whether a lease is of land appurtenant to a building a vice-versa continues to remain an issue providing pabulum for many a litigation. In the instant case also that issue has assumed decisive dimension. Our efforts to have this case settled out of court did not fructify despite the active role played by counsel on both sides. So we have to determine this issue on the facts of this case.

2. This case reached the Supreme Court after drifting through a long stream of vicissitudes. Genesis of this litigation is traced to a lease created during pre-independence days when one of the two buildings situated in the disputed property was rented out by its owner, (a bureaucrat then stationed at Delhi) to one Somappa Naik. On 28.7.1951 a new lease deed was executed by the said Somappa Naik in respect of the disputed property having an area of 1.06 acres containing the same pucca residential building thereon, for a monthly rent of Rs. 9/-. When the lessee continued under the lease he assigned his rights in favour of the present respondent (who is a practicing advocate of Kassargod District Court) on 17.8.1968.

3. When the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short “the Act”) came into force the respondent filed an application before the Land Tribunal, Kassargod in 1964 as per Section 72B of the Act for assigning to him the right, title and interest of the landowner, claiming that he is a cultivating tenant of the disputed land. Despite resistance made by the appellant (landowner) the said application was allowed by the Land Tribunal but the Appellate Authority remitted the case back to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal. The Land Tribunal again allowed the application and when appellant appealed, the Appellate Authority confirmed the order.

4. Appellant moved the High Court in revision under Section 103 of the Act. A Single Judge referred the case to a Division Bench as he felt that the legal question involved was to be determined by a larger Bench. By the impugned order a Division Bench of the High Court concurred with the conclusion made by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. Hence this appeal by special leave.

5. The main ground on which the appellant resisted the application of the respondent is that the lease was of a building with the land appurtenant thereto and hence it does not fall within the purview of the Act. Under Section 3 of the Act such a lease is exempted from the provisions relating to tenancies subsumed in Chapter II of the Act. Section 3(1)(ii) can be extracted here:

“Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to-

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(ii) leases only of buildings, including a house, shop of warehouse and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto.”

6. Shri T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel who argued for the respondent laid emphasis on the monosyllable “only” in order to bolster up his contention that the legislative intent was to limit the exemption to leases of buildings. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim “noscittur a sociis” (meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words) has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory provision.

7. If the clause was worded as “lease of buildings” there would have been difficulties in cases where land also adjoins the building. But the legislature chose to frame the clause as “leases only of the buildings with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto”. The legislature was conscious of many such leases where the dominant factor is the building, or the object of the lease is to demise building which has landed areas as adjunct or appendage or incident to the building.

8. The word ‘appurten

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1999 Supreme(SC) 442

Important PointWhere dominant object of lease was lease of building and landed por­tion was added as appendage or incidental thereto, the tenant could not claim to be a cultivating tenant so as to fall outside Section 3 to be entitled to benefit under Section 72-B.

Cases Referred (3)

Important Point
Where dominant object of lease was lease of building and landed portion was added as appendage or incidental thereto, the tenant could not claim to be a cultivating tenant so as to fall outside Section 3 to be entitled to benefit under Section 72-B.