Important Points
1. Inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code.
2. Where judgment was pronounced and matter was posted for the succeding day for the presence of accused so as to hear them on the question of sentence but on the failure of the accused, non-bailable warrant was issued and the accused moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C and the High Court stayed arrest of the accused it was held that the exercise of extraordinary power was illegal and erroneous.

Headnote:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent power-Legality of exercise-Judgment pronounced convicting accused - Matter stood posted to succeedings days for presence of accused to enable accused to have their say on question of sentence-Accused did not turn up and non-bailable warrant issued-Petition under Section 482 moved by accused before High Court which stayed arrest-Not justifiable-High Court intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedelled course of justice at a very crucial stage of trial-Entertainment of petition is illegal and erroneous-Order of High Court quashed.
       Held : It appears that unfortunately the High Court by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused that it was polluted by so called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be nacessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwisse to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary power to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well neigh settled that inherant power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedaled tha course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. (Para 2)
       The order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal, arroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that final judgment and order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also recorded by the trial court that as the accused were absent, the court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings including the operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the important legal aspect that accused have a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to have ben passed by the trial court. In such circumstances the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial judge the substantive law cannot be bypassed. (Para 9)
       Consequently the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition under Section 482 and the other interim orders passed thereunder are quashed. (Para 10)

Judgment

Shah, J.-Leave granted.

2. It appears that unfortunately the High Court by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused that it was polluted by so called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be nacessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwisse to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary power to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well neigh settled that inherant power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedaled tha course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.

3. In the present case, accused-respondentsf were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 302, 149 and also under Section 307/149 of the IPC for the incident which took place at about 1.30 p.m. on 26th July, 1981 at the village in Jhahirpur District, Lucknow. It appears that for one or the other reason, the trial dragged on till the end of November 1997. The proceedings as minuted by the sessions judge show that on 20.11.1997 judgment was pronounced convicting Ram Gopal Misra, RaM Naresh and Radhey Sham Mishra under Section 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of IPC. Accused Ram Gopal Misra was absent, but the other two accused went outside the court and did not return. So the case was posted to the succeeding days and since none of the accused turned up the sessions court ordered non-bailable warrants of arrest to be issued against them on 25.11.1997.

4. Instead of appearing before the trial court the accused filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code which was numbered as Criminal Miscellanous Case No. 743 of 1997 before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. The matter was placed before Virendra Saran J. The learned judge called for the comments of the sessions judge concerned. The court also directed the sessions judge to send the record including the short-hand book in a sealed cover. Thereafter on 6th January, 1998 the High Court stayed the execution of warrants of arrest issued against the accused. It appears that form 6th January, 1998 to 29the January, 1999 the High Court posted the Criminal Miscellaneous case to a large number or days for hearing, but unfortunately on every such day the hearing was merely adjourned, with a direction that interim order shall continue.

5. From the facts stated above, it is seen that Additional Sessions Judge pronounced judgment dated 20.11.1997 convicting the accused-respondents and as the accused were required to be heard on the question of sentence, the matter was kept on 21st, 22nd and 25th of November, 1997. But as the accused failed to appear, the trial judge issued non-bailable warrants returnable by 2nd December, 1997.

6. When the informant-injured witness moved an application in the High Court for modification of the order dated 9th December, 1997 that was placed before I.P. Vashishth, J. who observed that it was contended by counsel

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