Important Points
1. Prior to insertion of Section 14A in the Consumer Protecton Act, there being no time limit preseribed for filing complaint a complaint filed prior to insertion of Section 14A could not be dis­missed on ground of limitaion.
2. Where builder though delevered flat as per agreement but failed to execute sale deed, Consumer Protection Commission was justi­fied is giving direction to builder to specific performence of agree­ment.

Judgment

Sethi, J.-The appellants, promoters/developers of Perpetual Apart­ments, agreed to seel a flat in the name of minor daughter of the respondent. According to the Agreement between the parties, the price of the flat being Rs. 2,10,000/- was to be paid on or before Septem­ber, 1985. The possession of the flat is stated to have been delivered to the respondent in September, 1985 on payment of the whole of the agreed amount. Despite various requests made, the appellant did not execute the sale deed in false pretexts. In the absence of the sale deed, the respondent-complainant could not efficaciously enjoy the property for which she is stated to have paid the price. It was sub­mitted that as the construction of the flat was sub-standard, the respondent-complainant had to incur an expense of Rs. 26,000/- for immediate repairs. Her petition, filed on 19.6.1992 was dismissed by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Goa (hereinafter referred to as “the District Forum”) on the ground of limitation vide order dated 19.10.1992. The appeal preferred by the respondent was accepted by the Goa State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the State Commission”) and the matter was remitted to the District Forum permitting the respondent to amend her complaint. The District Forum again, vide its order dated 31st March, 1993, dismissed the complaint as barred by time. The respondent filed an appeal which was allowed by the State Commission with a direction to the appellants for specific performance of the Agreement. The revision filed by the appellant before the National Consumer Dispute Redressai Comission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the National Commisssion”) was dismissed vide impugned order dated 31.1.1994.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued that as the complaint filed by the respondent was barred by time, the State Commission was not justified in issuing the directions which were contimed by the National Commission. It is contended that before insertion of Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the period of limitation for preferring a claim was such period as is prescribed under the Limitation Act and aas according to him the complaint was filed by the respondent after seven years, the same deserved dismissal.

3. The argument, though attractive on the facr of it, has no substance when examined in depth. Admittedly, no period of limitation had been prescribed in the Act before insertion of Section 24A vide amendment made w.e.f. 18th June, 1993. Section 24A of the Act, for the first time, prescribed that the District Forum, the Stae Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless the same was filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arose. Sub-section (2) of Section 24A authorises the Commission to entertain complaint even after the period of limitation on the exist­ence of sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the statutory period by recording its reasons for condoning the delay. It is conceded before us that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. The Limitation Act does not extinguish a right but only bars the remedy after a prescribed period of limitation. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines the “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provi­sions of the Act. It is not the case of the appellants that complaint filed by the respondent was either a suit or an appeal or an applica­tion within the meaning of the provisions of the Limitation Act. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it appropriate not to pre­scribe the period of limitation for proceedings under the Act,