Important Points
1. Section 116 of the Evidence Act puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. But subsequent to his induction as tenant if the landlord looses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title holder then any denial of title by such tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by this principle of estoppel under this section.
2. The definition of landlord contained in Section 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act is very wide to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent. The explanation includes even a tenant to be landlord under this Act.

Headnote:(i) Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Sections 10(2)(1), 10(2) and 14(1)(b)-Wilful default-Demolition and reconstruction-Tenants plea that he came to know another person, a Devasthanam was owner and he stopped paying rent to landlord petitioner-Concurrent findings of lower Court that denial of title not bona fide and default in payment of rent wilful and building required for demolition and reconstruction-No demand from Devasthanam for rent from tenant respondent-Devasthanam a paramount owner-Landlord tenant lessee of Devasthanam-Tenant aware that he was inducted by landlord petitioner-No evidence to show that landlord lost his title-Relationship of landlord tenant not changed-Denial of title by tenant followed by refusal to pay rent constitutes wilful default-Section 116 of Evidence Act puts an embargo on tenant to deny title of his landlord unless landlord looses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat to tenant of his eviction by paramount title holder-Eviction order does not warrant interference.
       Held : It is only when a tenant denies title of the landlord, the court has to scrutinise the evidence and come to the conclusion prima facie, whether the denial of title is bona fide or not. It is in the context of course court has to go into the evidence to test the veracity of this denial of title. Thus, any finding in this regard could not be a finding on the question of title. There is neither any claim of title set up by the respondent nor there is any such issue between the parties in these proceedings and hence recording of any finding in this regard is only to be understood for a limited purpose of testing the bona fide of tenant to deny the title of the landlord. (Para 7)
       What has to be considered in a case of denial of title by a tenant is, whether their still exists any relationship of landlord and tenant inter se, as in the present case between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant. In other words by such denial of title does liability to pay this rent to such landlord ceases? Does mere denial of title is sufficient not to tender rent to such landlord or at what stage such liability ceases. These are all considerations in the context of testing the defence of a tenant in not tendering the rent to such landlord. (Para 8)
       The definition of landlord contained in Section 2(6) is very wide to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent. The explanation includes even a tenant to be landlord under this Act. (Para 9)
       In the present case it is not in dispute that the appellant was inducted into tenancy by the predecessor of the respondent. After such induction he had been paying rent first to the predecessor of the respondent No. 1 from 1962 and then to the respondent No. 1 since 1980. The appellant in his cross examination has admitted this by stating that he came as a tenant under one Shivlingam who is the elder brother of Respondent No. 1 and from 1980 onwards he had been paying rent to respondent No. 1. It is in this background we have to test the submission for the appellant with respect to the default and denial of title. It is clear as is also finding recorded that the appellant himself approached the Devasthanam subsequently to execute the tenancy of the disputed premises in question to him. The finding of lower Courts speaks for itself the conduct of the tenant in denial of Respondent No. 1 title. In spite of no claim of the rent made from the appellant he on his own volition requested the Devasthanam to accept him as his tenant. Further, Devasthanam had not even informed the appellant that they are the owner. In this background can denial of title by tenant could be held to be bona fide? The courts below rightly held it to be not bonafide. (Para 9)
       Relationship between the appellant and the respondent is of tenant and landlord under the Act while relationship between the respondent and Devasthanam may be of lessee and lessor in a different set of fact. This would make no difference. The definition of ‘landlord’ is under Section 2(6) and under its explanation even tenant is treated to be landlord. (Para 10)
       Section 116 of Evidence Act puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. The significant words under it are ‘at the beginning of the tenancy’. This is indicative of the sphere of the operation of this section. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later he cannot deny his landlord title. Thus, this principle of estoppel debars a tenant from denying the title of his landlord from the beginning of his tenancy. Howsoever defective title of such landlord could be, such tenant cannot deny his title. But subsequent to his induction as tenant if the landlord looses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title holder then any denial of title by such tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by this principle of estoppel under this section. (Para 10)
       In the present case admittedly the appellant was inducted into tenancy by the predecessor of Respondent No. 1 in 1962 and he continued to pay rent to Respondent No. 1 since 1980. There is no case or any evidence that since thereafter Respondent No. 1 lost his title to the disputed premises. On the contrary denial of title in the present case is based on some information that Devasthanam is the owner of the property since inception. No. case, Devasthanam became owner of this property after 1962. In other words, the denial of title by the appellant against his landlord is from the very inception. This is forbidden under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. So both on law and facts we do not find the submissions for the appellant is sustainable. All the courts below rightly concluded that denial of title by the appellant was not bona fide and hence non payment of rent to him amounts to wilful default. (Para 11)
       (ii) Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 116-Estoppel of tenant-During continuance of tenancy tenant cannot deny title of his landlord at the beginning of tenancy-Principles of estoppel would not be applicable if subsequent to tenants induction landlord looses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title holder. (Para 10)
       (iii) Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Rent Control Courts jurisdiction to enquire into title of landlord-Scope and extent of. (Para 7)

Order

These appeals are directed against the order of the High Court of Madras dated 24.11.1997 in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 3476 of 1985 and 830 of 1997 dismissing these revisions. These appeals arise under the Tamil Nadu Buldings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 18 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The short facts are that the appellant is a tenant of the disputed premises, who was running an automobile workshop. The respondent filed the eviction petition against him, on the grounds that he is defaulter, not paid the rents from October, 1982 to May 1983, the said premises is required for demolition and reconstruction and that he has sub-let a portion of the disputed premises.

2. The appellant’s stand is that earlier he was under an impression that the respondent is the owner of the premises but later he came to know that Arulmigu Athikesava Perumal Peyalwar Devasthanam is the owner of the premises. So he wrote a letter to the said Devasthanam to recognise the appellant as a tenant. Since then and for this reason the appellant did not pay any rent to the respondent bona fide believing the Devasthanam to be the owner. The Rent Controller rejected this defence and held that the appellant committed default in the payment of rent, the premises in question is legitimately required by the respondent for demolition and reconstruction. However, the Rent Controller rejected the case of sub-letting, which for the present appeal is not in issue as it has become final. The appellant then filed an appeal. The Appellate Authority confirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller and held, there exists relation of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellant and the denial of title by the appellant is not bona fide and the default of payment of rent is wilful. Finally, the appellant filed civil revision before the High Court. The main contention raised before the High Court is also the same as raised before us that the courts below have failed to appreciate on the facts and circumstances of this case that denial of title by the appellant is bona fide and hence non-payment of rent cannot be held to be wilful. The appellant also relied on facts which came into existence, during the pendency of the said revision that in fact the said Devasthanam filed a suit on 30th October, 1987 against the appellant and others, claiming paramount title over the land including disputed one and also for eviction before the City Civil Court, Madras. Reliance is sought to be placed on the reply affidavit of the appellant in the said suit, where it is said he has admitted to be the tenant of the Devasthanam. On the other hand aforesaid revision of the appellant was dismissed for default by the High Court on 27th April, 1989. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for restoration. Meanwhile, the respondent filed execution petition before the Rent Controller. The appellant in this execution also referred to the suit of the Devasthanam, and submitted rent was rightly paid to the temple and not to this respondent thus this execution has become inexecutable. Respondent denied this claim on merit and further objected of this being considered in the execution proceedings. It was urged the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. Thus the executing court on 24th September, 1987 rejected the appellant’s contention. The appellant thereafter preferred Civil Revision Petition No. 830 of 1997, as aforesaid, before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

3. The application of the appellant for restoration of the revision was allowed. Finally, the High Court dismissed both the said revisions. In the restored revision High Court held, even if the entire property belong to the temple, but since at the initial stage through the arrangement with the respondent, the appellant was inducted into the tenancy, the appellant cannot deny his right and title. Consequently, held that non-pa

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1999 Supreme(SC) 915

Cases Referred (1)