IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Remedy to move for recalling the order passed by an Accident Claims Tribunal, on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed and no Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim.
2. Fraud and justice never dwell together.

Headnote:(i) MOTOR ACCIDENTS-Fake claim-Legal remedy when awards passed for a bulk sum-Awards became final-Neither owner of car nor Insurance Company filed any appeal-Subsequently, Insurance Company complaining of fraud having been practised on it as well as on court resulting in a decree-Remedy to move for recalling the order on basis of newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high decree-Held, no Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect very basis of the claim. (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -Sections 151, 152, 153).
       Held : It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. (Para 15)
       Therefore, the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degrees, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. (Para 16)
       (ii) MOTOR ACCIDENTS-Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Sections 151, 152, 153-Accident claims made by father and son-Their case that when they were riding a motorcycle, an Ambassador Car collided with the motorcycle and caused injuries to both of them-Tribunal finding driver of car negligent held the owner vicariously liable-Award of Rs. 3,55,000 to father and Rs. 1,52,000/- in favour of son with interest at the rate of 12% p.a.-Awards became final as no appeal filed by owner of car or by Insurance Company-Receipt of report prepared by Sub Inspector of Police, Delhi, filed after four months, disclosing new facts-Report disclosing that injuries were received by claimants when trailor tractor had slipped into the pit and not in car accident-Petitions filed by Insurance Company under Sections 151, 152, 153 CPC praying for recall of awards on revelation of new facts -Petitions dismissed by claims Tribunal as not maintainable-Writ petition for quashing awards-Whether rightly dismissed as not maintainable-(No)-In such cases of fraud, no Court or Tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order.
       Held : For a High Court in India to say that it has no power even to consider the contention that the awards secured are the by products of stark fraud played on a Tribunal, the plenary power conferred on the High Court by the Constitution may become a mirage and people s faith in the efficacy of the High Courts would corrode. We would have appreciated if the Tribunal or at least the High Court had considered the plea and found them unsustainable on merits, if they are meritless. But when the Courts pre-empted the Insurance Company by slamming the doors against them, this Court has to step in and salvage the situation. (Para 4)
       The Tribunal refused to open the door to the appellant Company as the High Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction which is almost plenary for which no statutory constrictions could possibly be imposed. If a party complaining of fraud having been practised on him as well as on the court by another party resulting in a decree, cannot avail himself of the remedy of review or even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, what else is the alternative remedy for him? Is he to surrender to the product of the fraud and thereby became a conduit to enrich the imposter unjustly? Learned Single Judge who indicated some other alternative remedy did not unfortunately spell out what is the other remedy which the appellant Insurance Company could pursue with. (Para 11)
       No one can possibly fault the Insurance Company for persistently pursuing the matter up to this court because they are dealing with public money. If they have discovered that such public fund, in a whopping measure, would be knocked off fraudulently through a fake claim, there is full justification for the Insurance Company in approaching the Tribunal itself first. At any rate the High Court ought not have refused to consider their grievances. What is the legal remedy when a party to a judgment or order of court later discovered that it was obtained by fraud? (Para 12)
       The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside without further probe into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice. (Para 17)
       (iii) Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227-Writ jurisdiction-Scope-Insurance company pleading that Motor Accident Claims Award secured by fraud played on the claims Tribunal-High Court ought not to have refused to consider the grievances-Dismissal of writ petitions as not maintainable, held, not justified -Jurisdiction of the High Court is almost plenary for which no statutory constrictions could possibly be imposed. (Paras 4 & 12)

JUDGMENT

Thomas, J.-Leave granted.

2. If what the appellant-Insurance Company now says is true, then a rank fraud had been played by two claimants and wangled two separate Awards from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for a bulk sum. But neither the Tribunal nor the High Court of Allahabad, before which the Insurance Company approached for annulling the awards, opened the door but expressed helplessness even to look into the matter and hence the Insurance Company has filed these appeals by Special leave.

3. "Fraud and justice never dwell together". (Frans at jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that "no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything" (Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley1).

4. For a High Court in India to say that it has no power even to consider the contention that the awards secured are the by products of stark fraud played on a Tribunal, the plenary power conferred on the High Court by the Constitution may become a mirage and people s faith in the efficacy of the High Courts would corrode. We would have appreciated if the Tribunal or at least the High Court had considered the plea and found them unsustainable on merits, if they are meritless. But when the Courts pre-empted the Insurance Company by slamming the doors against them, this Court has to step in and salvage the situation.

5. Facts are these: One Rajendra Singh and his son Sanjay Singh (first respondent in the respective appeals) filed two separate claim petitions before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bulandsahar (for short the Tribunal ) in 1994 praying for awarding compensation in respect of an accident which happened on 9.11.1993. The claimants put forth-identical averments regarding the accident which are in substance the following :

Rajendra Singh, the father was travelling on the pillion of a two wheeler motorcycle which was then ridden by his son Sanjay Singh and an Ambassador Car (DL 2C-9793) driven by Jai Prakash collided with the motorcycle of the claimants and caused injuries to both of them. The ambassador car was owned by the second respondent.

6. Rajendra Singh made a claim for more than Rs. 4 lacs and Sanjay Singh s claim was even above that (Rs. 5.5. lacs). As the ambassador car was, at the relevant time, covered by a policy of Insurance with the appellant Company, the claimants made the appellant Company also a party in the claim proceedings before the Tribunal. Though the owner of the Car as well as the Insurance Company resisted the claims on the premise that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Car, the Tribunal found the driver guilty of negligent driving. Hence, the owner was held vicariously liable for the damages payable to the injured claimants. Accordingly, two awards were passed on 15.1.1998, one in favour of Rajendra Singh in a sum of Rs. 3,55,000/- and the other in favour of Sanjay Singh in a sum of Rs. 1,52,000/-. Both the awards were to carry interest at the rate of 12% annum from the date of claim. An interim order was passed already for covering "no fault liability" and we are told that the amount towards that had been paid by the appellant Company.

7. The award became final as neither the owner of the ambassador car nor the Insurance Company filed any appeal thereon. Thus far, there was no problem for the awardees. Hardly four months elapsed after passing the awards, a gentleman visisted the Divisional Office of the appellant Company at Ghaziabad and delivered the photocopy of a report prepared by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Subzi Mandi, Police Station, Delhi on 9.11.1993 in which contained a narration that Sanjay Singh and Rajendra Singh received the injuries in a different circumstance at a different place altogether (i.e. while they were operating their own tractor

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2000 Supreme(SC) 563

Cases Referred (3)