2000(3) Supreme 413
Supreme Court of India
(From Bombay High Court)
B.N. Kirpal & R.P. Sethi, JJ.
Standard Chartered Bank & Anr. etc. —Appellants
versus
The Custodian & Anr. etc. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 762 of 1999
With
Civil Appeal No. 1878 of 1999
Decided on 18-4-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K.K. Venugopal, K.S. Cooper, V.A. Bobde, Sr. Advocates, Tushad Cooper, Mahesh Agrawal, Gurukrishnakumar, Manish Jha, Prasant Pakhade, S. Prasad, S. Ganesh, Manish Parekh, P.S. Sudheer, P. Venugopal, K.J. John, Shiraz Rustomjee, A. Subba Rao, Gaurav Joshi, Mahesh Agrawal, H.S. Chandok, P.S. Sudheer, Advocates.
Held : The contention of Dalal that the said shares were taken away from him forcibly is not correct. In the issues which were framed the onus of proof that the letter dated 11th May, 1992 had been executed under threat of physical terror and criminal prosecution was on Dalal. Hiten Dalal however chose not to enter the witness box in support of this plea. Not only did he not lead any evidence in order to prove coercion, the appellant bank on the other hand examined witnesses who clearly proved that Dalal had not only signed the letter dated 11th May, 1992 but he also signed other documents to which we will presently refer. As Dalal had failed to step into the witness box or lead any evidence on his behalf, the Special Court rightly drew an adverse inference against him. Even though the letter was prepared by the employees of the appellant Bank had been voluntarily and willingly signed by Hiten Dalal and the shares, securities etc. had been delivered by Dalal to the Appellant Bank. (Paras 21 & 22)
The Special Court, on the basis of the evidence before it, came to the conclusion that except for sum of Rs. 280.00 crores, the balance claim of the appellants stood "dis-proved". As we have already noticed, the suit was filed by the appellant bank because it had in its possession shares and securities which had been lodged by Dalal as a notified party with the appellant bank between 11th and 15th May, 1992. The appellants had been asked by the Custodian to establish its right to retain the said shares and securities and this is the reason why the suit was filed. Even though in the plaint, it was said, and that is noted in Ex. `G’ itself that the appellant bank had suffered a loss of Rs. 1253 crores for the purpose of establishing its right to retain and sell shares and securities worth Rs. 145 crores, it was not necessary for the appellant bank to have proved the extent of total loss which it had suffered. It was enough for the Bank to prove that it had paid money in excess of Rs. 145 crores and had not received shares or Bankers receipt in respect thereof. This would give the Bank right to retain the said shares as having been pledged to it. (Para 37)
Undoubtedly the Special Court had required the appellant bank to prove by independent evidence as to what was the extent of loss suffered by it. One of the issues between the appellant bank and the custodian, being Issue No. 2, was as to what was the extent of loss suffered by the Bank. The Special Court answered the issue by holding that the appellant bank had been able to prove that it had suffered a loss to the extent of Rs. 280.80 crores only. Having come to this conclusion it would have been more appropriate, in our opinion, for the Special Court to have observed that the appellant bank had failed to prove loss in excess of Rs. 280.80 crores rather than giving a finding that the loss in excess of Rs. 280.80 crores stands dis-proved. This loss which it had suffered was sufficient to enable it to retain and dispose off the shares to the extent of Rs. 145 crores which had been pledged with it. (Para 38)
The decision of the Special Court holding that the appellants had been able to prove loss to the extent of Rs. 280.80 crores is affirmed. Bonus shares, dividend and interest were accretions to the pledged stock and have to be regarded as forming part of the pledged property which could not be ordered to be handed over unless redemption takes place. We hold that the letter dated 11th May, 1992, addressed by Hiten P. Dalal to the appellants created a pledge in their favour not only of the shares and debentures worth Rs. 105 crores, particulars of which were given in the said letter, but also on the bonus shares, dividend and interest accrued on the said pledged shares and debentures. In reduction of Dalal’s liability to the appellants, they are entitled to sell the original shares, rights shares and the bonus shares and also to retain the dividend and interest accrued on the original shares. Cantriple Units referred to in the letter dated 11th May, 1992 representing transaction value of Rs. 205 crores shall be returned to the custodian and his retention would be subject to the out come of the other proceedings including Miscellaneous Application No. 36 of 1993 and the appellants and other parties would be entitled to try and establish their rival claims to the said units. The observations made by the Special Court with regard to the conduct of the appellants and their employees do not call for any interference. The award of costs by the Special Court for Rs. 30 lacs against Hiten P. Dalal is affirmed. (Para 63)
(ii) Indian Contract Act, 1872—Section 163—Bailment—Bailor’s right to accretions to pledged property—If pledge extends to accretions to pledged goods pledgee would not only have right to retain accretions but also have right to sell same along with original goods.
What Section 163 of the Contract Act really means is that accretions in respect of the goods bailed cannot be a property of the bailee but must be returned when the goods themselves bailed are returned. A necessary corollary to this would be that as the pledge extends to such accretions then when the pledged goods are returned these accretions must also be given back. But if the pledge extends to such natural increase of the pledged goods it must follow that the pledgee would not only have the right to retain the said accretions but also have the right to sell the same along with original shares pledged for the purposes of realising amounts due to it and in respect of which the shares were pledged as a security. (Para 50)
It is not possible to accept the contention of the custodian that as and when any accretion takes place the pawnee is under Section 163 liable to hand over the accretions to the pawnor. It is true that the words "upon redemption" as used in Section 63 and 64 of the Transfer of Property Act are not included in Section 163 of Contract Act but it is to be seen that if the accretion is to be regarded as forming part of the bailed property then such accretion must remain with the pawnee and be dealt with by him in the same manner as the pledged shares. In other words the accretions form an integral part of the attached shares as on the date of attachment, as held in T.B. Ruia’s case, and it follows that it would also be an integral part of the shares when they were pledged and would, therefore, constitute a part of the pledged security. The appellant bank would, therefore, be entitled to retain the same and deal with them as pledged stocks. The decision of the Special Court that the bonus shares, dividend and interest which had accrued on the pledged shares were not themselves the subject matter of the pledge and must, therefore, be handed over by the appellant bank to the custodian cannot be sustained. (Para 51)
JUDGMENT
Kirpal, J.—The Reserve Bank of India noticed large-scale irregularities and mal-practices in transactions in both the Government and other securities indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and financial institutions. The said irregularities and mal-practices had led to the diversion of fund from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers.
2. With a view to deal with this situation and in particular to ensure speedy recovery of
the huge amounts involved, the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to ‘transactions in securities’) Ordinance, 1992 was promulgated on 6th June, 1992. The said Ordinance has now been replaced by an Act known as Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Section 3 of the Act enables the Central Government to appoint one or more Custodian for the purposes of the Act. The Custodian has power under sub-section 2 of Section 3 to notify the name of any person in the official gazette, who has been involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities after the first day of April, 1991 and on/or before 6th June, 1992. The effect of a person being so notified was that according to sub-section 3 of Section 3, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force, any property, movable or immovable or both, belonging to any person notified under that sub-section stands attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification. The property so attached is to be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct.
3. The Special Court is established under Section 5 of the Act to be presided over by a sitting Judge of a High Court. The Special Court is to take cognizance of or to try such cases as are instituted before it or transferred to it. It is this Court which, under Section 9A, has the jurisdiction to exercise such power and authority which was exercisable before the commencement of the Act by a Civil Court in relation to any property standing attached under sub-section 3 of Section 3 or in relation to any matter or claim arising out of transactions in securities entered into after first day of April, 1991 and on/or before 6th day of June, 1992, in which a person notified under Section 3(2) is involved as a party, a broker, intermediary or in any other manner.
4. On 8th June, 1995, respondent No. 1 the Custodian, who had been appointed under the Act, notified Hiten P. Dalal (respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 762 of 1999 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1878 of 1999) under Section 3(2) of the said Act. The Custodian then got to know that some shares and securities, which belonged to respondent No. 2, were in the possession of the appellant bank. It also came to the knowledge of the Custodian that the appellant bank had got some of the shares transferred to its name. Correspondence was then exchanged between the Custodian and the appellant bank whereunder the appellant bank was called upon by the Custodian to either hand over the shares and securities to the Custodian or the bank should obtain an appropriate direction from the Court in case the appellant bank was claiming any title to the said shares
5. The demand of the Custodian requiring the appellant bank to hand over the said shares which it had obtained from the notified party led the appellant bank, which is incorporated under the laws of England and Wales and has its Head Office at 1, Aldermanbury Square, London, and the second appellant which is an existing company under the Companies Act, 1956 and is a wholly owned subsidiary of the 1st appellant, to file a suit No.1958 of 1993 in the Bombay High Court. On transfer to the Special Court, the suit was numbered as Suit No. 3 of 1994. On 29th June, 1994 the appellants withdrew suit No. 3 of 1994 with liberty to file a fresh suit. It is thereupon that
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