2000 Supreme(SC) 869

2000(3) Supreme 437
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
Sagayam -Appellant
versus
State of Karnataka -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 289 of 2000
Decided on 26-4-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : P.S. Narasimha, P. Sridhar, K.N. Jha, Bharati B.V.G. Pragasam, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Sanjay R. Hegde, Satya Mitra, Advocates.

Headnote:(i) Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987-Sections 3 and 5-Terrorists Act-What constitutes-Allegation that accused was recorded in police record as roudy element and 17 cases registered against him-Evidence of police that accused stored lethal weapons in his house and threathened business men, autoriskshaw drivers and others and forcibly snatched away money and valuable-Conviction by trial Court on basis of evidence of police and alleged confessional statement-Not justified-Mere storing of weapons such as cycle chain chopper would be sufficient to conclude Commission of offence under Section 3-Act done must be to overawe Government as by law established and to strike terror in poeple or any section of people-Offence under Section 3 not made out-Conviction set aside.

       Held : In order to constitute an act to be a terrorist act , the meaning assigned to that expression under Section 3(1) of the TADA has to be borne in mind and the expression "terrorist" has to be accordingly construed. Section 3 has come up for consideration before this Court on many occasions and the decisions rendered therein lay down that the person who does any act by using any of the substances enumerated in the aforesaid provision in any manner as specified therein cannot be said to commit a terrorist act unless the act is done with the intent to do :

        1. To overawe the Government as by law established; or

        2. To strike terror in the people or any section of the people; or

        3. To alienate any section of the people; or

        4. To adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people. (Para 3)

       In the instant case the evidence upon which the Designated Court relied is that the appellant in order to spread the fear psycohosis in the minds of the people stored lethal weapons in his house, besides committed the act of terror in the people or in the section of people by threatening many people like businessmen, autorikshaw drivers and others and forcibly snatched away money, valuables from them. In reaching this conclusion, the trial Court relied upon Exh. P-7 made to a Police Officer. If the allegation made against the appellant does not establish any of the acts under Section 3(1) of the Act to which we have adverted to above and all the acts attributed to him should have been done with the intent to cause any of the above four acts; that such requirement would be satisfied only if the dominant intention of the doer is to cause the aforesaid effect. It is not enough that the act resulted in any of the four consequences. The legal position is that whether the act was done to overawe the Government as by law established and to strike terror in people or any section of the people, etc. If we examine the statements made by the witnesses who are Police Officers in this light it is clear that it is only to the effect of recovering certain arms or materials which can be used as lethal weapons and vague allegations of extortion or robbery. Though statements have been made that the appellant used to extract money from public by wielding a knife so as to threaten people and is involved in many cases of other illegal activities by itself would not lead to the conclusion that he has committed acts arising under Section 3 of the Act. Mere storing of certain weapons such as cycle chain, chopper would not also lead to the conclusion that the accused had committed these offences. (Para 4)

       The confessional statement which is marked as Exh. P-7 indicates that he used to go to Mines and used to commit theft of gold and iron articles and he used to terrorise people with the help of his group of friends and used to forcibly collect money, gold jewels etc. from the passers by and also from the businessmen; that he used to give threat to life along with his friends Janson, Raja Harry Aseer and his brother Thangam; that he also admitted that he used to store lethal weapons in his house such as Katti (knife or sword), cycle chains which were used to get money and he used to get the weapons by threatening the workshop owners and used to collect cycle chains; that whenever any complaint was made against him, he used to destroy the property of the complainant and he used to harm the witnesses who would give evidence against him; that there are many cases against him and others in Andersonpet, Robertsonpet, Marikuppam and Championreefs Police Stations. Taking this entire statement as a whole, the acts attributed to the appellant do not amount to any terrorist activity answering the test to which we have adverted to earlier. Therefore, the charge framed against him under the TADA Act falls to the ground much less could the Designated Court have relied upon the so called confessional statement recorded in terms of Section 15 of the TADA Act to come to such a conclusion. (Para 5)

       (ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 307-Attempt to murder-PW2 ASI went to search house of accused-Accused allegedly tried to assault and tried to pierce with sword but PW2 escaped and caught hold of him-Accused allegedly threatened that he would kill PW2-Overt act attributed to him would not amount to attempt to murder-It can be one of attempt to assault-Possibly accused confronted PW2-That itself would not result in concluding attempt to murder-Conviction rendered by trial Court set aside.

       To justify conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act fore boding death. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof, such act being proximate to the crime intended and if the attempt has gone so far that it would have been complete but for the extaneous intervention which frustrated its consummation. There are different stages in a crime. First intention to commit it; second preparation to commit it; third, an attempt to commit it. If at the third stage, the attempt falls, the crime is not complete but law punishes for attempting the same. An attempt to commit crime must be distinguished from an intent to commit it or preparation of its commission. (Para 6)

       In the instant case, ASI, PW2 was deputed to search the house of the appellant along with two other members of his staff. When he went to the house of the appellant along with the other officers, the accused tried to assault them. He somehow escaped from the assault. Again accused is said to have tried to pierce with a sword but he escaped that assault and caught hold of him but then he threatened that he would kill. This is all the evidence that have been given by the ASI which would only mean that there was only a threat to assault the said Rajanna but the overt acts attributed to him would not amount to attempt to murder, at best it can be one of attempt to assault but there is not even an injury upon the victim. A charge of this nature when there is not even an injury upon the victim cannot lead to an inference that there was any attempt to kill when the incident took place. It is possible that the accused confronted the ASI Rajanna but that by itself would not result in coming to the conclusion that it was an attempt to murder him. (Paras 7 and 8)