IMPORTANT POINT
Under Section 19(1)(a) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, a destitute widowed daughter has a right for maintenance against her father during his life time, which is a right not only against her father personally but against the property he may be holding and as such any property given to her in lieu of such a right would be her absolute property under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

Headnote:(i) Indian Succession Act, 1925-Section 88-Inconsistent clauses in Will-Construction of Will, in case of-Clause in Will describing widowed daughter to be owner of residue 1/3 share of property-Subsequent clause describing brother of testator shall be heirs of property on death of widowed daughter-Later clause describing widowed daughter s right as life interest-Later part/clause of Will would operate-Will conferred only life interest on widowed daughter. (Paras 7 to 10)
       (ii) Hindu Succession Act, 1956-Section 14 read with Section 8-Property of females Hindu-Father bequeathing life interest in self acquired property to widowed daughter with remainder interest to his brothers-Claim of daughter she became absolute owner by virtue of Section 14(1)-Plea that she had pre-existing legal right to inherit estate under Section 8-Untenable-She had a spes successionis and not a pre-existing legal right-Section 14(1) not applicable. (Para 10)
       (iii) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -Section 14(1) read with Hindu Adoption Maintenance Act, 1956-Sections 19, 21(iv) and 22(2)-Property of female Hindu-Acquisition of absolute ownership-Father bequeathing 1/3 of his self acquired property to widowed daughter-Life interest alone given leaving remainder right to his brothers-Claim of widowed daughter that she acquired absolute right over property under Will-Whether sustainable?-Held, Yes-Daughter, a destitute widow under Section 22 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act got legal right of being maintained out of estate of deceased father-Under Section 19 she got right for maintenance against her father personally and also against property-Widowed daughter had pre-existing right of being maintained from estate of death of testator, her father-Any property given in lieu of right to maintenance against her father would fall under Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act-Widowed daughter became absolute owner of 1/3 property given to her under Will of her father.
       As per Section 21(vi) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, if the deceased has left behind him his widowed daughter then provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband s estate, or from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate; or from her father-in-law or his father or the estate of either of them, then such widowed daughter is to be treated as a "dependant" of the deceased. As enjoined by Section 22, she gets the legal right of being maintained out of the estate inherited by any of the heirs of her deceased father. Thus the right of being maintained out of the estate of the deceased father would inhere in appellant No. 1, his widowed daughter and would get attached to the entire suit property if it goes in the hands of testator s other testamentary heirs. It is not in dispute between the parties that she was a destitute widowed daughter. That she had no issues. As the recitals in the will clearly indicate, the testator was worried about her maintenance and that is why even enjoined his brothers-other legatees under the Will, to look after his daughter, after his death. It is also not the case of the respondents /plaintiffs that appellant No. 1 - widowed daughter of the deceased, had any estate of her deceased husband or her father-in-law to fall back upon for claiming dependency benefit. If that was so, she would not have been maintained by her father in his lifetime. She, admittedly, was staying with him. Therefore, it has to be held that appellant No. 1 was a destitute widowed daughter of the testator who had his estate as the only source for getting maintenance and dependency benefits. That statutory right inhered in her even during the life time of her father, as clearly indicated by the Will itself. (Para 13)
       Section 22(2) of HAM Act clearly indicates that once a person is found to be "dependent" of the deceased, then such a "dependent" has a pre-existing right qua the estate of the deceased to get maintenance and that right, if not crystallised by way of grant of definite share in the estate of the deceased either on his intestacy or on the coming into operation of his testament in favour of the dependent, then such pre-existing right of maintenance would remain operative even after the death of the Hindu and would get attached to the estate which may get transmitted to his heirs either on his intestacy or on account of the testamentary disposition in their favour. Thus, Section 22 sub-section 2 underscores pre-existing right of maintenance in favour of the "dependent" qua the estate of the Hindu. (Para 14)
       Under the proviso to Section 19(1), the words used are "(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother" and they mean that she has a right - apart from the right she has against the estate of her husband - a personal right against her father or mother during their respective lives. The words the estate of before the words her husband are not to be read into the latter part of the clause as estate of her father or mother . What the proviso does here is to create (i) a right against the estate of her husband and also (ii) an independent and personal right against the father during his lifetime (or against the mother) if the daughter is unable to maintain herself out of her earnings or other property etc. That right against the father during his lifetime can be enforced against the property he is holding. The legislature has deliberately not used the words estate of her father in the proviso (a) to section 19(1). That right of the widowed daughter is covered under Section 21(vi) read with Section 22(2). We have already referred to that right of maintenance against the estate of her father in Section 22(2) read with Section 21(vi). If indeed we read with words estate of before the words father in Section 19(1)(a), then Section 22(2) read with section 21(vi) would become otiose. That is why we say that the provision (a) to Section 19(1) creates a personal right in favour of the widowed daughter against her father during his lifetime. Any property given in lieu thereof, during his life time or to go to her after the father s life time would certainly fall under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, that being in lieu of a pre-existing right during the father s lifetime. (Para 17)
       On the facts of the present case, therefore, it has to be held that appellant No. 1, who was a destitute widowed daughter of the testator and who was staying with him and was being maintained by him in his lifetime, had nothing to fall back upon so far as her deceased husbands estate was concerned and she had no estate of her own. Consequently, as per Section 19(1)(a) she could claim maintenance from the estate of her father even during her father s lifetime. This was a pre-existing right of the widowed daughter qua testator s estate in his own lifetime and this right which was tried to be crystallised in the will in her favour after his demise fell squarely within the provisions of Section 22(2) of the Maintenance Act. Thus, on a conjoint operation of Sections 19(1)(a) and 22(2) read with Section 21(vi) there is no escape from the conclusion that appellant No. 1 had a pre-existing right of being maintained from the estate of the testator during the testator s lifetime and also had got a subsisting right of maintenance from the said estate even after the testator s death when the estate would pass in favour of his testamentary heirs and the same situation would have occurred even if the testator had died intestate and if appellant No. 1 could have become a Class-I heir. As we have already seen earlier, if the testator had died intestate, instead of 1/3rd interest she would have got full interest, in the suit land and it is that interest which was curtailed up to 1/3rd in lieu of her claim for maintenance against the estate of the testator pursuant to the will in question. It, therefore, cannot be said that the provision in the will in her favour was not in lieu of a pre-existing right and was conferred only for the first time under the will so as to attract Section 14(2) of the Succession Act as, with respect, wrongly assumed by the High Court. (Para 19)
       The testator in his wisdom, with a view to ensure future claim of maintenance of appellant No. 1 against his estate, carved out the residuary 1/3rd part thereof for being handed over to appellant No. 1 on his demise. But for that provision his entire estate would have remained liable to meet the claim of future maintenance of appellant No. 1 from that estate and could have been enforced against any of the heirs of deceased testator who might have succeeded to his estate as testamentary heirs on the testamentary succession getting opened in their favour. The testator wanted to free his other testamentary heirs from this pre-existing liability attached to his estate. He, therefore, carved out a parcel of his estate for enjoyment of his destitute widowed daughter, though of course as life interest which Section 14(1) of the Act made a full estate on the demise of the testator. It is in the light of this pre-existing statutory right of appellant No. 1 for maintenance against the estate of the testator that the provision in the will, granting 1/3rd residuary life interest to appellant No. 1, has to be appreciated. Once this legal right of appellant No. 1 is visualised, it would obviously be the pre-existing right of maintenance in her favour qua the estate of the testator and it is this right which, though circumscribed as life interest in the will, would get matured into full ownership in her favour under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act, on the coming into operation of the will. That would precisely attract Section 14(1) of the Succession Act and would take the case out of the exceptional provision of Section 14(2). (Para 20)

JUDGMENT

S.B. Majmudar, J.-The appellants in this appeal, who are original defendant Nos. 1 & 2 in civil suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein have brought in challenge, on grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of the High Court decreeing the respondents /plaintiff s suit. This appeal raised a short question as to whether appellant No. 1-original defendant No. 1, who is the widowed destitute daughter to testator-Sham Singh, had acquired full ownership of 1/3rd interest in the suit land pursuant to the will of her father dated 21st August, 1959 or whether she had only a life interest therein, which did not mature into full ownership in her favour under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Succession Act ). The Trial Court, in the suit filed by the respondents /plaintiffs , took the view that appellant No. 1 had only a life interest which she could not bequeath in favour of defendant No. 2 and, accordingly, granted a declaratory decree in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned District Judge, as a Court of first appeal, took a contrary view and dismissed the suit by holding that appellant No. 1 had acquired full ownership of the suit property, up to her 1/3rd full interest in the suit land and she did not acquire only life interest therein pursuant to the will of the deceased.

2. As noted earlier, in the second appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court took a contrary view against the appellants and restored the decree of declaration granted by the Trial Court.

3. In support of this appeal learned senior counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that, on the facts of the present case, the right which accrued to appellant No. 1 under the will of her father as full owner of the property was well sustained under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act and that the High Court was in error in applying Section 14(2) of the said Act. He tried to support his contention on the ground that appellant No. 1, being widowed daughter of the testator, had a pre-existing legal right to succeed to the entire estate of the deceased under Section 8 of the Succession Act, if the testator had died intestate. It is this right of her s which was confirmed to the extent of 1/3rd by the will in question and, therefore, Section 14(1) of the Succession Act squarely got attracted to the facts of the present case and consequently the suit was liable to be dismissed.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent s/plaintiffs contended that the High Court had rightly applied Section 14(2) of the Succession Act for decreeing the suit. That as per the will of the testator only life interest was made available to appellant No. 1. That she had no pre-existing right in the estate of her father who, admittedly, was the sole owner of his property; that he could have gifted or willed away the property to anyone he liked. Consequently, if the testator conferred a limited interest to appellant No. 1 in his property as per his will, the said legacy was squarely covered by Section 14(2) of the Succession Act as held by the High Court and consequently the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

5. Before considering the aforesaid short question involved in this appeal for our consideration, it is necessary to keep in view certain admitted and well established facts on record.

Factual background :

6. One Sham Singh was the sole owner of land in dispute measuring 47 Kanals situated in village Dolharon, Tehsil Garhshankar of Hoshiarpur District of the State of Punjab. Appellant No. 1 is his widowed daughter and was dependent on him for her maintenance and support. He had no other issue. The said Sham Singh executed a will dated 21st August, 1959 in favour of his daughter-appellant No. 1 on whom he conferred life interest to the extent of residue 1/3rd of the suit land which, according to the will on her death had to re

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2000 Supreme(SC) 804

Cases Referred (1)